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Despite near consensus agreement about the importance of increasing the presence of teachers of
color in schools, there is limited research on how public policy can solve this problem. Drawing
on federal and one university’s teacher education data, this dissertation addresses whether a
Minority Teacher Scholarship (MTS) can alter the labor supply of teachers of color. The first
essay evaluates whether five states implementing MTS programs increase the proportion of
candidates of color earning teacher education bachelor’s degrees. Using event study and
difference-in-differences frameworks, I find that implementing states stabilized the share of
Black candidates relative to non-implementing states, a result driven by changes in private
institutions and states with the greatest financial value awards. In the second essay, I estimate
whether teacher candidates of color in the same program are more likely to complete a degree if
receiving MTS aid. Using linear probability and propensity score matching models, I find MTS
receipt associated positively with bachelor’s and master’s degree completion for individuals who
were observably similar on individual characteristics. The third essay investigates whether
teacher candidates of color in the same program university respond MTS awards differentially in
the labor market. Using linear probability and discrete-time survival analysis models, I find that
MTS receipt associated positively with public school teaching employment within two years of
graduation, and negatively with exiting teaching in a public school for individuals of color from
the same program. The three studies provide suggestive evidence that MTS programs benefit
individuals and the largest group of people of color in states implementing MTS programs.

Repairing the Teacher Pipeline for People of Color: Three Essays on Minority Teacher
Scholarships

Jeremy B. Landa
B.A., Wayne State University, 2003
Ed.M., Harvard University, 2009
M.A. University of Connecticut, 2017

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the
University of Connecticut
2020

ii

Copyright by
Jeremy Benjamin Landa
2020

iii
Approval Page

Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation
Repairing the Teacher Pipeline for People of Color: Three Essays on Minority Teacher
Scholarships
Presented by Jeremy B. Landa, B.A, Ed.M., M.A.

Dissertation Chair and Advisor_____________________________________________________
Morgaen L. Donaldson, Ed.D.

Dissertation Committee __________________________________________________________
Shaun M. Dougherty, Ed.D.

Dissertation Committee __________________________________________________________
Eric J. Brunner, Ph.D.

Dissertation Committee __________________________________________________________
Ann Traynor, Ed.D.

Dissertation Committee __________________________________________________________
H. Kenny Nienhusser, Ed.D.

University of Connecticut
2020

iv
Dedication
For Shari, who made this possible. For Oscar and George, who kept me grounded while
completing work that is ostensibly maddening. For my family, near and far, whose shoulders I
stood on to achieve this feat. And for Elise. As the first-born, I thought you deserved to be the
first doctor in our immediate family.

v
Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my committee whose efforts are the reason I produced a dissertation. To Morgaen
Donaldson, who made me a better writer, thinker, and was always willing to provide feedback
and guidance despite her busy schedule. To Shaun Dougherty, whose mentorship and investment
in my career has persisted through his own job transition. To Eric Brunner, who responded with
patience and support to numerous stream of consciousness methodological questions. To Ann
Traynor, who has been an eager broker of data access and provider of practitioner insight for this
work. And to Kenny Nienhusser, whose detailed and organized feedback and orientation to
criticality has always made me pause and think.
Thanks to my colleagues—in particular to Monique Golden, who helped me survive the first
three years of classes, and Daron Cyr, who became a regular thought partner and a provider of
feedback on my dissertation writings. Thanks to Sam Kamin, whose presence ensured that I know
something about statistics and can use Stata fluently. Thanks to Michael Correl, Chelsea
Connery, Alex Lamb, Shannon Holder, Britney Jones, Patricia Virella, and Dave Alexandro
whose feedback, cheerleading, and camaraderie sustained me when the requirements felt
overwhelming.
And to Shari, who took on the bulk of the childcare during the pandemic so that I could reach the
finish line in this doctoral journey. I can’t imagine having done any of this without you, and
cannot wait for what the future holds.

vi
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... v
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ vi
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................... ix
List of Figures .................................................................................................................................. x
Chapter 1 Repairing the Teacher Pipeline for People of Color: Evidence from States Adopting
Minority Teacher Scholarships ........................................................................................................ 1
Background ................................................................................................................................... 4
The Dysfunctional Teacher Pipeline for Individuals of Color .................................................. 5
Preparation Pathways ............................................................................................................ 6
State Scholarships, Public Service, and Teacher Scholarships ................................................. 7
States’ Approaches to Scholarships ...................................................................................... 7
State Merit Scholarships. ................................................................................................... 7
State Financial Need Scholarships..................................................................................... 8
Public Service and Scholarships............................................................................................ 9
The Outcomes of Teaching Scholarships ............................................................................ 10
Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................................... 11
Methods ....................................................................................................................................... 12
Program Description and Context ........................................................................................... 13
Type ..................................................................................................................................... 17
Eligibility Criteria................................................................................................................ 17
Generosity ........................................................................................................................... 19
Data Source ............................................................................................................................. 19
Summary Statistics .................................................................................................................. 20
Outcomes................................................................................................................................. 29
Controls ................................................................................................................................... 29
Empirical Strategy ................................................................................................................... 32
Results ......................................................................................................................................... 34
Event Study ............................................................................................................................. 35
Difference-in-Differences Estimates ....................................................................................... 38
Tests of Robustness ................................................................................................................. 42
Heterogeneous Effects ............................................................................................................ 46
Greatest Financial Value Scholarships ................................................................................ 46
Private Higher Education Institutions ................................................................................. 50
Placebo Test ............................................................................................................................ 53
Discussion and Implications ........................................................................................................ 57
Limitations .............................................................................................................................. 58
Financial Incentives are not Large Enough ............................................................................. 59
Programs are not Scaled Properly ........................................................................................... 60
Programs are Substitutes of State Level Financial Aid Based on Merit or Need ................... 61
Programs are Adopted in States with Specific Racial-Ethnic Structures ................................ 62
Implications ............................................................................................................................. 63
References ................................................................................................................................... 66
Appendix 1-A. Procedures for Identifying “Minority Teacher Scholarship” Program States ... 71

vii
Appendix 1-B. Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) Code selection for Teachers and
Nursing ........................................................................................................................................ 72
Chapter 2 Do Minority Teacher Scholarships Lessen Leaks in the Teacher Pipeline? Evidence
Flagship University’s Traditional Teacher Education Program ..................................................... 74
Background ................................................................................................................................. 76
Teachers of Color Matter for Schooling ................................................................................. 78
Entry into the Teacher Pipeline for Individuals of Color ........................................................ 79
The Challenges of Unobserved Selection for Identifying Causal Impacts ............................. 81
Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................................... 83
Methods ....................................................................................................................................... 84
Program Description ............................................................................................................... 84
University Context .................................................................................................................. 85
Data ......................................................................................................................................... 86
Measures ................................................................................................................................. 86
Outcomes ............................................................................................................................. 86
Independent Variables ......................................................................................................... 87
Summary Statistics .................................................................................................................. 88
Empirical Strategy ................................................................................................................... 92
Coefficient Stability ............................................................................................................ 92
Propensity Score Matching ................................................................................................. 93
Alternative Matching Strategies .......................................................................................... 95
Findings ....................................................................................................................................... 95
OLS Estimates ......................................................................................................................... 96
Propensity Score Matching Estimates ..................................................................................... 99
Sensitivity Analysis ............................................................................................................... 100
Remove GPA Cut-Off Years ............................................................................................. 100
Tests of Differential Associations ......................................................................................... 102
Differential Results by Cohort .......................................................................................... 102
Differential Results by Pre-Teaching Major or Financial Aid Based on Need ................. 104
Discussion and Implications ...................................................................................................... 106
Limitations ............................................................................................................................ 107
Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 108
Implications ........................................................................................................................... 109
References ................................................................................................................................. 113
Appendix 2-A. Procedures for identifying “Minority Teacher Scholarship” Program States .. 118
Appendix 2-B. Common Support and Covariate Balance ........................................................ 119
Chapter 3 Minority Teacher Scholarships and Employment: A Case Study of Labor Market
Outcomes from Flagship University’s Traditional Teacher Education Program ......................... 122
Background ............................................................................................................................... 124
Financial Aid Incentives for Teaching Service ..................................................................... 126
Differential Access to Teacher Labor Markets by Race/Ethnicity ....................................... 128
Employment ...................................................................................................................... 129

viii
Turnover ............................................................................................................................ 130
Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................................. 132
Research Questions ................................................................................................................... 133
Methods ..................................................................................................................................... 133
Program Description ............................................................................................................. 133
University Context ............................................................................................................ 135
Data Sources and Sample ...................................................................................................... 136
Outcomes............................................................................................................................... 136
Employment ...................................................................................................................... 137
Exit .................................................................................................................................... 137
Educators or Students of Color ......................................................................................... 137
Predictors............................................................................................................................... 138
Predictor of Interest ........................................................................................................... 138
Covariates .......................................................................................................................... 138
Empirical Strategy ................................................................................................................. 140
Employment ...................................................................................................................... 140
Exit .................................................................................................................................... 141
Students or Educators of Color ......................................................................................... 141
Findings ..................................................................................................................................... 143
Summary Statistics ................................................................................................................ 143
Inferential Statistics ............................................................................................................... 147
Employment ...................................................................................................................... 147
Exit .................................................................................................................................... 149
Discrete Time Survival Analysis Models ............................................................................. 149
Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves .......................................................................................... 151
Racial and Ethnic Match in Schools and MTS Status ........................................................... 153
Students of Color ............................................................................................................... 153
Educators of Color............................................................................................................. 157
Limitations, Discussion, and Implications ................................................................................ 160
References ................................................................................................................................. 166
Appendix A ............................................................................................................................... 172

ix
List of Tables
Study 1
Table 1-1. Description of Minority Teacher Scholarships (MTS) 14
Table 1-1 (Continued). Description of Minority Teacher Scholarships (MTS) ............................. 15
Table 1-2. Proportion of Teacher Education Bachelor's Degrees Conferred by Race/Ethnicity ... 24
Table 1-3. Outcomes and Covariates in Baseline Year of Data (1994-1995) ................................ 28
Table 1-4. Definitions of Variables ................................................................................................ 31
Table 1-5. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of MTS Program Implementation ...................... 40
Table 1-6. Tests of Robustness for Difference-in-Differences Estimates of MTS Program
Implementation and the Proportion of Black Teacher Candidates ................................................. 45
Table 1-7. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of MTS Programs Association with the
Proportion of Black Teacher Candidates........................................................................................ 49
Table 1-8. Triple-Difference Estimates of MTS Programs Association with the Proportion of
Black Teacher Candidates .............................................................................................................. 52
Table 1-9. Placebo Test for Difference-in-Differences Estimates of MTS Programs Association
with the Proportion of Black Teacher or Nursing Candidates ....................................................... 57
Study 2
Table 2-1. Definitions of Variables for Study of MTS recipients .................................................. 88
Table 2-2. Outcomes and Predictors by MTS Recipient Status ..................................................... 91
Table 2-3. Linear Probability Models of MTS Relationship to Degree Attainment ...................... 98
Table 2- 4. OLS and Propensity Score Matching Estimates of the Relationship Between MTS
Award on Recipients’ Degree Attainment ................................................................................... 100
Table 2-5. Propensity Score Matching of MTS Award on Recipients Master's Degree Attainment
without GPA Selection Cut-off Years .......................................................................................... 102
Table 2-6. Differential Test of the Relationship Between MTS Receipt and Degree Attainment by
Cohort ........................................................................................................................................... 104
Table 2-7. Differential Tests for Receiving Financial Aid Based on Need or Pre-Teaching Major
by MTS ......................................................................................................................................... 106
Table 2-B.1. Propensity Score Balancing of Covariates after matching for Estimating the
Relationship Between MTS receipt and Degree Attainment ....................................................... 121
Study 3
Table 3-1. Hypothesis of the role of Minority Teacher Scholarships in Observed Employment or
Exit Activities from the Public Schools ....................................................................................... 126
Table 3-2. Outcomes for Teacher Candidates of Color at a Flagship University in a state with an
MTS Program ............................................................................................................................... 146
Table 3-3. Independent Variables for Teacher Candidates of Color at a Flagship University in a
state with an MTS Program .......................................................................................................... 146
Table 3-4. Association Between MTS and Employment within 2 years of Graduation .............. 149
Table 3-5. Discrete Time Survival Analysis of the Association Between MTS and Exit from the
Profession ..................................................................................................................................... 151
Table 3-6. OLS Regression to Estimate the Association Between Students of Color and MTS
Receipt .......................................................................................................................................... 155
Table 3-7. OLS Regression to Estimate the Association Between Licensed Educators of Color
and MTS Receipt .......................................................................................................................... 158
Table A.1. State Level Financial Incentives for Pre- and In-service Teachers ............................ 172
Table A.2. Definitions of Variables for Study of Employment Outcomes for MTS recipients ... 174

x
List of Figures
Study 1
Figure 1-1. States implementing MTS scholarships ...................................................................... 13
Figure 1-2. Total teacher candidates who completed bachelor’s degrees by year ......................... 21
Figure 1-3. Total (a) teacher candidates of color, (b) Black, non-Hispanic candidates, (c) Hispanic
candidates, and (d) Asian, Native American, Pacific Islander, or multi-race candidates who
completed bachelor’s degrees by year ............................................................................................ 22
Figure 1-4. Proportion of (a) teacher candidates of color, (b) Black, non-Hispanic candidates, (c)
Hispanic candidates, and (d) Asian, Native American, Pacific Islander, or multi-race candidates
who completed bachelor’s degrees by whether the state ever implemented an MTS program ..... 26
Figure 1-5. Event study measuring the proportion of (a) teacher candidates of color, (b) Black,
non-Hispanic candidates, (c) Hispanic candidates, and (d) Asian, Native American, Pacific
Islander, or multi-race candidates who completed bachelor’s degrees before and after MTS
implementation ............................................................................................................................... 37
Figure 1-6. Event study for the proportion of Black, non-Hispanic candidates who completed
bachelor’s degrees in (a) the states with the larger financial value scholarships, and (b) states with
smaller financial value scholarship in states implementing an MTS ............................................. 48
Figure 1-7. Event study showing the difference between public and private schooling institutions
by the proportion of Black, non-Hispanic candidates who completed bachelor’s degrees in states
with MTS programs........................................................................................................................ 51
Figure 1-8. Event study showing the proportion of Black, non-Hispanic candidates who
completed (a) teacher education or (b) nursing bachelor’s degrees in states implementing MTS
programs ......................................................................................................................................... 55
Study 2
Figure 2-B.1. Comparison of Unmatched and Matched Kernel Density Histograms
119
Study 3
Figure 3-1. Kaplan-Meier survival curves for exit by MTS status from the public schools from
year 1 to year 12 for all master’s degree earning teacher education majors who are individuals of
color from the same university’s teacher education program ...................................................... 152

1
Chapter 1 Repairing the Teacher Pipeline for People of Color: Evidence from States
Adopting Minority Teacher Scholarships
Over the last 35 years, each state in the U.S. has become more racially and ethnically
diverse (Lee et al., 2017). The racial and ethnic population changes are mirrored by changes
within the public schools. The National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data
shows that across the 50 states and DC, 10,247 local education agencies served an average of
16.9% more students of color in 2018 than in 1988.1 Despite large shifts in students’ racial and
ethnic characteristics, the number of teachers of color increased across the country only 8% over
a similar time frame (U.S. Department of Education, 2016). This suggests, and research
confirms, that the system is inequitably designed resulting in differential recruitment into and
retention within the teacher pipeline by race and ethnicity of individuals (Lindsay et al., 2017).
Governments play a major role in solving the underrepresentation of teachers of color in
public schools. State governments regulate which programs become teacher preparation
providers and the credentials necessary for individuals to become teachers from within different
pathways. They determine how much postsecondary education costs through in-state tuition
subsidies (Long & Riley, 2007), and teachers are very likely to attend an in-state school since
distance from home high school and university to first employing school are correlated (Boyd et
al., 2005). And yet, public policies from state governments are largely lacking when it comes to
solving the underrepresentation of teachers of color in public education.

1

To calculate this information, I accessed student race and ethnicity data in the CCD from 1988-1989 to 2018-2019
school years. I calculated the difference in proportions of students of color by dividing any students who was a race
or ethnicity other than white and dividing that by the total number of students in a district. This is a rough
calculation because local education agency definitions shift from state-to-state.
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One promising state level public policy to increase the number of teachers of color is a
Minority Teacher Scholarship (MTS). When a student of color applies for and receives MTS
financial aid, the program reduces tuition by a nontrivial amount for teacher candidates of color
already enrolled in undergraduate teacher education programs. Since 1988, this extrinsic
incentive has been implemented in 11 states costing the government over $120 million (Bachler
& Hill, 2003; Carver-Thomas, 2018; Dilworth & Coleman, 2014; Villegas et al., 2012). Yet,
there is scarce evaluation of whether these public policies benefit states by increasing the
proportion of teacher candidates of color who complete bachelor’s degrees, which predicts future
teaching employment regardless of race (Redding & Baker, 2019; Rucinski & Goodman, 2019).
In this study, I take the first steps toward describing whether states adopting MTS
programs experience gains in the number of individuals of color majoring in teacher education
and earning bachelor’s degrees. To make plausibly causal inferences, I employ difference-indifferences and event study approaches to estimate the impact of the presence of an MTS
program on the proportion of individuals of color who majored in teacher education and earned a
bachelor’s degree. I do this by identifying variation in whether and when a state implemented an
MTS program to compare states with and without MTS programs.
The total population of bachelor’s degree earning teacher candidates of color increased
from 1994-1995 to 2016-2017 even though the total population of teacher education bachelor’s
degrees declined over the same time. Using difference-in-differences and event study models, I
find no evidence that states implementing MTS programs experienced greater gains in the
proportion of candidates of color who earned teacher education bachelor’s degrees. However,
when I restrict my sample to Black teacher candidates earning bachelor’s degrees, I find
suggestive evidence that states with MTS programs slow declines in the number of Black
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candidates earning teacher education bachelor’s degrees more than states without MTS
programs. These differences appear prominently in private postsecondary institutions and the
effects are pronounced in states with scholarships covering more tuition and fees over four years.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides the first
nationwide evidence on how MTS programs’ impact on the composition of teacher education
bachelor’s degree completing teacher candidates of color. As federal policies have centered the
importance of recruiting and retaining teachers from underrepresented minority groups (Every
Student Succeeds Act, 2015), it is important that public policies focused on reducing racial and
ethnic diversity are successful. I speculate in the discussion about why the results were null.
A secondary contribution of this study is that this research positions state policymakers
(e.g., state politicians, or K-12 or higher education state educational agency employees) as
central actors to counter financial barriers to teaching for people of color. This is a critical
strategy because states are the rule-makers and they can choose to offer financial aid, add
regulations for teacher education providers to understand the outcomes of individuals of color in
a program, or eliminate or relax the regulations requiring each licensed teacher to pass a teacher
licensure test. Ultimately, financial aid in the form of tuition reductions may reduce leaks from
the teacher pipeline for this reason. However, there are still many other barriers to becoming an
employed teacher including overt and covert employment discrimination (Drake et al., 2019;
Tillman, 2004), biased teacher licensure tests (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010; Nettles et al., 2011),
and normalized whiteness within teacher preparation programs that dims the educational
experiences of people of color hoping to become teachers (Berry et al., 2020; Sleeter, 2017).
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Background
When more individuals participate in postsecondary education, they are more likely to
contribute in democratic processes (e.g., voting, broader awareness and openness to diversity;
Dee, 2004b) and foster healthy infants (Currie & Moretti, 2003), and less likely to engage in
criminal behavior (Lochner & Moretti, 2004). Given that education provides important returns to
societies, and tangential evidence shows that the presence of teachers of color in schools
provides meaningful instructional and emotional support for students of color (Bristol & MartinFernandez, 2019; Dee, 2004a; Egalite et al., 2015; Gershenson et al., 2018; Holt & Gershenson,
2015; Lindsay & Hart, 2017; Redding, 2019), states’ may adopt public policies that address
recruitment and retention of candidates of color in postsecondary teacher training.
A key problem, but not the only problem, that public policymakers should aim to solve is
disparate rates of degree completion for teacher education majors by race and ethnicity. Indeed,
prior research finds that white education majors are approximately 30 percentage points more
likely to complete bachelor’s degrees than Black or Hispanic education majors (U.S. Department
of Education, 2016). One reason that Black or Hispanic enrolled teacher education majors may
be unable to complete their degrees is related to financing a post-secondary education. In fact,
some research finds that merit scholarships are a mechanism supporting individuals of color
seeking and completing bachelor’s rather than associate’s degrees (Dynarski, 2008). This
suggests that public policymakers may be able to reduce disparate rates of teacher education
degree attainment by race or ethnicity with teacher scholarships.
Yet, existing study of teacher scholarships bears little knowledge of whether different
types of scholarships result in a more racially and ethnically diverse teacher workforce because
studies are largely focused on the academic credentials or employment outcomes of recipients
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(Feng & Sass, 2018; Henry et al., 2012; Steele et al., 2011). The lack of information about
whether any teacher scholarships result in higher rates of graduation is particularly important
since research suggests that completing a teacher education bachelor’s degree is an important
predictor of future employment (Redding & Baker, 2019; Rucinski & Goodman, 2019).
Given that there is a lack of information about teacher scholarships in general and MTS
aid specifically, I review education literature in two areas seeking to establish that: (a) the
teacher pipeline for individuals of color is dysfunctional as is, and (b) state’s financial aid
support could play a role in remedying existing dysfunction.
The Dysfunctional Teacher Pipeline for Individuals of Color
The two primary modes to enter the teacher pipeline are via alternative and traditional
pathways. I define the primary difference between the two pathways is that alternative programs
offer individuals the opportunity to train while also teaching while traditional programs require
individuals to train prior to becoming a teacher (U.S. Department of Education, 2016).
Furthermore, alternative programs also require less coursework, focus on practical or technical
rather than theoretical aspects of teaching, and require less clinical preparation than traditional
programs (Redding & Smith, 2016).
Over the last 40 years with the help of federal policies like the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001, alternative programs have grown exponentially (Feistreizer, 1993; Humphrey &
Wechsler, 2007; Redding & Smith, 2016) creating pathways that individuals of color use with
more frequency than their white peers (U.S. Department of Education, 2016). With providers of
teacher education offering new entry points that individuals of color are represented in better and
simultaneous increases in the proportion of teacher candidates of color seeking bachelor’s degree
through traditional programs (U.S. Department of Education, 2016), a logical conclusion to this
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development would be that teachers of color represent a rapidly increasing share of the
workforce. And yet, as of 2012, even though individuals of color represented 26% of traditional
pathway enrollers and 41% of non-institution of higher education alternative pathways, only
18% of the total teacher workforce and 22% of the workforce with less than 3 or fewer years of
experience were teachers of color (U.S. Department of Education, 2016). The most logical
inferences from this data are that enrolled teacher candidates of color leave (a) before attaining a
teacher education degree or (b) in the first few years of a teaching career in response to the
system. I focus on traditional preparation pathways here since MTS programs are almost
exclusively for students preparing in this manner.
Preparation Pathways
Research studies find that individuals of color exit at greater rates after enrolling in
traditional teacher education programs than white counterparts (Lindsay et al., 2017; Redding &
Baker, 2019; Rucinski & Goodman, 2019; U.S. Department of Education, 2016). Within the
teacher pipeline, many barriers are related to, if not systemically cause, the disparities in
enrolling teachers not finishing their teacher education degrees. Some of the impediments that
students of color face include a lack of faculty of color and culturally responsive teacher
preparation curriculums (Sleeter, 2017), teacher licensure testing (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010;
Milner et al., 2013; Nettles et al., 2011; Petacheur, 2012), and paying for postsecondary
education disproportionately with student loans (Fiddiman et al., 2019). MTS programs reduce
tuition owed and potentially debts for student loans that an individual acquires while preparing to
teach. The cost reductions could ultimately close existing gaps in teacher education bachelor’s
degree attainment by race and ethnicity and boost the available teacher of color labor supply.
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State Scholarships, Public Service, and Teacher Scholarships
State education agencies design policies that govern each state’s education system. This
includes but is not limited to determining which organizations provide teacher education
preparation, the minimum requirements to complete preparation, and the requirements to earn
and maintain licensure as a teacher. Not only do states regulate who becomes a teacher, but they
also heavily subsidize in-state students’ postsecondary undergraduate education with tuition
reductions or need and merit scholarships (Long & Riley, 2007).
States’ Approaches to Scholarships
Money matters to individuals who are deciding whether to enroll and continue in
postsecondary education (Dynarski, 2003). Scholarships are available broadly, offered by federal
and state-level governments. Students typically qualify for them based on different standards
although states routinely use two types of scholarships, merit or need, to attend to students with
strong academic credentials or who are from families with less income or wealth accumulations.
State Merit Scholarships. As of 2014, 20 states offered merit scholarships with vastly
different performance standards on academic standardized test scores and cumulative high
school grade point average and award sizes (Jia, 2019). Among the most generous programs is
the well-known Georgia’s HOPE scholarship began in 1993 (Dynarski, 2000; 2004; 2008). In
2014, this program offered students earning a 3.0 grade point average in high school full tuition
and fees and students’ scholarship renewed if they maintained a 3.0 grade point average. Merit
scholarships differ in performance requirements and generosity.
Several researchers have used strong identification strategies to establish whether merit
scholarships result in enrollment, persistence, or completion benefits for students who receive
them. Broadly, Dynarski (2000; 2004; 2008) found that merit scholarships yield positive benefits
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for students’ enrollment, persistence, and completion rates in states that implement programs.
Additionally, she found that states with merit scholarships increased enrollment and completion
primarily in 4-year public institutions relative to states without programs, although programs had
differential outcomes (Dynarski, 2008). Jia (2019) built on this result showing that program sizes
and standards differentially impacted students’ observed behaviors. She found that the size of
financial aid awards increased enrollment and completion of bachelor’s degrees while more
lenient performance standards increased associate’s degree completion. Merit scholarship monies
matter, but students respond more to larger incentives.
Dynarski and other researchers expanded this analysis addressing how student
characteristics like race or income correlated with merit scholarships and outcomes (Dynarski,
2002; 2004; 2008; Goodman, 2008). On one hand, Dynarski found that merit scholarships were
not accessed or used more for two-year degrees by students whose parent’s had lower incomes or
who identified as Black (2002; 2008). On the other hand, she also found evidence of differential
effects for Black or Hispanic students by state (2004). Goodman (2008) added to Dynarski’s
findings showing that low-income students exhibited were more sensitive to the price of
postsecondary education than higher income students. In sum, merit aid programs impact
postsecondary outcomes, but differentially by race/ethnicity and gender and state context.
State Financial Need Scholarships. Needs scholarships are awarded based on individual
students and their family’s ability to pay for post-secondary education. There is scant research
that uses methods allowing for causal inference of state programs. This is even though states
spent about $9 billion dollars in need-based aid in the 2017-2018 school year (NASSGAP,
2019). Of the studies I could locate, only two address a state program aiding students with
financial needs above and beyond what the federal Pell grant system provides. Castleman and
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Long (2016) study the Florida Student Access Grant using a regression discontinuity strategy to
determine the effect of attendance right around the financial cut-point. They find that students
attend 4-year public institutions, earn more credits, and complete bachelor’s degrees within 6
years more often when they receive extra need aid from the state than when they do not.
Bettinger (2015) studied a change to who could receive the Ohio Need-Based College Grants
program using a difference-in-differences framework. He also found that more financial aid
increased first year college persistence, enrollment at four-year campuses, and students’ grade
point averages. Like other financial aid, money matters to students with unmet financial needs.
Public Service and Scholarships
To some degree, loan aversions or loan sensitivities affect whether individuals seek
public or private sector employment (Field, 2009; Rouse & Rothstein, 2011). Two studies reveal
how individuals whose tuition is reduced behave differently than individuals who acquire loans
that are paid back once they are employed. In a field experiment that focused on reducing debt
burdens for law school students, Field (2009) studied whether NYU law students randomly
assigned either a loan that would be forgiven or conditional scholarship that required no loan
became employed in public interest law (e.g., public defender or district’s attorney offices, legal
aid organizations, government or non-profit agencies). Field (2009) found evidence that students
matriculated more often when they received a conditional scholarship rather than a loan.
Furthermore, recipients of the conditional scholarship were worked in a public interest law area
much more frequently than recipients of the loan option. This evidence suggests that students
educated similarly within the same program sought employment in public or private law
differential based on whether they had a scholarship or loan. Similar research in a selective
university undergraduate setting also found that eliminated loans increased entry into public
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service occupational choice once loans were eliminated as a form of financial aid (Rouse &
Rothstein, 2011) and analysis of national data suggests that individuals of color who take more
than the average loan amount are two to three percentage points less likely to become teachers
(Baker et al., 2018). Given these studies, it is feasible to believe that MTS aid that reduces loans
may increase degree completion and entry into the public service sector as a teacher.
The Outcomes of Teaching Scholarships
Two studies provide evidence about whether conditional scholarships for preparing
teachers generate desired improvements in the quality of teachers or the sorting of strong
academic credentialed teachers into hard-to-staff schools. Steele et al. (2010) studied whether the
Governor’s Teaching Fellowship in California, a $20,000 conditional scholarship, increased the
probability an academically talented novice teacher gained employment in a low-performing
school. Using the scholarship’s beginning and ending as an instrument, they find that teachers
became employed in schools where students perform poorly on tests by nearly 30 percentage
points more when the scholarship existed.
Henry et al. (2012) studied the North Carolina Teaching Fellows program, a $26,000
conditional teaching scholarship. Henry and colleagues compared teaching fellows to other
North Carolina public school teachers and found that teaching fellows scored higher on the SAT,
worked in schools with students who performed better on standardized tests, and were retained
for longer than non-fellows. In sum, state legislated conditional scholarships may reduce or
eliminate student loans while concurrently drawing in individuals with higher standardized test
scores into teaching and spurring them to work in hard-to-staff schools. However, existing
studies answer no policy questions focused on the relationship between scholarships and aspiring

11
educators of color, and thus leave questions about whether states should tinker with or
implement new programs.
Conceptual Framework
I adapt a simple Roy (1951) model of occupational choice for my study of MTS
programs. This model conceptualizes that individuals choose their work by optimizing wages in
one chosen profession relative to those in other potential occupations. Individuals calculate this
by weighing anticipated wages, individual ability, costs of training in an alternative profession,
expected returns to ability as a teacher (including intrinsic rewards), and the costs of training to
become a teacher. Without financial incentives or loans, an already enrolled teacher is likely to
update their cost and benefit calculations with new or better information. One way that an
individual might update their beliefs about the benefits of teaching is by gaining improved
information about the limitations of future earnings as a teacher (Allegretto & Mishel, 2018;
Baker et al., 2016; Han, 2020). Another option is that as an individual gains theoretical or
practical knowledge about teaching, they come to understand the work is not what they expected
or prefer. Independent of these reasons, individuals may also update their cost and benefit
calculations when the true price of enrolling, persisting, and completing teacher education is
reduced.
MTS financial aid is a cost reduction from the true price of tuition for individuals who
have already enrolled in a traditional teacher education program. In the most simplified version
of Roy’s model of occupational choice, the reduced cost of attendance would predict increased
persistence in postsecondary education until a student attains a teacher education degree.
However, true costs are difficult to pin down because some students can pay tuition in its
entirety, and most students receive federal and state financial aid.
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Prior research on scholarships also updates the Roy model of occupational choice. Some
research suggests that scholarships, whether conditionally or unconditionally guaranteed, predict
future public service employment whereas student loan acquisition does not (Baker et al., 2018;
Field, 2009; Rouse & Rothstein, 2011). This is predictably irrational behavior that occurs
because individuals prefer to receive money immediately and pay back the money owed with
work (e.g., the basis of conditional service scholarships) rather than to receive the exact same
amount of money in the form of a loan that is paid back with future income. To drive home this
point further, some evidence shows that aspiring teachers of color acquire more student loan debt
than peers who are white (Delisle & Holt, 2017). MTS programs commonly use conditional
service scholarships (with two exceptions) and this would predict that states adopting programs
would have favorable responses from recipients, especially for individuals whose loans are
reduced. In fact, MTS programs, which reduce the amount of loans a student borrows to pay for
postsecondary tuition, could feasibly lower the cost of training to teach resulting in greater
degree attainment and more employed teachers of color. Drawing on this rationale for this
research and noting the scarce amount of empirical evidence about whether MTS programs work
as predicted, I ask the following research questions:
1.
2.

Does the implementation of an MTS program in a state increase the proportion of teacher
candidates of color who complete bachelor’s degrees in that state?
Do MTS programs differentially impact the proportion of teacher candidates of color in a
state based (a) the maximum available scholarship in the state or (b) whether a student was
prepared in a public or non-profit, private institution?
Methods
In this study, I use difference-in-differences and event study frameworks to examine
whether states implementing MTS programs experience greater relative changes over time in the
proportion of teacher candidates of color relative to states that do not implement MTS programs

13
and are in the same region. Using a rigorous search procedure, I identified 11 states with MTS
programs (described in Appendix 1-A). From the available data, in five states I observed degree
completions before and after the implementation of an MTS program. Of the remaining six states
with MTS programs, I could observe degree completions before implementation in one and after
implementation in five.
Program Description and Context
Minority Teacher Scholarships are a tuition reduction incentive program. Since 1988, 11
states across three Census regions implemented MTS incentive programs (Figure 1-1). The
programs offered differ in design on several dimensions including type, eligibility criteria, and
generosity of scholarships. I discuss the various design features below, summarized in Table 1-1.
Figure 1-1. States implementing MTS scholarships
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Table 1-1. Description of Minority Teacher Scholarships (MTS)
State
Arkansas
Arkansas
Connecticut
Florida
Illinois
Indiana
Indiana
Kentucky
Missouri

North Carolina

Oregon
Tennessee

Wisconsin

Name of Scholarship
Minority Teacher Scholars
Program
Critical Needs Minority
Teacher Scholarship Program
Minority Teacher Incentive
Program
Minority Teacher Education
Scholarship
Minority Teachers of Illinois
Scholarship
William A. Crawford
Minority Teacher Scholarship
Minority Teacher Stipend
Kentucky Minority Educator
Recruitment Retention
Scholarship
Missouri Minority Teaching
Scholarship
Millenium Teacher
Scholarship Loan Program
Oregon Teacher Scholars
Program
Tennessee Minority Teaching
Fellows Program
Wisconsin Minority Teacher
Loan Program

Census
Region

Year of
Legislation

First Funding
Year

Year Funding Ended

South

1994

1995

2013

South

2001

2004

On-going

Northeast

1998

1999

On-going

South

2002

2003

On-going

Midwest

1991

1991

On-going

Midwest

1989

1990

Midwest

2014

2014

On-going (renamed in
2016)
On-going

Border

1993

1996

2016

Border

1990

1991

2016

South

2004

2004

2013

West

2018

2018

On-going

South

1990

1991

On-going

Midwest

1990

1991

On-going

Minority group requirements?
African-, Hispanic-, Asian-, or
Native-American
African-, Hispanic-, Asian-, or
Native-American
African-, Hispanic-, Asian-, or
Native-American
African-, Hispanic-, Asian-, or
Native-American
African-, Hispanic-, Asian-, or
Native-American
African- or Hispanic-American
African- or Hispanic-American
African-, Hispanic-, Asian-, or
Native-American
African-, Hispanic-, Asian-, or
Native-American
Attend Historically Black Colleges
or Universities at: Fayetteville State
University or Winston-Salem State
University
Linguistically or ethnically diverse
African-, Hispanic-, Asian-, or
Native-American
African- Hispanic-, or Southeast
Asian-American from Laos,
Cambodia, or Vietnam admitted to
the U. S. after December 31, 1975
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Table 1-1 (Continued). Description of Minority Teacher Scholarships (MTS)

State

Arkansas

Arkansas

Connecticut

Florida

Illinois

Indiana

Other qualification requirements or special program
components?

Arkansas Resident
U.S. Citizen
Enrolled full-time in an Arkansas public or private
4-year institution
Completed 60 credit hours and admitted to a teacher
certification program
2.5 GPA minimum
Agree in writing to work in the Mississippi Delta or
other geographical area of the state with teacher
shortages
Completed a core curriculum in High School
3.0 GPA
19 or above on ACT
Enrolled in university or community college
U.S. Citizen or permanent resident alien

Signature from the Dean of the School of Education

Florida resident and U.S. citizen or eligible nonresident citizen
Not in upper division courses
Must be a full-time student
Essay
Must maintain a 2.5 GPA and attend MTES annual
symposium for renewal of award
Illinois Resident
U.S. Citizen
GPA of 2.5 out of 4.0 if sophomore or above
Registered with selective service
Completed application
Not receiving other ISAC scholarships
30% of funds reserved for male teachers of color
Indiana Resident
U.S. Citizen or eligible non-citizen
Maintain GPA required for admission to school of
education at institution of enrollment

Range of
participants
in the
program

Range of
Teacher
Candidates
of Color
Earning
Bachelor's
Degrees

Service Requirement

Bachelor’s
or master’s
degree?

Maximum
Length of
scholarship

Maximum
Financial Value
(annual award in
parentheses)

Proportion of
2018-2019
Tuition
Coverage in
Public
Institution

Bachelor's

2 years

$10,000 ($5,000)

59.6%

12 to 64

110 to 190

Five years of service

Bachelor's

4 years

$6,000 ($1,500)

17.9%

35 to 155

110 to 190

One-year teaching for
each scholarship year

Bachelor's

2 years + 4
years as
teacher

$20,000 ($10,000
as student;
$10,000 once a
teacher)

38.6%

44 to 155

33 to 84

Receive a loan
stipend for each year
of teaching service
up to four years,
assuming outstanding
loans

Bachelor's
OR
Master's if
individual
holds no
Bachelor’s

2 years

$8,000 ($4,000)

90.0%

279 to 937

1270 to
1726

One-year teaching for
each scholarship year

Bachelor's
or Master's

4 years

$20,000 ($5,000)

35.1%

0 to 631

685 to 1138

One-year teaching for
each scholarship year

159 to 268

Must apply for
teaching positions in
Indiana and, if hired,
teach in Indiana for 3
years

Bachelor's

4 years

$16,000 ($4,000)

43.4%

140 to 336
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Indiana

Kentucky

Missouri

North
Carolina

Oregon

Be a full-time or intend to be a full-time student
Meet any other discretionary criteria
Award available while completing student teaching
or School Administration internship
Must work at school authorized for internship by
Indiana Department of Education
Must agree in writing to apply for jobs in Indiana
Kentucky resident
U.S. citizen
Seeking teacher certification and majoring in
teacher education
Maintain 2.75 out of 4.0 GPA
Prioritization for math and science subject area
teachers
Missouri resident
U.S. citizen or permanent resident
High School graduate ranking in top 25 of class or
top 25% of ACT or SAT exam takers OR
Returning master's student approved in math or
science teacher education
Meet June 1 deadline
Renewal includes maintaining 2.5 out 4.0 GPA
North Carolina resident
Attend Fayetteville State University or WinstonSalem State University
Minimum of 2.5 GPA and 900 SAT
Already enrolled or intend to enroll in teacher
education
Invited to apply after invited to be a member of the
Oregon Teacher Scholars Network
Hosts networking events for members

Bachelor's
or Master's

1 year

$4,000 ($4,000)

43.4%

33 to 47

159 to 268

Must apply for
teaching positions in
Indiana and, if hired,
teach in Indiana for 3
years

Bachelor's
or Master's

4 years

$20,000 ($5,000)

46.8%

171 to 330

87 to 221

One-year teaching for
each scholarship year

Bachelor's

4 years

$12,000 ($3,000)

35.1%

20 to 89

164 to 205

Five years of service

Bachelor's

4 years

$26,000 ($6,500)

90.6%

21 to 98

361 to 806

One-year teaching for
each scholarship year

Bachelor's
or Master's

2 years

$10,000 ($5,000)

48.6%

based on
funding, 40
per year

None

None

Tennessee

Tennessee resident
Achieve a 18 on ACT or 860 on SAT (math and
reading) OR maintain a 2.5 cumulative GPA in
college
Full-time student
Letter of recommendations from school official and
community member
List of extracurricular activities and essay
Complete TSAC application

Bachelor's

4 years

$20,000 ($5,000)

51.1%

47 to 116

118 to 461

Wisconsin

Wisconsin resident
Registered with Selective Service
Enrolled in teacher education program in state
identified teacher shortage area

Bachelor's

3 years

$30,000 ($10,000)

115.0%

59 to 108

110 to 222

One year to obtain a
job in an eligible
Tennessee public
school
One-year teaching for
each scholarship
year, and one year of
service for 1 and 1/3
years of scholarship
in priority schools
designated by the
State of Tennessee
One-year teaching for
each scholarship year
and work in
Milwaukee in a
teacher shortage area
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Type
States tend to adopt two types of scholarships. The first, used by nine of 11 states, is a
service scholarship model. These scholarships are contingent grants that require the recipient to
teach in the public education sector in that state after completing their degree. If students provide
this service, their loan is forgiven. However, if students fail to complete their service, the
scholarship converts to a loan. Alternatively, two states, Connecticut and Oregon, adopted
different models. The alternative type of scholarships are grants, which amount to a tuition
reduction without any contractual obligation to teach in the same state. The Connecticut model
includes loan stipends if a graduating student takes a public education teaching position has debt.
While the categories of scholarships are straight-forward, the public service
contingencies of service scholarships are not. Of the nine states that use a service scholarship, six
simply require one year of teaching service for each year of scholarship. Only one state,
Tennessee, includes reductions in service time for teaching in priority schools that are
determined by the Tennessee Department of Education. Another state, Indiana, requires students
to signal their intent to teach in the state, but if this obligation is met and the student is unable to
gain employment, the scholarship is not converted into debt. If the student in Indiana does find a
public education teaching job, they are required to teach for three years. The final two states,
Arkansas and Missouri, require five years of service for accepting a scholarship regardless of the
length of the award. Thus, service scholarships, while similar in aim, have different contractual
requirements to meet to prevent the scholarship being converted into a loan.
Eligibility Criteria
States implementing MTS programs use similar racial and ethnic criteria to determine
which population of students are eligible for awards. Seven states require individual applicants to
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identify as a person of color and this is inclusive of any IPEDS racial or ethnic category except
for individuals who are white. One state offers scholarships to underrepresented minoritized
individuals only.2 The three remaining states adopt other eligibility criteria including awards
contingent on attending Historically Black Colleges or Universities, for Black or Hispanic
individuals and Southeast Asian Americans from Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam admitted to the U.
S. after December 31, 1975, or for any IPEDS racial or ethnic category and linguistically diverse
individuals (which implies people could be White and non-Hispanic, e.g., Bosnian). While
scholarships differed on inclusivity of the various racial and ethnic groups, a vast majority of
states include any person who could be considered a person of color. Thus, it is less than clear if
any one racial or ethnic group benefits from MTS.
All states also had additional requirements, which ensured that MTS had differential
access to programs. On one end of the spectrum, Connecticut had the most accessible program.
Assuming a student was enrolled in teacher education, the key requirement was to racially or
ethnically identify as a person of color and to signal individual intent to teach in the State of
Connecticut upon graduation. There was no consequence should a student not teach in the state.
All other states were more demanding on several dimensions including requiring students to be
residents of the state, meeting academic requirements aligned with entry into teacher education
programs, attending annual events under the program’s purview (e.g., networking or professional
development), writing essays, or collecting letters of recommendation. The least accessible
program was in Oregon, where only those invited to apply could.

2

In extant literature, this language refers to individuals who identify as Black or Hispanic.
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Generosity
States that adopt MTS differed in the generosity of programs. On an annual basis,
scholarships ranged from a minimum of $1,500 in Arkansas to a maximum of $10,000 in
Wisconsin. The modal award was $5,000 per year. The similar generosity across states suggests
that MTS programs aim to cover a nontrivial amount of tuition in public and private institutions.
In effect, the average MTS award in a public institution covers 55% of 2017-2018 tuition and
fees. 3 This ranges from a low of 17.9% in Arkansas to a high of 115% in Wisconsin (Table 1-1).
While there is similarity annual generosity, there are differences in the duration of
awards, and thus the total generosity for teacher candidates of color. States choose from two,
three, or four years as the duration of their scholarship programs. Six states opt for four years of
scholarships while four states opt for two years. One state, Wisconsin, has an award available for
three years. Since the length of time of awards differs, the maximum total scholarship money any
student can receive varies widely. The range of total funding extends from $6,000 to $30,000.
The heterogeneity in generosity of MTS aid may be important to both scale and effectiveness. In
sum, most states designed scholarships with a loan conversion option contingent upon teaching
public service in the same state, differences in generosity, and eligibility dependent upon
identifying as any race or ethnicity but white, non-Hispanic along with other residential,
academic, professional, and application requirements.
Data Source
This study uses publicly accessible institution level survey data from the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). In a 12-part survey, IPEDS data is collected
from each postsecondary institution receiving federal money. Since all teacher education

3

I used U.S. Department of Education statistics to calculate these found here
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_330.10.asp
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programs located in the U.S. are within institutions of higher education, the survey is inclusive of
the universe of undergraduate teacher education programs.4 Using the completions survey data, I
observe each unique teacher education major bachelor’s degree earned by year and racial or
ethnic identity of a completer. To convert this to a state-by-year panel of data, I sum the number
of degrees conferred across individual universities and colleges in each school year between
1994-1995 to 2016-2017. I use additional measures from the IPEDS institutional characteristics
survey to capture state and sector-specific information.
I supplement the data by using selected measures from the U.S. Federal Government and
prior education research on school- or teacher-level accountability policies. From the U.S.
Census Bureau, I draw estimates of the racial and ethnic demographics of the working
population by state from 1990 through 2017. From the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, I access
the median income and unadjusted unemployment rate by state from 1994 to 2017. Finally, I
draw on Jacob and Dee’s (2011) study of the impact of the NCLB on NAEP scores to identify
states that implemented consequential accountability policies prior to 2001 and Kraft et al.’s
(2020) study of the impact of teacher evaluation policies on the supply of prospective teachers to
identify states timing of teacher evaluation legislation after 2010.
Summary Statistics
There are 1,857 unique teacher education bachelor’s degree granting institutions and over
2.3 million unique teacher education bachelor’s degree completions in the 23 years of data.5
Teacher education majors annually earned between 87,493 to 106,125 bachelor’s degrees, of
which between 12,069 and 19,106 identify as teacher candidates of color (Figures 1-2 and 1-3).
4

The IPEDS completion survey can be found on the NCES IPEDS webpage here:
https://surveys.nces.ed.gov/IPEDS/Downloads/Forms/package_10_80.pdf
5

This summed calculation excludes all non-resident and unknown race completers.
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Figure 1-2. Total teacher candidates who completed bachelor’s degrees by year

22
Figure 1-3. Total (a) teacher candidates of color, (b) Black, non-Hispanic candidates, (c) Hispanic candidates, and (d) Asian, Native
American, Pacific Islander, or multi-race candidates who completed bachelor’s degrees by year

(a)

(c)

(b)

(d)
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The final sample consists of 50 states and the District of Columbia from the school year
period of 1994-1995 to 2016-2017. Table 1-2 presents summary statistics of the outcomes used
in the study. In the table are the means and standard deviations for the full sample, for states that
do not and do implement MTS programs. I separate the do implement MTS programs into two
separate aggregations. The first includes information for all 10 states in which post-MTS
implementation data is available. The second includes only the five states in which I observe preand post-MTS implementation data.
In states that lack an MTS program, 16.7% of the teacher candidates who graduate with
bachelor’s degrees identify as candidates of color. This proportion compares favorably to states
that carry out MTS programs. In the five states MTS program where pre- and postimplementation data is available, 14.7% of teacher candidates identify as people of color and
graduate with teacher education bachelor’s degrees. The pooled proportion across 23 years of
data for teacher candidates of color masks racial and ethnic differences in states with or without
MTS programs. Overall, 5.9% of bachelor’s degree earning teachers identify as Black in states
that never implement an MTS program while 8.1% of bachelor’s degree earning teachers identify
as Black in states with MTS programs. States without and with MTS awards differ by Hispanic
(5.9% to 4.8%) and all remaining groups (5.4% to 1.9%).
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Table 1-2. Proportion of Teacher Education Bachelor's Degrees Conferred by
Race/Ethnicity
State-by-year counts in states that
never implement MTS

Outcomes
Teacher
Candidates
of Color
Completing
BA's
Black
candidates
completing
BA's
Hispanic
candidates
completing
BA's
Other
candidates
of color
completing
BA's

State-by-year counts in states that
implement MTS

State-by-year counts in states that
implement MTS and have pre- and
post-observation data

Total
state-byyear
observati
ons

Average
proportio
n

Standar
d
deviatio
n

Total stateby-year
observatio
ns

Average
proportio
n

Standar
d
deviatio
n

Total stateby-year
observatio
ns

Average
proportio
n

Standar
d
deviatio
n

943

0.167

0.155

230

0.123

0.077

115

0.147

0.089

943

0.058

0.077

230

0.067

0.041

115

0.081

0.043

943

0.054

0.087

230

0.037

0.046

115

0.048

0.059

943

0.054

0.110

230

0.019

0.010

115

0.019

0.010

This information also fails to reveal year-over-year trend disparities by racial and ethnic
group (Figure 4a-4d). Figure 4a represents the proportion of teacher candidates of color earning
bachelor’s degrees and MTS status. This figure displays all three groups (no MTS, MTS
implementation observed, MTS without implementation observed) experience little change in the
proportion of candidates of color completing degrees between 1994 and 2005. After 2005, each
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group has similar positive linear growth. It is notable that the pattern is similar for Hispanic
candidates (Figure 4c) and Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, or multi-race candidates
(Figure 4d). The proportion of Black candidates differs from the other racial and ethnic groups
patterns in Figure 4b. Over time, there is little change in the proportion of Black candidates who
earned bachelor’s degrees for either of the three groups.
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Figure 1-4. Proportion of (a) teacher candidates of color, (b) Black, non-Hispanic candidates, (c)
Hispanic candidates, and (d) Asian, Native American, Pacific Islander, or multi-race candidates
who completed bachelor’s degrees by whether the state ever implemented an MTS program

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)
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To provide additional context about how states with and without MTS programs differ,
Table 1-3 presents summary statistics for the outcomes and control variables in the baseline year,
1994-1995. At baseline, states that never implemented MTS programs had a greater proportion
of Hispanic, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, or multi-race candidates and a lesser
proportion of Black candidates completing bachelor’s degrees than states with MTS programs.
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Table 1-3. Outcomes and Covariates in Baseline Year of Data (1994-1995)
State-by-year counts in states that never
implement MTS

State-by-year counts in states that
implement MTS

State-by-year counts in states that
implement MTS and have pre- and
post-observation data
Total
Standard
Observatio
Mean
deviation
ns

Total
Observatio
ns

Mean

Standard
deviation

Total
Observatio
ns

Mean

Standard
deviation

41

0.132

0.146

10

0.098

0.065

5

0.118

0.081

41
41

0.059
0.030

0.090
0.056

10
10

0.064
0.024

0.043
0.035

5
5

0.076
0.034

0.049
0.050

41

0.044

0.116

10

0.009

0.005

5

0.008

0.005

41

$53,774.68

$7,987.11

10

$50,838.70

$7,861.73

5

$50,101.80

$10,164.73

41

5.722

1.408

10

5.230

0.617

5

5.440

0.713

Proportion of Workforce Identified as
Black

41

0.101

0.125

10

0.120

0.050

5

0.132

0.057

Proportion of Workforce Identified as
Hispanic

41

0.065

0.085

10

0.043

0.048

5

0.053

0.060

Proportion of Workforce Identified as
Other Candidate of Color

41

0.053

0.093

10

0.018

0.008

5

0.018

0.007

Consequential School Level
Accountability prior to NCLB

41

0.024

0.156

10

0.200

0.422

5

0.000

0.000

Consequential Teacher Evaluation
Legislation

41

0.000

0.000

10

0.000

0.000

5

0.000

0.000

Outcomes
Teacher Candidates of Color
Completing BA's
Black candidates completing BA's
Hispanic candidates completing BA's
Other candidates of color completing
BA's
Covariates
Median Income
Unemployment rate
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Outcomes
I construct the outcome for this study from the total number of bachelor’s degree
completers of teacher education degrees by race and ethnicity and year. Drawing on the IPEDS
completions survey, I aggregate all bachelor’s degree completers by teacher education
Classification of Instructional Program code (CIP) and racial or ethnic identity.6 Then, I divide
the sum of all degrees conferred to teacher candidates of color divided by the sum of all degrees
conferred to teacher candidates in state s and year t to calculate the proportion of teacher
candidates of color.7 I replicate this procedure to calculate the proportions for Black, nonHispanic candidates, Hispanic candidates, or candidates of all remaining races and ethnicities by
replacing the numerator with the appropriate racial or ethnic category.
Controls
I construct several control variables to capture state-specific time-varying characteristics
that are non-random and could confound the MTS estimate. These factors include state labor
market variables for (a) median income, and (b) unemployment rates, and state demographic
labor market information for the (c) proportion of working age (15-64 years) individuals of
color. Other control variables included account for state-specific educational accountability
policies meant to instill consequences on schools (Dee & Jacob, 2011) or teachers (Kraft et al.,
forthcoming). This is an important control because consequential accountability policies created

6

The Classification of Instructional Program Code aligns the content or major of study using a six-digit
identification number. I use CIP codes within the education field and draw on guidance from Kraft et al. (2018) and
Baron (2019) who identified codes that were most relevant and likely to capture the true measure of teacher
education majors. More information can be retrieved from https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/cipcode/FAQ.aspx?y=56
7

Teacher candidates of color includes individuals who identify as Asian, non-Hispanic, Black, non-Hispanic, any
race, Hispanic, Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic, Native American, non-Hispanic, and Two or more races. The
calculation of total degrees conferred to teacher candidates excludes individuals who not citizens of the U.S. or
whose race or ethnicity is unknown.
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the conditions for increased teacher licensure testing and teacher evaluation, which could result
in discrimination by race or ethnicity (Drake et al, 2019; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010; Nettles et
al., 2011; Petchauer, 2012). The definitions of the measures are in Table 1-4.
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Table 1-4. Definitions of Variables
Outcome
Variables

Descriptions

Data source

Teacher education
Completers of
Color

A continuous measure between 0 and 1 of the teacher education bachelor and master
degree completers of color as a proportion of the total white and individuals of color
completing teacher education bachelor's or master's degrees in year t.

IPEDS

Black teacher
education
completers

A continuous measure between 0 and 1 of the Black teacher education bachelor and
master degree completers as a proportion of the total white and individuals of color
completing teacher education bachelor's or master's degrees in year t.

IPEDS

Latino teacher
education
completers

A continuous measure between 0 and 1 of the Latino teacher education bachelor and
master degree completers as a proportion of the total white and individuals of color
completing teacher education bachelor's or master's degrees in year t.

IPEDS

A dichotomous measure of policy exposure that takes on a value of 1 if a minority teacher
scholarship is funded and there are recipients in state s at time t and a 0 otherwise.

NASSGAP survey and other sources

A continuous measure of U.S. dollars representing the median unadjusted annual income
in state s at time t.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

A continuous measure of unadjusted annual unemployment rate in state s at time t.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Treatment
MTS
Control variables
Median income
Unemployment
rate
Working age
individuals of
color
Alternative
Certification
Programs
Teacher-Level
Accountability
Evaluation
Reform

A continuous measure between 0 and 1 of the proportion of working age (15-64 based on
OECD definition) individuals of color as a proportion of the total working age population
in state s at time t.
A dichotomous measure to capture when alternative certification programs appear as a
preparation pathway in state s at time t that takes a value of 1 if the state has any
alternative certification program and 0 if it does not.
A dichotomous measure to capture when a teacher evaluation reform took effect in state s
at time t that takes on a value of 1 if the state has passed teacher evaluation. This captures
variation after 2011.

Kraft, Brunner, Dougherty, and
Schwegman, 2019

School-level
Accountability

A dichotomous measure to capture when school-level accountability legislation was first
passed in state s at time t that takes on a value of 1 if accountability existed prior to 2001
and a value of 0 otherwise. This captures variation prior to 2001.

Dee and Jacob (2011)

American Community Survey

Title II Data
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Empirical Strategy
To examine the impact of MTS programs on the proportion of teacher candidates of
color, Black, non-Hispanic candidates, Hispanic candidates, and candidates of all remaining
races who completed bachelor’s degrees, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy. I begin
with a non-parametric event-study specification to allow for dynamic change before and after an
MTS program is implemented by a state. The event study specification takes the following form:
𝑌𝑠𝑟𝑡 = ∑10
𝑇=−4 𝛽𝑇 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑇,𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛉𝐗 𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝜋𝑟𝑡 + λ𝑠 + 𝜇𝑠𝑟𝑡

(1)

where 𝑌𝑠𝑟𝑡 denotes outcome of interest for state s and region r at time t and 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑇,𝑠𝑟𝑡 represents
lead and lag indicator variables for when state s implemented an MTS and the entire regression is
weighted based on the number of teacher candidates earning bachelor’s degrees in the state. This
model includes a covariate vector 𝜃𝑋𝑠𝑟𝑡 , and state and region-by-year fixed effects indicators,
𝜋𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜆𝑠 . This set of controls ensures that estimates capture the differences from year-to-year

within a state in regions that have states with and without MTS programs. Finally, I include 𝜇𝑠𝑟𝑡
as a random error term at the state level. Since I only observe pre- and post-observation data for
five states, and by including state and region-by-year fixed effects in equation (1), this analysis
identifies variation from Census defined Northeast and South regions. In the preferred model, I
exclude the early adopting states since I cannot observe pre-implementation completions.
In the event study model, I re-center the year an MTS program became operational so
that 𝑇1,𝑠𝑡 always equals 1 in the year the MTS first disbursed money to teacher education
students in state s. This approach allows for uncertainty in the true first funding date. I include
indicator variables for -1 to -4 or more years prior to an MTS program implementation
( 𝑇−4,𝑠𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑇−1,𝑠𝑟𝑡 ) and 1 to 10 or more years after the beginning of MTS operation
(𝑇1,𝑠𝑟𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑇10,𝑠𝑟𝑡 ). Note that 𝑇−4𝑠𝑟𝑡 pools all observations 4 or more years prior an active MTS
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program, and 𝑇10,𝑠𝑟𝑡 pools all observations 10 or more years after the beginning of an MTS
program. The omitted category is the year before the MTS program funding starts, 𝑇0,𝑠𝑟𝑡 .
The coefficients of interest in equation (1) are 𝛽 𝑇 ′𝑠, which represent the difference-indifferences estimates of the impact of MTS program implementation on the outcomes of interest
in years from 𝑡−4 to 𝑡10 . The estimated coefficients on the lead treatment indicators
( 𝛾−4 , . . . , 𝛾−1) provide evidence about whether the proportion of degree completers were
trending similarly prior to the time an MTS program became operational in state s. For MTS
estimates to be inferred as causal, the pre-MTS period lead indicators should be small in
magnitude and statistically insignificant. The lagged treatment indicators (𝛾1 , … , 𝛾10) allow for
dynamic effects of an MTS program over time.
I complement the event-study specification with a standard difference-in-differences
(DD) model to increase the precision by pooling estimates across pre- and post-MTS years. I fit a
DD model in the following form:
𝑌𝑠𝑟𝑡 = 𝛿𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝜋𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠 + 𝜇𝑠𝑟𝑡

(2)

where 𝑌𝑠𝑟𝑡 represents a generalized outcome for states s at time t. The identifying assumption of
the preferred model is that the relative change in the fraction of teacher candidates of color who
complete bachelor’s degrees in teacher education at time t, above and beyond the known
controls, is attributable to the presence of a scholarship program, 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑟𝑡 . The coefficient of
interest in equation (2) is 𝛿 , which represents the rate of change in the proportion of teacher
candidates of color in states that do and do not implement MTS programs. This coefficient can
be interpreted as causal when the event study provides evidence that the control and treatment
groups have parallel trends prior to implementation.
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I also modify the standard DD approach to allow the slopes to change in the pre- and
post- period instead of including a single post indicator as in equation (2). This model is
estimated as follows:
𝑌𝑠𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑡 𝑥 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑟𝑡 ) + 𝜃𝑋𝑠𝑟𝑡 + 𝜋𝑟𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠 + 𝜇𝑠𝑟𝑡

(3)

where 𝑌𝑠𝑟𝑡 is the proportion of teacher candidates of color in state s and region r at year t,
𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑟𝑡 is the dummy for whether a state implemented an MTS program, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑡 is a
relative-year trend variable that captures the number of years before or after an MTS program
became active (this is negative prior, positive after, and zero during the year of implementation,
and zero for states that never adopt an MTS program), and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑟𝑡 is the
interaction of the two, which gives the number of years since installation during the post period.
The coefficient on 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑟𝑡 is the difference in the proportion of teacher candidates of color
conditional on implementation of an MTS program. The coefficient on 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑡 estimates
the pre-trend, and the coefficient on the interaction term is the amount of additional increase in
the proportion of degree completers for every year after an MTS program begins. I include the
same covariates and fixed effect indicators as in equation (2).
Results
After implementation, states with MTS programs had smaller declines in Black teacher
candidates who completed bachelor’s degrees than states without MTS programs. Notably, states
with MTS programs had less overall growth in the proportion of teacher candidates of color and
Hispanic candidates who completed bachelor’s degrees in teacher education relative to states
without programs. These findings are robust to several alternative specifications. MTS
implementing states had differential gains in the proportion of Black candidates completing
bachelor’s degrees in private institutions and in states with greater maximum scholarships.
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Event Study
I begin the analysis by examining the impact of MTS programs on the proportion of
degree completing teacher candidates of color using the event-study model. I estimate equation
(1), and plot estimated 𝛽𝑇 ′𝑠 and associated 90% confidence intervals from these regressions. The
event study model demonstrates that there is a non-trivial and negative pre-trend in states that
implement MTS programs. After implementation, states with MTS programs experienced less
decline in the proportion of Black candidates relative to states without MTS programs.
States adopting MTS programs faced declines in the share of teacher candidates of color
earning bachelor’s degrees in the lead up to adopting a program (Figure 1-5a). These drops
amounted to a three-percentage point change in magnitude from four years to one year before
implementation of an MTS. The evidence suggests that the three-point decline was split evenly
between Black or Hispanic candidates (Figures 1-5b and 1-5c). The proportion of Black
candidates declines by just over one percentage point in the pre-MTS period (Figure 1-5b).
Similarly, the proportion of degree earning Hispanic candidates declines over one percentage
point (Figure 1-5c). All other racial and ethnic groups were flat in the pre- and post-MTS period
(Figure 1-5d). The negative pre-trend raises concerns about using the more restrictive differencein-differences approach to infer causal impacts of an MTS program. I address this in the next
section.
It is notable that states with MTS programs experience less change in the representation
of Black candidates after implementation than states without MTS programs. Beginning in year
one after an MTS program was implemented, the proportion of teacher education bachelor’s
degree earning Black candidates remains stable when compared to states without MTS programs
(Figure 1-5b). Between year one and year four the proportion of Black candidates increases
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dynamically. At peak, states with MTS programs graduate approximately 1.6 percent more Black
candidates than states without MTS program. After the peak, the proportion of Black candidates
in MTS program states relative to states without programs declines from year four to year seven,
with the difference between the groups dropping to a 0.2 percentage point difference. By year
nine after implementation, the estimate rebounded to near peak. The magnitude of this finding is
small and should be interpreted as suggestive evidence that MTS program states maintain the
proportion of Black teacher candidates while states without MTS programs experience declines.
Unlike Black candidates, after implementation of an MTS, there is evidence of a negative
change for all teacher candidates of color or Hispanic candidates relative to states without MTS
programs. When the outcome is the proportion of teacher candidates of color completing
bachelor’s degrees, states implementing MTS programs have a small gain of 0.3 percentage
points relative to states without MTS programs by year three (Figure 1-5a). After year three, the
proportion of teacher candidates of color who earned bachelor’s degrees declines relative to
states without MTS programs until it is just over 2.1 percentage points less. This result is almost
identical to the proportion of Hispanic candidates completing bachelor’s degrees in teacher
education (Figure 1-5c). While the proportion of Hispanic candidates who earned bachelor’s
degrees is almost the same from year one to three after implementation, there is a steep decline
from year three to year five of 2.2 percentage points. The difference in the proportion of
Hispanic candidates between states with and without MTS programs persists through year 10.
Thus, the event study suggests states implementing MTS programs experience stabilization of
the proportion of Black candidates earning teacher education degrees and slower growth in the
proportion of Hispanic candidates relative to states that never implement an MTS program.
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Figure 1-5. Event study measuring the proportion of (a) teacher candidates of color, (b) Black, nonHispanic candidates, (c) Hispanic candidates, and (d) Asian, Native American, Pacific Islander, or
multi-race candidates who completed bachelor’s degrees before and after MTS implementation

(a)

(c)

(b)

(d)
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Difference-in-Differences Estimates
The negative pre-trend in the event study results raises questions about interpreting the
standard DD estimates as causal evidence. There are two concerns. First, if the negative pretrend is statistically significant and meaningful, this could bias estimation because it would be
impossible to know whether estimates are due to MTS programs, omitted variables, or mean
reversion. Second, the standard DD model may not be able to effectively deal with dynamic
post-trends if the trend is non-linear. To address these concerns, I include a differences-indifferences model that allows pre- and post-trends to differ by treatment and control group.
I present the standard and pre- and post-trends difference-in-differences (DD) models in
Table 1-5. In the standard DD models, I find no evidence that states implementing MTS
programs have statistically different proportions of teacher candidates of color, Black, Hispanic,
or other racial and ethnic candidates completing bachelor’s degrees when compared to states
without MTS programs (columns 1-4). When I allow the slopes to change in the pre- and postMTS implementation periods, I find the MTS coefficient is attenuated indicating the model
performs sub-optimally (columns 5-7). In the same models, the pre-trend is negative, and the
post-trend is positive. I interpret this as suggestive evidence of the presence of an MTS effect.
The implementation of an MTS program is associated with a slower growth in the
proportion of teacher candidates of color of 2.78 percentage points relative to states that lack an
MTS program (row 1, column 1). These differences are smaller but similar in magnitude when
the outcome is the proportion of Black (row 1, column 2; -0.48 percentage points) or Hispanic
(row 1, column 3; -2.43 percentage points) candidates completing bachelor’s degrees. Finally,
the other race and ethnicity outcome is positive although barely different (row 1, column 4; 0.13
percentage points). No result is a statistically significant difference, which indicates that either
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(a) the parametric specification and differential trends make detecting an effect difficult, or (b)
there is no effect. However, the estimate of -0.5 percentage points difference in Black candidates
completing degrees in states with and without MTS programs represents about 6% (.5/8) of the
proportion Black candidates completing degrees in states with scholarships, which is meaningful.
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Table 1-5. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of MTS Program Implementation
(1)
Teacher
candidates of
Color

(2)

(3)

Black
candidates

Hispanic
candidates

-0.0048
(0.0079)

-0.0243
(0.0191)

(4)
Other race
and ethnicity
candidates

(5)
Teacher
candidates of
Color

(6)

(7)

0.0013
(0.0031)

(8)
Other race
and ethnicity
candidates

Black
candidates

Hispanic
candidates

-0.0067
(0.0104)

0.0011
(0.0087)

-0.0094
(0.0078)

0.0015
(0.0018)

-0.0036
(0.0027)
0.0024
(0.0036)

-0.0016
(0.0019)
0.0018
(0.0027)

-0.0020
(0.0016)
0.0006
(0.0016)

-0.0000
(0.0006)
0.0000
(0.0007)

Treatment
MTS Implemented

-0.0278
(0.0200)

Pooled trends
Pre-trend
Post-trend
Covariates
Median Income (ln)
Unemployment rate
Demeaned Proportion of Workforce
Identified as Black
Demeaned Proportion of Workforce
Identified as Hispanic
Demeaned Proportion of Workforce
Identified as Person of Color (not
Black or Hispanic)
Consequential School Level
Accountability prior to NCLB
Consequential Teacher Evaluation
Legislation

-0.0020
(0.0300)
-0.0051
(0.0040)
0.5287
(0.5466)
1.1733*
(0.5769)
1.6268*
(0.6671)
-0.0148
(0.0089)
-0.0104
(0.0093)

0.0192
(0.0238)
0.0034~
(0.0020)
0.7939
(0.4860)
-0.0162
(0.2011)

-0.0242
(0.0171)
-0.0074~
(0.0042)
-0.3973
(0.2716)
1.3432*
(0.5761)

0.0029
(0.0101)
-0.0011
(0.0009)
0.1321
(0.1465)
-0.1537~
(0.0838)

-0.0073
(0.0313)
-0.0049
(0.0038)
0.4825
(0.5778)
1.2433*
(0.5901)

0.0181
(0.0244)
0.0034~
(0.0020)
0.7759
(0.4991)
-0.0040
(0.1991)

-0.0283
(0.0179)
-0.0072~
(0.0039)
-0.4250
(0.3025)
1.3999*
(0.6073)

0.0029
(0.0099)
-0.0010
(0.0009)
0.1316
(0.1496)
-0.1526~
(0.0898)

0.5870
(0.5091)

0.1184
(0.4853)

0.9215***
(0.2249)

1.5255*
(0.6994)

0.5869
(0.5134)

0.0192
(0.5569)

0.9194***
(0.2307)

-0.0027
(0.0052)
-0.0061
(0.0080)

-0.0103
(0.0068)
-0.0092
(0.0067)

-0.0018
(0.0016)
0.0049
(0.0032)

-0.0147
-0.0023
-0.0106
-0.0018
(0.0095)
(0.0057)
(0.0070)
(0.0016)
-0.0099
-0.0062
-0.0085
0.0049
(0.0089)
(0.0078)
(0.0062)
(0.0032)
Evolving
Evolving
Evolving
Evolving
Difference-in-Differences Model
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard
Post-Trend
Post-Trend
Post-Trend
Post-Trend
Observations
1053
1053
1053
1053
1053
1053
1053
1053
R-squared
0.9695
0.9429
0.9592
0.9820
0.9698
0.9431
0.9597
0.9820
Notes: All models include state and region-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state level and in parentheses. Significance levels: ~ p<0.10, * p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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I fit a model using equation (3), which allows the treatment and control group pre- and
post-trends to evolve differently (columns 5-8). These models have three noteworthy results:
First, there is attenuation between the estimate of MTS treatment and the proportion of teacher
candidates of color, Black, and Hispanic candidates when the model allows for dynamic trends
(compared to columns 1 through 3), as would be expected with a negative pre-trend. Second,
these models confirm the small negative pre-trend is not statistically significant. Third, all groups
have small positive post-trends, which are also not statistically significant.
In MTS program states, teacher candidates of color grew less as a share of all teacher
candidates after implementation by 0.67 percentage points relative to states that never implement
MTS programs (row 1, column 5). When I compare states with active MTS programs to states
without a program, active states gained fewer Hispanic teacher candidates relative to states
without programs. The difference in the number of Hispanic candidates was -0.94 percentage
points after MTS implementation relative to non-MTS states. Conversely, states with MTS
programs are positive but near zero for the proportion of Black candidates (0.11 percentage
points) and other racial and ethnic identity candidates (0.14) relative to states without MTS
programs. When I control for dynamic change from state-to-state, the MTS estimate magnitude
declines towards 0 and remains statistically insignificant.
In fact, it is clear the main effect estimates of MTS programs decline in magnitude
because there are dynamic changes that occur in the pre- and post-implementation periods. Row
2, Column 5 shows that the pre-trend for teacher candidates of color is -0.36 percentage points
per year in MTS implementing states. Row 2, Column 6 shows the pre-trend is for Black
candidates is -0.16 percentage points per year in states with active MTS programs. The pretrends when Hispanic candidates is the outcome falls between teacher candidates of color and
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Black candidates with an estimate of -0.20 percentage points (Row 2, Column 7). While no pretrends are statistically significant, they are practically important to the estimation because they
suggest that prior to MTS implementation, states with programs have undergone important
declines in the share of Black or Hispanic candidates earning bachelor’s degrees relative to states
without MTS programs.
In the post-period, the trend indicator (Row 3, Columns 5-8) provides suggestive
evidence that the implementation of an MTS program is associated with small positive changes
for all three racial and ethnic groupings. In other words, my estimates show that states
implementing MTS programs have very small positive and statistically non-significant increases
in the proportion of teacher candidates of color, Black, or Hispanic candidates relative to nonMTS program states over time. In Row 3, Column 5, 6, and 7 the annual post-trend is 0.24, 0.18,
and 0.06 percentage points for teacher candidates of color, Black candidates, and Hispanic
candidates, respectively. This evidence is consistently indicative that states that implement MTS
programs experience a directional trend change before and after implementation of an MTS
program when compared to states without MTS programs. While this evidence is not conclusive,
I interpret the evidence about Black candidates to be statistically meaningful and policy relevant.
Tests of Robustness
I conduct six sensitivity checks to examine the robustness of the results to decisions
regarding the construction of the sample and the difference-in-differences model specification
for Black candidates earning bachelor’s degrees. I alter models in the following way: (a) limiting
the years after MTS implementation to five years to examine whether pooled positive estimates
in the early years of a program are statistically significant, (b) limiting analysis to the Census
defined South region to measure whether a region with four of the five MTS programs drove the
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results, (c) including all early adopting states in the sample to explore whether post-trends
change with early adopting states included in the model, (d) using state and year fixed effects to
inspect whether including the West and Midwest regions alters the estimates, (e) reducing the
analysis to include CIP codes that are teacher education specific only, 8 and finally (f) using an
inverse propensity score weighting strategy with the DD model to condition the analysis based
on the degree to which states are comparable on baseline statistics.
In the first column of Table 6, I replicate the baseline preferred model for comparison
purposes. This model includes pre- and post-trends because I determined the standard DD model
performed sub-optimally in the previous section. I include the outcome measuring the proportion
of Black candidates earning bachelor’s degrees only since this was suggestively positive. This
exercise helps determine whether the preferred model results are robust to alternative modeling
choices or not. In columns two through seven are a series of alternative approaches fitting the
model to the data.
I find that the preferred model generates the largest estimate (0.11 percentage points)
relative to the non-preferred models. The alternative specifications estimate the relationship
between MTS implementation and the proportion of Black candidates ranges from -0.35 and
0.03 percentage points difference between states with and without MTS programs. This range of
estimates reinforces the conclusion that states do not significantly increase the proportion of
Black candidates completing bachelor’s degrees before and after an MTS program begins.
While the MTS estimate is near 0, the pre- and post-trend indicators collectively reveal
there are negative pre- trends and positive post-trends across all specifications, as with the

8

I draw on Baron (2019) work and only include 13.02 (multicultural education), 13.10 (special education major),
13.12 (grade level specific major), 13.13 (subject area specific major), and 13.14 (English learner specific major).
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preferred model. Across the columns in row 2, the pre-trend slopes are consistently negative and
small ranging from -0.18 to near zero. This suggests that states with MTS programs have small
negative declines in their share of Black candidates in the years leading up to the beginning of an
MTS program. Across the columns in row 3, the post-trend slopes are consistently positive and
small ranging from near zero to 0.50 percentage points each year after an MTS program is
funded. These results reinforce that after implementation, states with active MTS program have
dynamic increases in the proportion of Black candidates earning teacher education degrees
relative to states without an MTS program. However, the positive post-trend does not increase
the proportion of Black candidates relative to before MTS implementation.
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Table 1-6. Tests of Robustness for Difference-in-Differences Estimates of MTS Program Implementation and the
Proportion of Black Teacher Candidates
(1)
Preferred

(2)
All preyears to 5
years post

(3)
Only the
South

(4)
Including all
states with
MTS

(5)
State and
year FE

(6)
Only teacher
education
major codes

(7)
IPW with
DD

Treatment
MTS Implemented

0.0011
(0.0087)

-0.0035
(0.0065)

0.0003
(0.0099)

-0.0012
(0.0085)

-0.0024
(0.0065)

-0.0017
(0.0086)

-0.0005
(0.0053)

-0.0016
(0.0019)
0.0018
(0.0027)

-0.0018
(0.0022)
0.0050
(0.0034)

0.0000
(0.0017)
0.0005
(0.0024)

-0.0015
(0.0019)
0.0016
(0.0020)

-0.0018
(0.0017)
0.0011
(0.0028)

-0.0014
(0.0020)
0.0013
(0.0028)

0.0000
(0.0021)
0.0000
(0.0025)

Pooled trends
Pre-trend
Post-trend
Covariates
0.0181
0.0254
0.0513
0.0196
0.0090
0.0182
0.0308
(0.0244)
(0.0248)
(0.0394)
(0.0209)
(0.0244)
(0.0246)
(0.0229)
0.0034~
0.0034
0.0030
0.0034~
0.0034
0.0030
0.0021
Unemployment rate
(0.0020)
(0.0021)
(0.0029)
(0.0017)
(0.0022)
(0.0020)
(0.0016)
Proportion of Workforce Identified as
0.7759
0.8188
1.4388**
0.7578
0.4815
0.6012
1.6916***
Black
(0.4991)
(0.4920)
(0.3739)
(0.4525)
(0.5325)
(0.4597)
(0.3173)
Proportion of Workforce Identified as
-0.0040
0.2331
-0.4457~
-0.0123
0.3301
0.0128
-0.1387
Hispanic
(0.1991)
(0.2198)
(0.2279)
(0.1833)
(0.2441)
(0.1985)
(0.1404)
Proportion of Workforce Identified as
0.5869
0.4223
0.9073
0.5694
0.4596
0.6578
0.0795
Person of Color (not Black or Hispanic)
(0.5134)
(0.4980)
(0.6659)
(0.5091)
(0.4547)
(0.5267)
(0.3158)
Consequential School Level
-0.0023
0.0004
-0.0059
-0.0003
0.0041
-0.0024
-0.0018
Accountability prior to NCLB
(0.0057)
(0.0053)
(0.0120)
(0.0046)
(0.0042)
(0.0054)
(0.0061)
Consequential Teacher Evaluation
-0.0062
-0.0070
0.0035
-0.0042
-0.0132
-0.0072
-0.0028
Legislation
(0.0078)
(0.0088)
(0.0090)
(0.0063)
(0.0118)
(0.0075)
(0.0064)
State Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Region-by-Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Observations
1053
1005
363
1167
1053
1053
1053
R-squared
0.9434
0.9455
0.9130
0.9437
0.9320
0.9417
0.9379
Notes: All models include state and region-by-year fixed effects except Column 5. Standard errors clustered at the state level and in parentheses.
Significance levels: ~ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Median Income (ln)
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Heterogeneous Effects
I conduct two tests of differential MTS program associations with the proportion of Black
candidates. I find that states with MTS programs with the greatest financial value scholarships
experience dynamic positive gains in the proportion of Black candidates over time while states
with lesser financial value scholarships experience short-term gains that fade over time.
Furthermore, I find that Black gains concentrate in private, non-profit postsecondary and not
public institutions in MTS states.
Greatest Financial Value Scholarships
In the first test, I explore whether the total value of a scholarship appears to change the
relationship with the outcome. In the case of the five states, North Carolina offers a maximum
scholarship of $26,500 while Kentucky offers $20,000. This is in comparison to maximum
scholarships of much lesser value in Arkansas ($6,000), Connecticut ($10,000), and Florida
($8,000). It is possible that scholarships with greater financial value induce more response from
students of color. For instance, $20,000 in Kentucky over 4 years would cover about half of the
average public postsecondary institutions’ tuition and fees whereas $10,000 in Connecticut over
4 years would cover about 20% of the average public postsecondary institutions’ tuition and fees.
I formalize this analysis by fitting a fully flexibly event study model and a DD model that allows
for pre- and post-trends like that in equation (1) and equation (3), respectively. I estimate models
for Kentucky and North Carolina and then Arkansas, Connecticut, and Florida, separately.
In the pre-implementation period, Kentucky and North Carolina experience large,
statistically significant declines in the number of Black candidates relative to states without MTS
programs (Figure 1-6a). After the MTS programs are implemented in Kentucky and North
Carolina, the proportion of Black candidates does not change at all in years 1 and 2 when
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compared to states without MTS programs. Notably, though, the two states then see dynamic
growth in the proportion from year two through year nine after the scholarship begins relative to
states that never adopt MTS programs. In year nine is the peak, which indicates that Kentucky
and North Carolina had four percentage points more Black Candidates completing bachelor’s
degrees when compared to states that never adopt an MTS program. This evidence is strongly
suggestive that MTS programs with greater maximum scholarships experience positive,
persistent, and dynamic returns in the proportion of Black teacher candidates.
States with lesser financial value scholarships did not fare as well. In Arkansas,
Connecticut, and Florida, there were about one percentage point more Black teacher candidates
than in states that never implement MTS programs (Figure 1- 6b). In the post-MTS period,
Arkansas, Connecticut, and Florida gain two percentage points more Black teacher candidates
than states without MTS programs. However, these gains peaked in year two and declined until
year eight. In fact, by year six Arkansas, Connecticut, and Florida’s had smaller proportions of
Black candidates relative to states without MTS programs. This result continued through year 10.
In sum, states with greater value scholarships had more persistent and larger positive associations
than did states with smaller value scholarships, which had short-term gains and then declines.
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Figure 1-6. Event study for the proportion of Black, non-Hispanic candidates who completed bachelor’s degrees in (a) the states with the
larger financial value scholarships, and (b) states with smaller financial value scholarship in states implementing an MTS

(a)

(b)
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When I fit the DD model with pre- and post-trends, I find that Kentucky and North
Carolina had greater gains identified from MTS programs and statistically significant negative
pre- and positive post-trends while the other three states had smaller gains identified from MTS
programs and negative pre- and post-trends (Table 1-7). The MTS estimate indicates that the
proportion of Black teacher candidates in Kentucky and North Carolina before and after MTS
program implementation is 0.76 (Table 1-7, row 1, column 1) greater than states without a
program. The MTS coefficient for the three states three MTS states deviate -0.10 (Table 1-7, row
1, column 2) relative to states with no MTS program. Even more clearly, the estimates that
include Kentucky and North Carolina indicate these states had statistically significant and
negative pre-trends and statistically significant and positive post-trends. This runs counter to the
other three states with MTS programs, which had non-significant, positive pre-trends and nonsignificant, negative post-trends. In sum, this analysis reveals that states offering greater valued
scholarships experienced dynamic positive associations between MTS implementation and the
proportion of Black teacher candidates earning teacher education degrees while states offering
lesser valued scholarships did not experience gains over time.
Table 1-7. Difference-in-Differences Estimates of MTS Programs Association
with the Proportion of Black Teacher Candidates
(1)
Greatest Maximum
Scholarship States

(2)
Least Maximum
Scholarship States

Treatment
MTS Implemented
0.0076 (0.0058)
-0.0010 (0.0056)
Pooled trends
Pre-trend
-0.0047* (0.0019)
0.0008 (0.0022)
Post-trend
0.0068** (0.0025)
-0.0016 (0.0028)
All Covariates
Yes
Yes
State Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Year Fixed Effects
No
No
Region-by-Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
984
1012
R-squared
0.9448
0.9390
Notes: All models include state and region-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state
level and in parentheses. Significance levels: ~ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Private Higher Education Institutions
In the second test, I examine whether proportion of Black candidates earning degrees is
associated with whether an institution is private or public. All terms are the same as equation (1)
and (2) except for the lag and lead indicators, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑇,𝑠𝑟𝑡 and 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑡 𝑥 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑟𝑡 . The
indicators of interest come from the 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑡 𝑥 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑟𝑡 , which represent the change in the
proportion of Black teacher candidates in private and public institutions. I then fit a tripledifference model adding the same terms as above into equation (2). In this model, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑡
represents the difference between private and public school proportions of Black candidates
when MTS programs are not funded and the estimate of interest is 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑟𝑡 𝑥 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑠𝑟𝑡 , which
represents the difference between private and public schools in the pre- and post-MTS periods.
When I compare states with and without an MTS program after the scholarship becomes
active, the proportion of Black candidates earning bachelor’s degrees in private institutions
grows more rapidly than Black candidates in public institutions in states with MTS programs
(Figure 1-7). From year one through year 4, this difference grows to 3.5 percentage points total.
After a temporary decline, the estimates peak in year nine at just under 4 percentage points
difference between private and public institutions in states with and without MTS programs. The
event study suggests that growth in the proportion of Black candidates in states with MTS
programs is driven by private institutions.
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Figure 1-7. Event study showing the difference between public and private schooling institutions by the proportion of Black, non-Hispanic
candidates who completed bachelor’s degrees in states with MTS programs
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The MTS estimate generated using the triple-difference model shows that the difference
in the private and public-school proportion of Black candidates is not statistically significant, but
is meaningful in states with and without MTS (Table 1-8). This difference is -0.48 percentage
points in column 1, row 1 but only -0.25 percentage points in column 2, row 1. This reveals that
the MTS indicator yields no evidence that states with MTS programs are represented with more
Black candidates than states without MTS programs. Moreover, when I turn to the interaction,
which measures the difference in Black candidate bachelor degree completers in private and
public institutions between states with and without MTS programs before and after
implementation, private institutions in MTS states have 1.45 percentage points more growth in
the proportion of Black candidates completing their degrees than do private institutions in states
without MTS programs. I interpret this non-significant estimate as suggestive evidence that
private institutions have more rapid increases in the number of Black teacher candidates who
complete degrees in states with MTS programs.
Table 1-8. Triple-Difference Estimates of MTS Programs
Association with the Proportion of Black Teacher Candidates
(1)
(2)
Preferred
Private
Specification
Treatment
-0.0048
-0.0025
MTS
(0.0079)
(0.0145)
Setting
Private
0.0120 (0.0116)
Interaction
Private x MTS
0.0145 (0.0267)
All Covariates
Yes
Yes
State Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Region-by-Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Observations
1053
1012
R-squared
0.9695
0.9390
Notes: All models include state and region-by-year fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the state level and in parentheses.
Significance levels: ~ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Placebo Test
Finally, I conduct a placebo test. To do this, I draw on the approach that Harris and
Adams (2007) used to compare turnover across practitioner professions like teaching. In their
analysis, they study nurses, social workers, and accountants. In this analysis, I draw on
bachelor’s degrees in nursing9 primarily because Harris and Adams (2007) sample from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) demonstrates that representation of Black teachers (8.17%)
closely approximates that of Black nurses (8.94%).
In the baseline year of IPEDS data, 1994-1995, bachelor’s degree completing teacher
were represented as follows: Black candidates were 5.9%, Hispanic candidates 2.9%, and all
other racial and ethnic group candidates 3.7% of the total pool of completers. This is relatively
close to the proportion of nurses completing bachelor’s degrees in the baseline year, which stood
at: 6.0% for Black candidates, 2.4% for Hispanic candidates, and 4.6% for all other racial and
ethnic group candidates. Nationally, the two majors have similar shares of candidates of color.
I use equations (1), (2), and (3) for the nursing data to compare the results from the event
study and DD specifications. In Figure 8a, after states implement MTS programs, the proportion
of Black candidates earning teacher education bachelor’s degrees increases linearly from year
one through year three. From year three through year five is the peak difference between states
with and without MTS programs. There is a small decline from year five through seven, although
this decline never results in states with MTS programs have lower proportions of Black
candidates than states without MTS programs. From year seven through year 10, the proportion
of Black candidates increases again to near the peak in year four.

9

To determine who earned bachelor’s degrees in nursing, I used data from IPEDS with the first four digits of the
CIP code began with 51.38 and before 2010 this 51.16. In Appendix 1-B, how CIP codes were selected here and for
teacher education degree completers.
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This result differs substantially from the proportion of Black nurses who earn nursing
major bachelor’s degrees before and after MTS implementation (Figure 1-8b). After
implementation of MTS programs, Black nursing candidates have a small increase from year
zero to year one. However, after year 1, states with MTS programs experience slow declines all
the way through year ten. In most years the difference between the proportion of Black nurses
earning bachelor’s degrees is close to zero, from year seven to year eight the difference in MTS
states drops to about two percentage points lower when compared to states without MTS
programs. When replacing teacher education majors with nursing majors, there is no evidence
that the MTS teacher education estimates are spuriously related to unobserved changes in
universities in states with MTS programs.
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Figure 1-8. Event study showing the proportion of Black, non-Hispanic candidates who completed (a) teacher education or (b) nursing
bachelor’s degrees in states implementing MTS programs

(a)

(b)
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The standard and pre- and post-trend DD models in Table 9 confirm the event study
results. The estimated difference in the proportion of Black candidates earning teacher education
bachelor’s degrees in states with and without MTS programs is -0.48 percentage points (Table 8,
column 1, row 1) while Black candidates earning nursing degrees is -2.16 percentage points
(Table 8, column 3, row 1). The negative decline in states with MTS programs amongst nursing
majors is a statistically significant result (p<0.05). When I shift to an interaction to allow states
to linearly evolve, the MTS estimate changes. For teachers the difference is 0.11 percentage
points (Table 8, column 2, row 1) and for nurses the difference is -0.39 percentage points (Table
8, column 4, row 1). While dynamic changes close the gap, there remains a 0.50 percentage
points between Black teacher education and nursing majors. There are also differences in the
direction of the pre- and post-trend results. Black teacher education majors have a negative pretrend before MTS begins (-0.16 percentage points; Table 8, column 2, row 2) and a positive posttrend after MTS is implemented (0.18 percentage points; Table 8, column 2, row 3). This is
different than Black nursing majors earning bachelor’s degrees. For that, the pre-trend is
negative (-0.12; Table 8, column 4, row 2) and the post-trend is negative (-0.07; Table 8, column
4, row 3). Thus, the placebo test supports the notion that the association between MTS
implementation and Black teacher education gains are not confounded by general unobserved
change in Black individuals’ labor market opportunities.
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Table 1-9. Placebo Test for Difference-in-Differences Estimates of MTS Programs
Association with the Proportion of Black Teacher or Nursing Candidates
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Standard DD
Teachers

Linearly
Evolving DD
Teachers

Standard
DD Nurses

Linearly
Evolving
DD Nurses

-0.0048
(0.0079)

0.0011
(0.0087)

-0.0216*
(0.0100)

-0.0039
(0.0063)

Treatment
MTS Implemented
Pooled trends
Pre-trend

-0.0016
(0.0019)

-0.0012
(0.0021)

0.0018
-0.0007
(0.0027)
(0.0021)
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Region-by-Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
1053
1053
1053
1053
R-squared
0.9429
0.9431
0.9502
0.9513
Notes: Full models include all covariates like Table 5. All models include state and region-byyear fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the state level and in parentheses. Significance
levels: ~ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Post-trend

Discussion and Implications
In sum, when I compare states with and without MTS programs, I find that MTS
programs do not increase the share of teacher candidates of color. However, the presence of
MTS programs stabilizes the proportion of Black candidates in MTS states, which is driven by
increasing the proportion of Black candidates in private institutions and in states with larger
maximum financial value scholarships. This evidence should be interpreted cautiously since the
most restrictive assumption of a DD model requires parallel trends and this assumption is
violated. Yet, I interpret this evidence as illuminating because (a) there is no previous study of
this topic and (b) the alternative specifications, differential tests, and placebo test all suggest that
the relationship between MTS and the proportion of Black candidates completing teacher
education is a robust finding.
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In light of the results here and other results suggesting that state level financial aid for
merit and need boost completion rates (Castleman & Long, 2016; Dynarski, 2008; Jia, 2019), I
consider three explanations for the main findings. The three plausibly explanations for the results
are the programs: (a) are not large enough, (b) are substitutes to state level financial aid based on
academic merit or need, or (c) are enacted in states with specific racial-ethnic structures (Lee et
al., 2017).
Limitations
Before addressing potential explanations for these results, I address the threats to the
internal and external validity of the results. There are three key threats to the internal validity of
the estimates. First, since the data are collected through self-reporting by each institution, there is
the potential that each institution or state has systematically under-reported the number of
aspiring teachers by race or ethnicity (Ford et al., 2020), teacher education major, or by sector.
Second, the key assumption of causal inference when using a difference-in-differences
framework is to have parallel pre-trends between the treatment and control groups. While the
negative pre-trend is not statistically significant in the preferred model, the pre-trend is
meaningful because it represents a large fraction of the total teachers of color in any state. When
I include a pre- and post-trend in my DD model, the MTS estimate is attenuated suggesting that
this is a non-trivial difference. I argue this result supports interpreting the relationships as
correlational. Third, since MTS programs are small and understudied, there is considerable
uncertainty among researchers about when programs began, how many students received
scholarships and graduated in any given year, and how much money students received. While
this threatens the internal validity of my evidence, I contend that this paper illuminates MTS
programs as an important public policy in several states.
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There is one threat to the external validity of this study. The setting is important and one
where I am limited in this study. Since a small number of implementing states have pre- and
post-MTS outcomes, the conclusions are limited to the five states where it is possible to observe
pre- and post-MTS data. This restriction implies that five other early adopting states are not
addressed through this study and it is plausible that early adopting MTS states differ qualitatively
and quantitatively. I now turn to the three potential explanations for why these outcomes run
contrary to what might be expected from other scholarship literature.
Financial Incentives are not Large Enough
Individuals generally weigh many factors when they determine whether to enroll and
remain in postsecondary education and when they select a major. Existing research, when
coupled with economic theory, suggests that individuals weigh preferences for taking out loans
with given ability and costs of training in one occupation relative to another when determining
post-secondary educational investments (Boatman et al., 2017; Field, 2009; Roth, 1951). It is
simply possible that the benefits of existing scholarships do not overcome the loan preferences of
aspiring teachers of color.
The size of any incentive could be an especially problematic design feature if teacher
candidates of color are borrowing more heavily to earn a degree (Delisle & Holt, 2017), more
unlikely to teach if they take out above average loan amounts (Baker et al., 2018), or averse to
any student loans (Boatman et al., 2017). The evidence from this study suggests that states with
larger financial value scholarships have greater gains in the proportion of Black candidates
relative to states with smaller financial value scholarships. The fact that individuals appear to
respond to the size of the financial incentive aligns with tangential research that shows
individuals respond to tuition relief differently than loan forgiveness (Field, 2009) and loan
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elimination programs (Rouse & Rothstein, 2011). Larger awards for individuals of color who
wish to teach might build the teacher of color labor supply more quickly in the short-run, which
may have positive benefits for students that align with other teacher quality reforms that target
teacher characteristics (Goldhaber et al., 2019).
A second point reinforces the idea that individual financial aid incentives may not be
large enough. In one of my differential tests, I find evidence that suggests states with the greatest
financial value scholarships (Kentucky and North Carolina) had dynamic and substantial growth
in the proportion of Black candidates while lesser financial value scholarships had temporary
growth that faded out over time (Figure 6 and Table 7). In real terms, Arkansas, Connecticut, and
Florida cover 20% to 45% for four years of public university tuition and fees while Kentucky
and North Carolina give 45% to 90% of tuition and fees for four years. The gains I find here
build on studies that show positive employment outcomes in the labor market for recipients of
teacher scholarships (Henry et al., 2012; Steele et al., 2010). Assuming that money is
fundamental to higher education investments, the incentive size is a plausible explanation for the
underwhelming results and the differential findings based on financial value suggests that
individuals of color may have price elastic demand to for teacher education investments.
Programs are not Scaled Properly
A second explanation is that MTS programs are too small overall. Most implemented
programs are small relative to the number of teacher education bachelor’s degrees in any state.
For example, in the largest program in Florida, at peak 937 teacher candidates of color received
an MTS award. Without these awards distributed across cohorts of teacher candidates, this would
represent 65% of the teacher candidates of color who had a bachelor’s degree conferred in the
state. If the programs perfectly recruited new teacher candidates of color who would otherwise
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not enter teacher preparation and graduated each one, then programs would generate large gains
in the proportion of candidates of color. But scholarships are likely spread across multiple
cohorts of students (indicating that smaller percentages of any graduating group received a
scholarship) and programs are unlikely to recruit many people who would otherwise be
uninterested in teaching. For instance, in a survey by the Illinois Student Assistance Commission
of 770 Minority Teachers of Illinois Scholarship or David A. DeBolt Teacher Shortage
Scholarship recipients, 81% of the recipients wanted to be teachers without a scholarship and
73% did not consider scholarship availability when deciding their major (Illinois Student
Assistance Commission, 2003). Without more granular information about who is price elastic to
MTS awards, the size of programs seems especially problematic to generating a statistical
change in the proportion of teacher candidates of color completing bachelor’s degrees.
It is also plausible that MTS programs size is related to a lack of public awareness of
programs. Through informal conversations with professors in universities across the state and
practitioners of color, it was clear that most had not heard about programs. Given the knowledge
that individuals are more apt to enter a public service job when student loans are eliminated
(Field, 2009; Rouse & Rothstein, 2011) and other evidence that Black or Hispanic individuals
are more loan averse to student debt than other racial groups (Boatman et al., 2017), states
implementing MTS programs should make great efforts to ensure that communities of color are
aware of their existence. As part of expanded advertising, states may seek to disentangle whether
MTS financial incentives are tools of recruitment or retention.
Programs are Substitutes of State Level Financial Aid Based on Merit or Need
It also could be that aspiring teachers who would be responsive to MTS never seek them
because they already receive state level financial aid based on merit or need. In this case, the
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presence of the MTS would be substituted by other financial aid that covers similar amounts of
tuition and fees. This is a plausible solution considering how big programs tend to be. For
instance, “in 2000-2001, 75,000 students received $277 million in [GA] HOPE scholarships”
(Dynarski, 2004, p. 70) and according to the National Association of State Student Grant and Aid
Programs (NASSGAP) survey over 100,000 students receive awards annually since 2003. Jia
(2019) shows that at least 20 states have merit scholarships. Need-based financial aid is largely
supported by federal Pell grants (Schudde & Scott-Clayton, 2016), but state programs expend at
least $7 billion annually (Castleman & Long, 2016). The large-scale of state financial aid based
on merit or need indicates that programs may be substitutes, not complements, for MTS aid.
Programs are Adopted in States with Specific Racial-Ethnic Structures
This study had one consistently positive and suggestive piece of evidence about MTS
programs. Across the evidence, MTS programs were associated with stabilizing the proportion of
Black candidates in states with programs relative to states without programs. This is an
encouraging finding. However, states with MTS programs had slower growth in the number of
Hispanic candidates when compared to states without MTS programs. This is a more
discouraging result as this is a rapidly growing demographic. This raises key questions about
how variation in the racial and ethnic structures of states intersects with program designs.
In 2017, Lee and colleagues show that, “states with high diversity…do not always
resemble each other in racial-ethnic structure (p. 1039). They demonstrate this by reviewing
states racial and ethnic groups and assigning a typology based on whether any racial or ethnic
group with more than 10% of the population. Through this strategy, they find that states typically
have white, white-Black, or white-Hispanic groups that represent more than 10% of the
population as of 2015. Of the five states I observe pre- and post-MTS data, two had more than
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10% of the population who were white and three had >10% of the population who were white or
Black in 1980. By 2015, one state had more than 10% of the population identify as white, one
had >10% of the population who were white or Black, one had >10% of the population who
were white or Hispanic, and two had >10% of the population who were white, Black, or
Hispanic. A straight-forward interpretation of this is that few states with MTS have significant
shares of any racial or ethnic group, and when they do tend to have the largest shares of people
who are Black. Thus, a reasonable assumption is individuals who among the most likely
recipients of MTS aid and this plausibly explains my results for Black candidates.
Implications
The conclusions from this research study raise suggestions for state education agencies,
teacher education program administrators, and financial aid administrators. Regardless of setting,
individuals should aim to build longitudinal panel datasets observing who enrolls and who
persists through alternative and traditional teacher education pathways. As part of this data, all
institutions should include demographic, academic, and financial characteristics (both financial
aid, loan debts, and family need) of the students who enter programs. As these datasets grow in
length and richness, institutions can invite knowledgeable researchers to conduct external
evaluations of programs. This strategy will allow states and universities to develop deeper
insights about the inequities that occur within teacher pipelines that potentially exacerbate
inequities within K-12 systems.
State education agencies should also seek to describe the racial and ethnic demographic
shifts occurring within student, educator, and the workforce populations writ large. As I
mentioned earlier, context matters and state education agencies who are responsible for writing
statutes and enacting laws can ensure that programs help individuals that would most benefit a
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K-12 system. For instance, MTS programs might work best by offering incentives to the largest
racial or ethnic group that is not white, in the vein of Lee et al., (2017) finding that states
typically have two racial groups that are 10% or more of the population. Another approach might
be to develop scholarships that are responsive to the specific racial and ethnic characteristics in a
state. Modeled after states identifying shortages by subject area, there may changes occurring at
the student level that require incentives to increase the rate of change at the teacher level. MTS
programs might most efficient when they are designed to respond to the context rather than to
nationalized claims that underrepresentation of teachers of color is prevalent everywhere.
Finally, financial aid administrators should seek to build data sets of financial
characteristics of individuals that includes tuition owed, loan and financial aid used to pay for
tuition, and family need. It is only with more granular data that nuance can be added to what is
already known about financial aid programs. This type of information is especially useful for
public service occupations since very little is known about how individuals make choices to train
to be a teacher or what causes individuals to persist through programs. Without financial aid
administrators supporting efforts, there can only be so much done to design financial aid
solutions that truly meet the problems of states, higher education institutions, and students.
In conclusion, recruiting, training, hiring, and retaining teachers of color matters for
students in American public schools. This study aimed to uncover the first national evidence
about whether states implementing MTS programs benefit with increased teacher candidate of
color degree attainment. I find no evidence that states benefit in this way, but suggestive
evidence that states see returns in the proportion of Black candidates who complete teacher
education degrees driven by gains in private institutions or states with larger financial value
scholarships. Rather than interpreting this evidence as conclusive, I argue that new questions
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arise about program design and racial and ethnic demographic contexts as key elements to target
for program improvement. I call for further quantitative inquiry linking MTS awards, individuals
of color who are enrolled in the teacher pipeline, and degree attainment and labor market
outcomes. Through this inquiry, politicians and policymakers have opportunities to engage in
programmatic improvement and to advocate for this as an important policy lever to improve
educator racial and ethnic diversity, and potentially student experiences and outcomes.
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Appendix 1-A. Procedures for Identifying “Minority Teacher Scholarship” Program
States
To determine whether a state adopted an MTS program, I defined MTS programs as a
scholarship operated by a state government that explicitly required an applicant to identify as an
individual of color. To locate states that implemented MTS programs, I used the following
search strategy. First, I used prior literature by Bachler and Hill (2003) and Villegas et al. (2012)
to scan state level minority teacher recruitment or retention policies. Second, I searched Google
for “Teacher Scholarships” and “Minority Teacher Scholarships” by state. Third, I searched
Higher Education, Financial Aid, and Department of Education websites by state. Finally, I used
the National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP) to review all aid
available by state.10 Using the described procedure resulted in the identification of 11 MTS
programs.
It is notable as well that the definitions of individuals of color varied from state-to-state.
Some states defined fewer racial groups as an individual of color than other states. Seven of the
11 states included Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Native American identified peoples; one state
included Black and Hispanic identified peoples; another state included Black, Hispanic, and
Asian person from Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam; yet, other states include all racially and
linguistically diverse peoples and one state included only individuals attending two Historically
Black Colleges and Universities in the state. Despite the different definitions by state, the main
goal of each program remained the same; the programs aim to boost racial and ethnic diversity of
teacher candidates completing teacher education degrees and earning teacher certification.

10

NASSGAP information was retrieved from:
https://www.nassgapsurvey.com/survey/program_finder/program_finder.asp.

Appendix 1-B. Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) Code selection for Teachers
and Nursing
I drew on the guidance from Kraft et al. (2020), which is found in Appendix C of their
paper. I follow the exact approach from their paper using CIP descriptors and CIP codes as
follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Education, General: 13.0101
Bilingual, Multilingual, and Multicultural Education 13.0201-12.0299
Curriculum and Instruction: 13.0301
Special Education and Teaching: 13.1001-13.1099
Teacher Education & Professional Development, Specific Levels and Methods: 13.120113.1299
Teacher Education & Professional Development, Specific Levels and Methods: 13.130113.1399
Teaching English or French as a Second or Foreign Language: 13.1401-13.1499
Education, Other: 13.9999 (p. 78)

I restrict the data to include only graduates that earned a bachelor’s and summed the institutionlevel counts at the state-by-year level. I also extended their approach in a specification check. I
specifically was checking to see whether limiting the CIP codes to definitive teacher education
areas altered the results. In that approach, I kept the following five CIP categories and codes:
•
•
•
•
•

Bilingual, Multilingual, and Multicultural Education 13.0201-12.0299
Special Education and Teaching: 13.1001-13.1099
Teacher Education & Professional Development, Specific Levels and Methods: 13.120113.1299
Teacher Education & Professional Development, Specific Levels and Methods: 13.130113.1399
Teaching English or French as a Second or Foreign Language: 13.1401-13.1499

I also conduct a placebo test using nursing CIP categories and codes. Since no other research
offered clear guidance, I used data from IPEDS with the first four digits of the CIP code began
with 51.38.11 From there, I selected CIP codes by reading the definition of the group and making
a decision about whether this was likely to be a nurse practitioner major or not. The categories
and codes I included are found below:
•
•
•
•
•
•
11

Nursing/Registered Nurse (RN, ASN, BSN, MSN) 51.3801
Adult Health Nurse/Nursing 51.3803
Family Practice Nurse/Nurse Practitioner 51.3805
Maternal/Child Health and Neonatal Nurse/Nursing 51.3806
Pediatric Nurse/Nursing 51.3809
Psychiatric/Mental Health Nurse/Nursing 51.3810

I used the CIP code crosswalk to use similar definitions across all the years of the data. The crosswalk is found
here: https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/cipcode/crosswalk.aspx?y=55

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Public Health/Community Nurse/Nursing 51.3811
Perioperative/Operating Room and Surgical Nurse/Nursing 51.3812
Clinical Nurse Specialist 51.3813
Critical Care Nursing 51.3814
Occupational and Environmental Health Nursing 51.3815
Emergency Room/Trauma Nursing 51.3816
Nursing Practice 51.3118
Palliative Care Nursing 51.3819
Geriatric Nurse/Nursing 51.3821
Women's Health Nurse/Nursing 51.3822
Registered Nursing, Nursing Administration, Nursing Research and Clinical Nursing,
Other 51.3899
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Chapter 2 Do Minority Teacher Scholarships Lessen Leaks in the Teacher Pipeline?
Evidence Flagship University’s Traditional Teacher Education Program
Minoritized teachers play a positive role in the schooling experiences and outcomes of
minoritized students (Achinstein et al., 2010; Bristol & Martin-Fernandez, 2019; Dee, 2004;
Egalite et al., 2015; Gershenson et al., 2018; Ouazad, 2014; Redding, 2019). Despite near
consensus arguments that increasing the presence of teachers of color in schools would benefit
schools (Phillip & Brown, 2020), individuals of color leave during teacher candidacy (“the
pipeline”) more frequently than individuals who identify as white (Lindsay et al., 2017; Redding
& Baker, 2019; Rucinski & Goodman, 2019; U.S. Department of Education, 2016). The
persistent failure to ensure that the pipeline does not leak for individuals of color ensures that
rising student of color populations remain underrepresented by teachers of color (Boser, 2014).
For states to address this problem, public policy strategies must widen the pipeline by increasing
access to teaching and fix leaks from within the teacher pipeline to ensure that individuals of
color who enroll in teacher education complete degrees.
For at least 30 years, most public policies have widened the pipeline of potential
educators. Widening strategies, often referred to as alternative teacher certification pathways,
expand access to teaching by allowing individuals to become the teacher of record during their
preparation as long as they have other necessary credentials or experiences (e.g., bachelor’s
degree or classroom experience) that make them viable teaching candidates (Clewell & Villegas,
1998; Gist et al., 2019; Guha et al., 2017; Silva et al., 2014). These strategies frequently increase
access for individuals of color (Carver-Thomas, 2018; Guha et al., 2017). Despite the persistent
presence of this strategy, alternative certification programs are costly investments, train fewer
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candidates than traditional certification programs, and have worse completion outcomes (Guha et
al., 2017; Silva et al., 2014; Villegas & Clewell, 1998).1
Over the same time frame, only one policy effort at the state level, a financial aid policy,
sought to reduce the number of enrolling teachers of color who leave before earning a teacher
education degree. Financial aid is an oft-used tool by states to support aspiring teachers (Landa,
2020) and eleven2 states have implemented programs called Minority Teacher Scholarships
(MTS). 3 MTS programs directly reduce tuition for individuals who identify as a person of color
(i.e., all racial or ethnic identities exclusive of white). These efforts are promising because higher
education is costly and aspiring teachers may alter their occupational choices when the costs of
preparation are reduced. In fact, the effects of financial aid for future teachers of color may be
especially large because individuals of color are more likely to be loan averse or sensitive to the
amount of student loans they acquire than colleagues who are white (Baker et al., 2018; Boatman
et al., 2017).
Since 1988, states implementing MTS programs have paid out over $120 million in
scholarship aid to individuals of color, but no analysis has established whether the receipt of an
MTS is related to degree attainment. I take the first steps toward addressing the lack of empirical
information about MTS programs by answering the question, “does an MTS award affect
bachelor and master teacher education degree completion for students of color already enrolled
in a flagship university's teacher education program?” To motivate inferences that reduce but do
not eliminate concerns of selection bias, I employ complementary OLS and propensity score

1

I use Silva et al. (2014) and Villegas & Clewell (1998) summary statistics to calculate raw attrition rates from the
programs they study.
2
A table summarizing this information is available upon request to the author.
3
The number of MTS programs is based on the author’s definition of an MTS program and a multi-step
identification procedure that is explained in Appendix 2-A.

76
matching approaches to estimate the relationship between MTS participation and degree
attainment. By using OLS, I address concerns that models suffer from omitted variable bias. I
extend the analysis using propensity score matching, which reduces concerns that non-linear
selection of recipients for MTS aid biases my estimates. When the assumptions of propensity
score matching are met, this approach is a distinct improvement for comparisons over OLS.
I find that receipt of an MTS award has a strong association with bachelor and master
degree conferral for teacher candidates of color. Across models, the results similarly indicate that
teacher candidates of color who received an MTS award completed their bachelor’s degree
between 5.9 and 17.7 percentage points and master’s degree (along with teacher licensure)
between 26.1 and 41.6 percentage points more than otherwise observably similar individuals
who received no MTS award. The results are statistically significant and practically large, but the
estimates are sensitive to model specification.
Background
Recent work shows that teachers of color can affect processes related to discipline and
gatekeeping for gifted or special education (Grissom et al., 2015), act as role models for students
(Gershenson et al., 2018), and ensure curriculums are culturally responsive for students (LadsonBillings,1994; Sleeter, 2012). Practically, teachers of color contribute in all these areas and these
contribute to better perceived experiences and outcomes for students of color taught by a teacher
of color (Bristol & Martin-Fernandez, 2019; Dee, 2004; Egalite et al., 2015; Gershenson et al.,
2018; Ouazad, 2014; Redding, 2019). Yet, state public policymakers have offered few policy
solutions to underrepresentation of teachers of color and research has largely left unexamined
whether policies applied within the teacher pipeline can reduce this problem.
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Despite few empirical studies of public policies intended to boost the teacher of color
labor supply, for at least twenty years researchers have suggested that MTS programs are a
conceptually strong state strategy to reduce underrepresentation of teachers of color (Bachler &
Hill, 2003; Carver-Thomas, 2018; Dilworth & Coleman, 2014; Hirsch et al., 2001; Villegas et
al., 2012). This idea is likely driven by a key assumption that state awarded financial aid
supports improved outcomes. While in some cases this is true, this assumption is not empirically
supported across all contexts. Several studies of state level scholarships awarded on merit
(Dynarski, 2000; 2004; 2008) and need (Bettinger, 2015; Castleman & Long, 2016) suggest that
students respond to reductions in the costs of higher education schooling by enrolling and
completing degrees more than if the money did not exist. Other studies purport that not all merit
or needs scholarships spur individuals to enroll in different more selective institutions nor do
they improve degree attainment (Cohodes & Goodman, 2014), a result that one scholar attributed
to differences in generosity and leniency for initial and continuing eligibility of merit-based
awards (Jia, 2020). MTS programs that are insufficiently generous or lenient may not support
student persistence and degree attainment.
I seek to contribute to this literature by estimating the relationship between receiving an
MTS financial aid award and earning a teacher education bachelor’s or master’s degree. Given
conflicting evidence about state level financial aid awarded for merit and based on the lack of
empirical knowledge about how well MTS incentives work to improve degree attainment, I draw
on three areas of educational literature to ground this study. Two of the areas focus on teachers
of color including: (a) teachers of color matter, but (b) the teacher pipeline is not designed to
serve teachers of color effectively. The third area focuses on (c) the challenges of identifying
causal effects of self-selected scholarships.
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Teachers of Color Matter for Schooling
Over the last two decades, education researchers have established two clear empirical
relationships. First, teachers are the single most important in-school determinant to student’s
academic, behavioral, and social development (Chetty et al., 2014). The basis of this idea is
critical to schools since recruitment, hiring, retention, and
Second, teachers of color impact similar outcomes for students of color (add cites).
Existing research findings show that racial congruence, defined as a student and a teacher
sharing the same racial or ethnic identity, correlates with differences in students’ outcomes. For
instance, students who are taught by a teacher who shares their racial or ethnic identity score
higher on standardized tests (Dee, 2004; Egalite et al., 2015), are suspended less (Holt &
Gershenson, 2015; Lindsay & Hart, 2017), have higher daily attendance (Holt & Gershenson,
2015), and graduate from high school and enroll in college more, on average, than students who
are not taught by a teacher who shares their racial or ethnic identity (Gershenson et al., 2018).
The effects are greatest for Black students who work with Black teachers in early elementary
grades, but also appear when Hispanic4 students are taught by Hispanic teachers5 (Bristol &
Martin-Fernandez, 2019; Joshi et al., 2018; Penney, 2017; Redding, 2019). The representation
gaps and positive relationship between racially and ethnically congruent matches of students and
teachers suggests that more aggressive public policies could support the education of students.
One recent work summarizes how impactful public policies could be for students of
color. Goldhaber et al. (2019) contextualize the effects of racial and ethnic matching in

4

I alter the language of Bristol & Martin-Fernandez (2019) to ensure that the language extracted from the data and
the language I use in the paper align, but this choice masks expected heterogeneity within this ethnic category.
5
While it is important to interpret these estimates with caution because race, ethnicity, and culture intersect with
identity, the consistency in results across settings suggests that there are key benefits when a student of color is
taught by a teacher of color (see Reardon, Cimpian, & Weathers, 2015 for discussion of within racial group
heterogeneity).
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classrooms, arguing policies that increase racial and ethnic matching for students of color would
compare favorably to policies focused on extending career duration, licensure qualifications, or
National Board Certification in math and reading. They also show that the largest effect sizes
from racial congruence work are surprisingly like the effects of having a higher quality teacher
(83rd percentile versus 50th percentile teacher). This evidence supports policy action to increase
the number of racially and ethnically diverse individuals available to teach, and any application
of the evidence would need to support traditional or alternative pathway education. MTS
programs are one approach that could generate meaningful impacts within the teacher pipeline.
Entry into the Teacher Pipeline for Individuals of Color
While MTS programs are one type of program that could increase the number of
underrepresented racial and ethnic minority teachers, states developed other types of pathways
that could be especially productive for teachers of color to earn a license and become employed.
Existing programs focus on recruiting different potential pools of people, ranging from those
who are unlicensed educators, high school students, or individuals who already hold bachelor’s
degrees and want a quicker path into teaching. All programs are specifically focused on ways to
open access for local and diverse talent to train to become teachers. I review two such alternative
certification initiatives, teacher residency and Grow Your Own (GYO) programs, to provide
some context for understanding where MTS programs apply within the pipeline.
States or non-profit organizations have routinely funded training local individuals, such
as paraprofessionals, teachers, or offered curriculum about education for interested middle or
high school students with a major goal of these efforts to expand the racial and ethnic diversity
of future teachers (Gist et al., 2019). Do GYO’s that target paraprofessionals and other
community leaders enroll and graduate students of color? Evidence is thin, but suggestive that
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students who enroll in a GYO have a low probability of completing their training. For example,
the Teaching Careers Program, a national program funded by Wallace-Reader’s Digest Funds,
supported 662 paraprofessionals who enrolled in the first six cohorts, but at the time of the
publication only 43.8% had finished the program while 42.4% were still in progress (Villegas &
Clewell, 1998). Evidence from the Illinois Grow Your Own Program, passed in 2005, confirmed
attrition is a problem, as 51% enrollees left the program and only 15% of all enrollees had
graduated with degrees at the time of study (46 graduates total as of 2011; Hunt et al., 2011).
This suggests that GYO’s hold promise as a grassroots pathway into teaching, but low
completion rates do not support the notion that this alone will improve the racial and ethnic
composition of the teacher workforce.
More recently, teacher residencies have become a policy idea tested in at least 50 large
urban cities and some states (Papay et al, 2012; Guha et al., 2017). These programs are
partnerships between districts and universities and seek participants who are apprentices for a
year during which they complete coursework. Residents receive financial support in the form of
stipends or tuition assistance, and make service commitments in return for the financial support.
Who do teacher residency programs target for enrollment and do those who enroll graduate?
Data suggests that directors of teacher residency programs select candidates based on the
composition of local communities and use rigorous selection criteria for admission to programs,
which correlates with high completion rates for a small number of participants (Silva et al.,
2014). For example, Guha et al. (2017) show evidence that 66% individuals completing the San
Francisco Teacher Residency were people of color while only 49% of all San Francisco Unified
School District teachers were people of color. Silva et al. (2014) use self-reports from 13
program directors, demonstrating that 92% of enrollees finished their teacher residency in 2009
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(n=28) and 86% of enrollees did so in 2010 (n=23). This suggests that teacher residency
programs also hold promise to draw new teachers of color into programs, most of which are
likely to complete their training and become teachers. However, teacher residencies are relatively
small, like GYO’s, and thus these programs should be considered complementary to traditional
teacher education where approximately 75% of teachers are trained nationally (Redding &
Smith, 2016). MTS program fund only teacher candidates of color who are enrolled in
undergraduate (or in rare cases graduate) teacher education programs located in institutions of
higher education. Thus, MTS programs, are uniquely positioned to make a difference in an
important pathway into teaching.
The Challenges of Unobserved Selection for Identifying Causal Impacts
While MTS programs have potential as a racial and ethnic diversity policy lever within
traditional teacher education preparation, those who receive MTS awards may differ qualitatively
from those who do not. This has implications in the development of studies that identify potential
counterfactual matches upon which comparisons can be made. For example, MTS scholarships
do not use random assignment mechanisms to determine who is selected to a program. Since this
is true, it could very well be the case that recipients of MTS awards are likely to have better
degree attainment outcomes than those who do not apply for awards. This could happen because
of unobserved but important variation related to support networks, parents’ educational
attainment, or some other combination of factors. The fact that selection bias is unaccounted for
has implications for the research design.
Past research focused on merit- and need-scholarship programs demonstrates that
selection bias can be addressed through any type of quasi-experimental design (see Page &
Scott-Clayton, 2016 review of literature for the various research designs). These studies identify
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causal impact by identifying naturally occurring experiments where cut-points, time, or a
program turning on or off serve as a random assignment mechanism. These approaches are
preferred when this type of mechanism can be drawn on. However, not all scholarship programs
have random assignment mechanisms available to identify causal variation.
An exception is a study by Carruthers and Fox (2015), which examines the Knox Promise
Scholarship Program. Since Knox Promise is a program where individuals choose whether to
participate, individual and unobserved selection remains a causal inference challenge. Carruthers
and Fox (2015) address self-selection and estimate whether the Knox Achieves program
improved high school graduation, college enrollment, type of college attended, and college
persistence by using both difference-in-differences and propensity score matching approaches.
By leveraging variation in participation within and across counties and over time, they apply the
two analytic frameworks to generate intent-to-treat and treatment-on-the-treated estimates.
The authors compared three counterfactual individuals in their propensity score matching
who arguably differed only on participation in Knox County Promise. The three groups are: (a)
individuals who are within Knox County schools; (b) individuals within Knox County and in the
surrounding counties (all in one pool); and (c) individuals who and those who are not (the
preferred model). Across the three types of comparisons, the authors find that students who
participated in the scholarship program were between 21 and 24 percentage points more likely to
enroll in college than similar-on-observables counterfactual individuals within or across Knox
County. When a scholarship program uses self-selection procedures, the use of the propensity
score matching models are one option to generate evidence that reduces selection bias.
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Theoretical Framework
Some researchers argue teachers of color are intrinsically motivated by, “a forceful
commitment to returning to schools like those they had attended to address systematic injustices
in their own educational backgrounds.” (Irizarry & Donaldson, 2012, p. 167). Yet, teachers are
likely to hold other motivations. Indeed, some evidence shows college students weigh the
potential wages they earn and the loan debt they accumulate together, and choose public service
careers more often if their loan debt is reduced (Rothstein & Rouse, 2011).
I adapt a Roy (1951) model of occupational choice for my study of MTS programs. This
model conceptualizes that individuals choose their work by optimizing wages in a chosen
profession relative to those in other potential occupations. Individuals calculate this by weighing
anticipated wages and individual ability in an alternative profession, expected returns to ability
as a teacher (including intrinsic rewards), and the costs of training to become a teacher.
MTS financial aid reduces the costs of teacher training for individuals enrolled in a
traditional teacher education program. A student who receives an MTS has their tuition costs
(directly for a student or indirectly for a student’s caretaker) or loan debt reduced. In theory, debt
reduction could be a powerful incentive for teacher candidates of color who tend to acquire more
debt than peers who identify as white (Delisle & Holt, 2017; Fiddiman et al., 2019). Once in the
teaching labor force, MTS incentives could also result in recipients devoting less earned income
to loan payments while in the workforce. This is important because new teachers, who earn
lower average wages relative to similarly educated peers (Allegretto & Mishel, 2018; Baker et
al., 2016), will have more disposable income to use as they acclimate into a teaching career.
While the Roy model of occupational choice is theory that assumes a high level of
rationality in decision-making for individuals, this model predicts that already enrolled teacher
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candidates of color will have different observed degree completion outcomes if students respond
to debt reduction during their undergraduate education. By identifying variation in the outcomes
for individuals who received an MTS award and those who did not, I am able to empirical test
whether teacher education cost reductions are a precursor to students’ degree attainment and
teacher certification. Based on this rationale, my research questions are:
1.
2.

Does an MTS award affect bachelor and master teacher education degree attainment for
students of color who enrolled in a flagship university teacher education program?
Are there differential effects by whether an individual received need scholarship money
(federal or state) or was a pre-teaching major?
Methods

Program Description
For two decades, the teacher candidates of color at the flagship university in the state
examined in this study have had the option of applying for an MTS award. Students qualify for
the scholarship by identifying as people of color (e.g., they check a box on a form that includes
Asian, Black, Hispanic or Latinx, or Native-American) and earn two years of grant money by
maintaining enrollment in a teacher education program in an institution sanctioned by the state.
All universities involved in the program offer undergraduate teacher education degrees. In these
circumstances, students aim to earn a bachelor’s degree and certification and become eligible for
an award in their final two years of undergraduate study. In some universities, including the one
in this study, students complete both bachelor’s and a master’s degrees as part of the same
teacher education experience. Teacher certification is earned with the master’s degree and
students enrolled in this type of teacher education training apply for an MTS award in their last
year of undergraduate study and only year of graduate study.
Students apply using a form that requires minimal information. The information collected
by the state’s higher education agency includes name, gender, and personal contact information,
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racial and ethnic classification, cumulative grade point average and total credits earned, major
and anticipated college graduation data, high school of attendance and graduation date, whether
the individual attended a community college, a signal of intent to teach in the state, and a
signature from the Dean of the School of Education that attests that the information about the
student is accurate.
If the student receives an MTS award, they are eligible to collect up to $20,000 in grants
and loan stipends over a six-year period. During two years of higher education, the student is
eligible for grants in the amount of $5,000 per school year. The second year of money is awarded
if the student maintains enrollment in teacher education. During the next four years, if an MTS
recipient gains and maintains employment in any of the state’s public schools and carries a loan
balance into the occupation, they can apply for a $2,500 loan stipend at the end of each school
year. This is paid to the individual student and is intended to reduce carried student loan debt.
University Context
The student level data used for this study is from a teacher education program at the
flagship university in an MTS state. Students of color are underrepresented in teacher education
when compared to the university’s general population. For school years 2005-2006 to 20132014, about 64% of the students enrolled in the university setting were white. 6 Of the remaining
students, 18% were students of color (Asian, Hispanic, Black, or Native American or Pacific
Islander), 7% were citizens of other countries, and 11% did not to reveal a race or ethnicity. In
the teacher education program covering 15 years of data, 79.2% of enrollees identified as white,
12.1% identified as people of color, and 8.7 identified as an unknown race or ethnicity.

6

I determined these calculations using the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) for the
university that is the setting of this study.
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The teacher education program has a rigorous application process. Students apply for
teacher education during the second year of undergraduate study. All applicants submit multiple
sources of information including key academic credentials (transcripts and standardized test
scores), a resume that contains evidence of time volunteering in schools, and multiple essays
discussing dedication and interest in the profession. In addition to the paper documents, all
applicants are evaluated during an in-person interview. The teacher education program enrolls
and graduates a large fraction of students who are admitted near the end of their second year of
undergraduate study. Between 2006 and 2018, an average of 177 students applied for admission
into the program, 127 were admitted, and 123 enrolled in the third year of study. The program
used a rigorous application process and had more applicants than available spaces in every year.
Data
I use student level administrative data from a flagship university in an MTS state for this
study. The data set includes only teacher education enrollees at a flagship university from
academic years 2002-2003 to 2016-2017 and key demographic, academic, and financial aid
information (expanded on below). The analysis uses a sample of 209 students of color who
enrolled in the teacher education program between the fall of 2002 and the fall of 2016.
Measures
Outcomes
In this study, I measured two outcomes: whether a student was observed to have a (a)
bachelor’s or (b) master’s degree in a teacher education major conferred by the university. To
construct each separate binary measure, I assigned a value of 0 if a student did not have a degree
conferral date and a one if a student did have a degree conferral date.
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Independent Variables
I also constructed several independent variables to use in the study. The measures
include: age at the time of admission to teacher education, whether a student prepared to teach a
shortage subject area (based on state determination and in the areas of science or mathematics,
special education, or foreign language), gender, GPA in the semester in which an application for
teacher education was submitted, GPA in the spring semester prior to the MTS application
deadline, standardized high school SAT math and verbal scores, whether the student received
state or federal need aid, and if the person enrolled in the major of pre-teaching, which functions
as an signal of intent to teach when a student matriculates to the university. In addition, to
control for the potential that students apply for MTS in different patterns and this relates to the
outcomes, I included five indicators for student cohorts. These indicators are constructed based
on the year of admission into the MTS program with each indicator corresponding to a three-year
time period. This was done because of the potential for idiosyncratic changes in enrolling
students across years. All measures are defined in Table 2-1.
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Table 2-1. Definitions of Variables for Study of MTS recipients
Outcome Variables
Bachelor’s Teacher
education degree
completer
Master’s Teacher
education degree
completer
Treatment
MTS

Descriptions
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student of color enrolled and
completed a bachelor’s teacher education degree and a 0 if they enrolled and did not
complete their degree
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student of color enrolled and
completed a master’s teacher education degree and a 0 if they enrolled and did not
complete their degree
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student of color receives an
MTS award and a 0 if a student of color does not receive an MTS award.

Observables for Matching
Age-at-admission
Gender
Shortage
GPA at time of
application to teacher
education
GPA in Spring Semester
Before MTS Application
Pre-teach major
Financial Aid Award
Based on Need from the
State or Federal
government
High school standardized
SAT math scores
High school standardized
SAT verbal scores
Cohort variable (in 3-year
stretches)

A demeaned continuous variable that takes on a value between -1.8 and 6.1
depending on the age of a student at their time of admission (in .25 increments).
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student of color is male and a
value of 0 if female.
A categorical variable that take a value of: 1 if a student is preparing in a shortage
area (STEM, SPED, or foreign language) and a 0 if a student is preparing in a nonshortage area (elementary, humanities, music)
A demeaned continuous variable that takes a value between -1.0 and 0.7 based on
cumulative GPA calculations made by the university at end of the fall semester of
sophomore year when students apply for a spot in the teacher education program.
A demeaned continuous variable that takes a value between -1.0 and 0.6 based on
cumulative GPA calculations made by the university at end of the spring semester
of junior year.
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student is a pre-teach
education major and a 0 if they are not.
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student received any state or
federal need aid during their time at the flagship university and a 0 if they did not.
A standardized continuous variable for SAT math scores that has a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1 after the transformation. The range of scores is from -2.5 to
2.4.
A standardized continuous variable for SAT verbal scores that takes on a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1 after the transformation. The range of scores is from 2.8 to 3.1.
A categorical temporal variable that groups students by admittance year in 3-year
cohorts. This takes a value of 0 for the years 2002-2003 to 2004-2005, 1 for 20052006 through 2007-2008, 2 for 2008-2009 through 2010-2011, 3 for 2011-2012
through 2013-2014, and 4 for 2014-2015 through 2016-2017, respectively.

Summary Statistics
Many teacher candidates of color in one university’s teacher education program received
MTS awards while enrolled. In total, 58.5% (123 of 209) of the sample received an MTS award.
I summarize the remainder of the outcome and control statistics from Table 2. Overall, 94.3% of
the teacher candidates of color finished their bachelor’s degree and 87.1% finished their master’s
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degree between 2002-2003 and 2016-2017. The high proportion of teacher candidates of color
completing degrees masks heterogeneity conditional on receipt of an MTS award. Of all MTS
aid recipients, 98.4% (121 out of 123) completed a bachelor’s degree and 97.6% (120 out of 123)
completed a master’s degree and received teacher certification. Of the 86 teacher candidates of
color who did not receive an MTS award, 88.4% completed their bachelor’s degree and 72.1%
completed a master’s degree and received teacher certification. These are large differences
between individuals of color and surprising considering they are prepared in the same program.
There are also small differences across factors that may associate with the outcome and
could potentially be related to the choice to apply for an MTS award. First, GPA in the last
semester prior to applying for an MTS award may be an important indicator of dedication to
schooling and efforts to become a teacher. Teacher candidates of color who received MTS
awards had slightly better mean grade point averages when they applied for teacher education
than teacher candidates of color who did not receive an MTS award. Second, teacher candidates
who declared pre-teaching as their major upon matriculation may have differences in their desire
to become a teacher than individuals who decide to become a teacher after a year or two of
undergraduate study. Overall, 65.9% of students who received an MTS award declared preteaching as a major. This proportion was higher than the 53.5% of teacher candidates of color
who declared a different major when they matriculated and never received an MTS award. Third,
teacher candidates of color who received financial aid based on need may be more responsive to
tuition reductions from an MTS award than teacher candidates of color who do not receive
financial aid based on need. In the data, teacher candidates of color who received federal or state
need aid (39.3%) were MTS award recipients more than were students who did not receive
federal or state need aid (33.7%). In sum, this suggests that students’ academic performance,
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declared major at the time of matriculation, and financial aid based on need differ and could
factor into both participating in an MTS program and completing a teacher education degree.
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Table 2-2. Outcomes and Predictors by MTS Recipient Status
Total students of color in a flagship
teacher education program
proportion/average
st. dev
Dependent Variable
Completed bachelor's degree
Completed master's degree
Minority Teacher Scholarship Recipient
Independent Variables
Age at Admission to Teacher Education (demeaned)
Male
Subject Area Shortage (SPED, STEM, Foreign
Language)
Grade Point Average When Accepted to Teacher
Education
Grade Point Average in Spring Before MTS Apply
High School SAT Math score
High School SAT Verbal score
Student received Financial Aid based on Need
Student Pre-Teaching as Major when matriculating
Cohort 1: 2002-2003 to 2004-2005
Cohort 2: 2005-2006 to 2007-2008
Cohort 3: 2008-2009 to 2010-2011
Cohort 4: 2011-2012 to 2013-2014
Cohort 5: 2014-2015 to 2016-2017
N

Did not receive an MTS award

Received an MTS award

proportion/average

st. dev

proportion/average

st. dev

0.943
0.871
0.589

0.233
0.336
0.493

0.884
0.721
0.000

0.322
0.451
0.000

0.984
0.976
1.000

0.127
0.155
0.000

20.221
0.182

0.696
0.387

20.203
0.209

0.519
0.409

20.234
0.163

0.799
0.371

0.287

0.453

0.221

0.417

0.333

0.473

3.336

0.337

3.286

0.338

3.370

0.333

3.400
565.600
552.250
0.368
0.608
0.191
0.187
0.172
0.177
0.273
209

0.317
70.658
67.849
0.484
0.489
0.394
0.391
0.379
0.383
0.446

3.347
567.176
564.824
0.337
0.535
0.105
0.174
0.163
0.116
0.442
86

0.326
69.942
66.541
0.476
0.502
0.308
0.382
0.371
0.322
0.500

3.437
564.435
542.957
0.390
0.659
0.252
0.195
0.179
0.220
0.154
123

0.306
71.466
67.590
0.490
0.476
0.436
0.398
0.385
0.416
0.363
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Empirical Strategy
This paper attempts to identify plausibly causal variation of an MTS award on degree
attainment for individuals of color. My identification strategy relies on comparing students of
color who receive an MTS award to their counterparts within the same flagship university
teacher education program who never receive this scholarship. MTS programs are open awards
that do not institute merit-based guidelines. The relatively easy application process for awards
(e.g., one-page form requiring personal characteristic information only) is coupled with clear
information sharing within the university in this study. Each year, a teacher education program
administrator emails all eligible students the application form and facilitates sign-off from the
Dean of the School of Education.
Despite the ease of applying, in most years of MTS award administration there is no
sharp selection identification criteria.18 Students self-select into MTS and this renders quasiexperimental identification very difficult to obtain. In addition, the data does not cross the time
the MTS was implemented in the state of study, I use complementary OLS and propensity score
matching approaches for this study to check the robustness of estimates.
Coefficient Stability
I fit a series of linear probability models using OLS. Across this set of models, I add
successive groups of covariates and attend to whether the coefficient of interest, MTS, is stable
across model specifications. The fully specified linear probability model appears in the following
form:
Yic = βMTSic + 𝛉𝐗 i + δc + εic

18

(1)

In the final two years of the data, the state had limited funds and used a GPA cut point to determine who received
scholarships. In Table 7, I fit the same models using data that excludes students who enrolled in years 14 and 15.
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where Y represents the bachelor’s or master’s degree outcome for student i in cohort c. In this
specification, β captures the difference in the probability of attaining the degree outcome
conditioned on receipt of an MTS award (the treatment), 𝛉 represents observable covariates
expected to influence the outcome and which may correlate with the treatment, δC is a cohort
fixed effects that allows the outcome to vary depending on the timing of enrollment for students,
and εic is a heteroscedasticity robust random disturbance term. The cohort fixed effects are
separately into three-year groupings due to the small sample size and unequal distribution of
MTS recipients year-over-year.
The untestable identification assumption in eq. (1) is if MTS is stable as additional
controls that explain more variation in the outcome are added to an OLS model, then this would
reduce concerns that omitted variable bias causes an over- or under-estimate of the relationship
between MTS awards and degree completion (Oster, 2019). If there is stability across estimates
of MTS, or limited attenuation of the estimates, this in turn increases the plausibility that there is
a causal relationship in the case where selection cannot be perfectly identified.
Propensity Score Matching
I complement the previous approach using propensity score matching procedures (Rubin,
2001: Stuart, 2010). This approach ensures common support on key variables thought to be
involved in who is selected for MTS and relaxes the linearity assumptions that are otherwise
imposed by OLS. The intuition of this approach is that everyone enrolled in the same program
who received an MTS award can be paired with an individual who did not receive an MTS at the
same university based on observably similar selection characteristics. When matching is
possible, the average difference across matched pairs represents the average treatment on the
treated effect.
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To estimate a propensity score, I use the following logistic regression equation to
calculate the conditional probability that any teacher candidate of color received treatment based
on characteristics preceding the receipt of a scholarship:
𝑒𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑇𝑖 = 1| 𝑋𝑖 )

(2)

where 𝑒𝑖 is the expected probability any individual in the data receives a scholarship and is based
on the probability of receiving a scholarship, P, given the set of anticipated selection covariates,
X, for the group of students who received an MTS award, 𝑻𝒊 = 1. After I estimate the
conditional probability that any individual received an MTS, I explore whether individual
propensity scores are similar and if covariates achieve balance. In the preferred model, I use a
caliper, which matches treatment and control group individuals if the estimated propensity to
receive a scholarship is within 0.01 (1%) percentage point of one another. This approach allows
me to recover the probability of attaining a bachelor or master degree conditioned on receipt of
the MTS award with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors, which are adjusted depending on
the number of nearest neighbors drawing on the guidance of Abadie and Imbens (2006).
The untestable identification assumption underlying eq. (2) is that the individuals who
received the MTS would have otherwise had the same degree attainment as those who did not
receive MTS. In practice, this assumption is violated if selection into the program is dependent
on unobservable characteristics. For instance, it could be the case that students who choose to
apply for and receive an MTS award were considerably more eager to become teachers than
individuals who do not choose to apply for MTS. This is an acute concern to this study since it is
impossible to control for who opted into the MTS program. If self-selection is propelled by
unobserved motivational differences between the treatment and control groups, the effect of
MTS would be over-stated because individuals who receive awards would be more likely to
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finish their degree than those who do not. While it is impossible to rule out that the two groups in
this study are differentially motivated, I draw on a rich set of covariates to estimate selection and
then compare individuals who did and did not apply for the MTS program who have similar
probabilities of taking up an MTS award.
Alternative Matching Strategies
To address concerns that the preferred matching algorithm is biased, I implemented three
additional matching strategies. In the first approach, I increase the number of nearest neighbors
so that each scholarship recipient is compared to two, rather than one, individual of color who
never received a scholarship. This strategy requires more matches and is a form of checking
whether analysis using “greedy” matching (e.g., 1 to 1) is biased. In the second approach, I use
doubly robust weighting, which combines nearest neighbor matching without a caliper and
frequency weighted OLS regression. This approach generates an unbiased estimator if either the
propensity score matching or the OLS regression models are mis-specified, a useful strategy
when evaluating a program without an empirical evidence base (Imbens & Woolridge, 2009).
Finally, in the third approach, I use kernel density matching to identify a common region of the
probability density function and use that for weighting comparisons. This approach to estimation
weights the propensity score by identifying a kernel density range and weighting comparisons
based on how close together the treated and control match. In sum, these three separate
approaches test the robustness of the results using disparate matching approaches.
Findings
I find that MTS award recipients complete bachelor’s degrees 8.7 and 17.1 percentage
points more than similarly observable peers who never received an MTS award. I also find that
MTS award recipients’ complete master’s degrees 26.1 and 41.6 percentage points more often
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than the similarly observable peers who never received an MTS award. These results are
statistically robust but sensitive to the specification the model.
OLS Estimates
I fit OLS models, which are interpretable as conditional probabilities, to examine the
stability of the MTS coefficient. In Table 2-3, I show six separate models, three for bachelor’s
degree and three for master’s degree completion. In the first model, I regressed bachelor’s and
master’s degree attainment on the MTS indicator. In the second model, I added GPA in the last
semester prior to MTS application (demeaned), whether the student matriculated to the
university as a pre-teaching major, and whether the student ever received federal or state need
aid during their university experience. In the third model, I included all other covariates: GPA at
time of admission (demeaned), gender, high school SAT scores (standardized), age at admission
(demeaned), trained in a shortage area defined by the state, and cohort fixed effects.
MTS awardees completed their bachelor’s degree between 8.3 and 10.0 percentage points
more than individuals who never receive an MTS award, a statistically significant result (p<0.05)
across all models (Table 2-3, columns 1 through 3). Between model one and three, the magnitude
of the results declines 1.7 percentage points, a reduction of 17 percent while the variance
explained by the model increases from 4.5% to 13.7%. This indicates that there is some
attenuation of the magnitude estimates, but the statistical significance and direction of the
relationship remain alike.
MTS awardees also completed their master’s degree between 24.2 and 26.1 percentage
points more than individuals who never receive an MTS award, a statistically significant result
(p<0.001) across all models (Table 2-3, columns 4 through 6). Between model one and three, the
magnitude of the MTS coefficient increased 0.5 percentage points, a gain of 1.9 percent, and the
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variance explained by the model increased from 14.0% to 20.5%. These results demonstrate that
additional predictors in the model increase the variance explained in the outcome while treatment
effect estimates remain robust, reliable, and statistically significant. This analysis lessens
concerns that omitted variables cause an over-estimate of the relationship between MTS receipt
and degree attainment.
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Table 2-3. Linear Probability Models of MTS Relationship to Degree Attainment

MTS recipient
Most likely confounds
Demeaned GPA in last semester before MTS
award application
Ever receive federal or state need aid
Enrolled in pre-teaching major at time of
matriculation
Other variables that could influence
Demeaned GPA at time of enrollment into teacher
education
Demeaned age at time of admission in teacher
education
Male
Shortage areas (math, science, special education,
foreign languages)
Standardized High School SAT math score
Standardized High School SAT English score
Cohort Fixed Effects

MA
completion
0.243***
(0.050)

MA
completion
0.261***
(0.057)

0.411 (0.236)

0.022 (0.079)

0.337 (0.222)

-0.021 (0.037)

-0.021 (0.035)

-0.035 (0.046)

-0.051 (0.048)

0.023 (0.031)

0.020 (0.037)

0.097* (0.047)

0.080 (0.050)

BA completion

BA completion

BA completion

0.100**
(0.037)

0.086* (0.034)

0.083* (0.039)

0.136 (0.071)

MA
completion
0.255***
(0.051)

-0.275 (0.203)

-0.319 (0.198)

-0.002 (0.023)

-0.043 (0.042)

0.008 (0.046)

-0.052 (0.068)

-0.032 (0.040)

0.027 (0.048)

-0.004 (0.021)
-0.015 (0.027)
-0.012 (0.026)
-0.005 (0.031)
✓
✓
0.884***
0.889***
0.867***
0.721***
0.683***
0.676***
Constant
(0.035)
(0.035)
(0.066)
(0.049)
(0.059)
(0.085)
N
209
209
209
209
209
209
Variance explained
0.045
0.087
0.145
0.140
0.163
0.207
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors standard errors in parentheses. Significance indicated by:* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, or *** p<0.001.
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Propensity Score Matching Estimates
The propensity scores estimated for recipients of scholarships and those who never
received scholarships has adequate overlap for comparison and the balance of covariates
improves from matching on propensity scores (Appendix 2-B). In Table 2-4, I present the from
the OLS model in column 1 and four propensity score matching models in columns 2 through 5.
For bachelor’s degree attainment, the results are all positive and some are statistically
significant (Table 2-4, Row 1, Column 2-5). The preferred matching algorithm, nearest neighbor
with a caliper of 0.01, generates a non-statistically significant difference of 10.3 percentage
points for bachelor’s degree attainment between recipients of MTS and students of color who
never receive an MTS award (Table 2-4, Row 1, Column 2). The estimates range from 8.7 to
17.1 percentage points when using 2:1 matching with a 0.01 caliper, doubly robust weighting,
and kernel density with bandwidth of 0.06 (Table 2-4, Row 1, Columns 3-5). Two of the three
results are statistically significant. The largest estimate is from the doubly robust approach while
the smallest is the 2:1 nearest neighbor matching. These results complement the OLS estimates
and reinforce that there is a positive relationship between MTS receipt and bachelor’s degree
attainment within this program.
When I modeled the relationship between MTS receipt and master’s degree attainment
for aspiring teachers of color, the results are two to three times larger than the bachelor’s degree
estimates and all are statistically significant (Table 2-4, Row 2, Columns 2-5). When I compared
master’s degree attainment of MTS participants and non-participants using 1:1 nearest neighbor
matching with a caliper of 0.01, MTS awardees were 37.1 percentage points more likely to
complete their degree than individuals who never receive an MTS award (p<0.001; Table 2-4,
Row 2, Column 2). The estimates range from 30.8 to 41.6 percentage points when using 2:1
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matching with a 0.01 caliper, doubly robust weighting, and kernel density with bandwidth of
0.06 (Table 4, Row 2, Columns 3-5). The largest estimate is from the doubly robust empirical
strategy and the smallest is from the kernel density with a bandwidth of 0.06. Taken together,
this evidence suggests that students who receive an MTS award had a higher probability of
finishing a teacher education master’s degree than students who did not receive an MTS award.
Table 2- 4. OLS and Propensity Score Matching Estimates of the Relationship Between
MTS Award on Recipients’ Degree Attainment
OLS
Regression

1:1 Nearest
Neighbor with
0.01 caliper

2:1 Nearest
Neighbor with
0.01 caliper

Doubly Robust
Weighted
Regression

Kernel Density
with
Bandwidth
0.06
0.104 (0.049)
*
0.308 (0.068)
***

B.A. for MTS
0.083
0.171 (0.033)
0.059 (0.106)
0.087 (0.079)
Recipient
(0.039) *
***
M.A. for MTS
0.261
0.320 (0.088)
0.416 (0.043)
0.287 (0.109) **
Recipient
(0.057) ***
***
***
N, on common
209
183
183
246
209
support
Notes: All models include the same set of covariates as the linear probability model (see equation (1) or
Table 3). The fully specified estimates are available upon request. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance: ~ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Sensitivity Analysis
I conducted one separate analysis to test whether the relationship between degree
attainment and MTS awards was sensitive to removing two years and 43 observations. This
approach accounted for the state using a GPA cut-off score for selection due to budget cuts.
Remove GPA Cut-Off Years
In Table 2-5, I restrict the sample by excluding observations from the last two years of
enrollees into the teacher education program. This is an important test because the state agency
administering the program dealt with budget declines by selecting MTS awardees on a GPA cut
point applied uniformly to all eligible institutions.19 The fact that the GPA cut point is used for

19

I analyzed who was selected for programs based on GPA cut points in the data by creating a figure where the yaxis was the probability of any GPA (rounded to the tenth) receiving an award and the x-axis was GPA. The GPA
cut point was 3.3 in year 14 and 3.6 in year 15 of the data.
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selection should increase the covariation between MTS awards and a student’s cumulative GPA
at the time of application to MTS and this may overstate MTS estimates in the preferred model.
I find that there is no systematic bias in the direction and small magnitude changes
overall when I remove the two years of data. For bachelor’s degree teacher education degree
attainment, three of the five models in Table 2-4 are larger in magnitude than the models in
Table 2-5. The OLS specification dropped in magnitude by 0.5 percentage points when
comparing Table 2-4, Row 1, Column 1 to Table 2-5, Row 1, Column 1. When comparing
propensity score matching models, two of the four estimates increased in magnitude relative to
the same model in Table 2-4 and the remaining two estimates decreased in magnitude relative to
the same model in table 2-5. The percent change in magnitude between all models in Table 2-5
and Table 2-4 estimates by column (Row 1, Column 1 to 5) are -6.0, 3.9, 29.9, -9.4, and -7.7.
The estimates change in positive and negative directions, and the average percent change in the
magnitude declines by an average of 2.1% across the models.
The master’s degree outcome with a restricted sample are also comparable. Three of the
five models in Table 2-4 increased in magnitude when estimated in Table 2-5. The OLS
specification was greater in magnitude by 3.2 percentage points when comparing Table 2-4, Row
2, Column 1 to Table 2-5, Row 2, Column 1. When I compare propensity score matching
models, two of the four estimates increase from Table 2-4 to Table 2-5 while the other two
decreased. For all models, the percent change between Table 2-5 and Table 2-4 estimates by
column (Table 2-5, Row 2, Column 1 to 5) are 12.3, -3.8, 7.8, -11.1 and 0.6. The estimates
change in positive and negative directions, and the average percent change in the magnitude
increases by an average of 1.2% across the models. These results indicate that removing the
years where selection is observable does not systematically alter the results.
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Table 2-5. Propensity Score Matching of MTS Award on Recipients Master's Degree Attainment without GPA
Selection Cut-off Years
1:1 Nearest
2:1 Nearest
Doubly Robust
Kernel Density
OLS regression
Neighbor with
Neighbor with
Weighted
with Bandwidth
0.01 caliper
0.01 caliper
Regression
0.02
B.A. for MTS
Recipient

0.078 (0.042) ~

0.107 (0.079)

0.113 (0.093)

0.155 (0.034) ***

0.096 (0.057) *

M.A. for MTS
Recipient

0.293 (0.067) ***

0.357 (0.112) **

0.345 (0.115) **

0.370 (0.049) ***

0.310 (0.080) ***

N, on common
support

166

144

144

212

166

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ~ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Tests of Differential Associations
I conduct three tests for differential associations based on whether an MTS award is
moderated by a differential cohort effect, an individual student receiving need based financial aid
during any enrolled year of attendance, or an individual student declaring a pre-teaching major
when they matriculated to the university. These tests address questions about whether an MTS
award changes by (a) cohort, (b) a student belonging to a family that qualifies for financial aid
based on need, or (c) a student declaring a pre-teaching major upon matriculating to the
university as a freshman. I conduct these tests for the bachelor’s and master’s degree outcome
using the fully specified linear probability model found in equation (1) with an interaction added
between the MTS coefficient and the aforementioned indicators.
Differential Results by Cohort
The results found in Table 2-6 suggest that receipt of an MTS differs from cohort to
cohort for bachelor’s and master’s degree attainment. In Table 2-6, row 1 & rows 6-9 are the
estimated relationship between MTS and cohort. The estimate for bachelor’s degree attainment
with receipt of an MTS award in cohort one indicates that receipt of an MTS is associated with a
9.7 percentage point gain in the probability of degree completion. Cohort two and three have
lower probabilities by 8.5 and 10.3 percentage points respectively. Cohort four and five have
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higher probabilities than cohort one recipients by 7.7 and 5.4 percentage points. These are all
highly suggestive that the relationship differs with degree attainment from cohort to cohort.
Master’s degree attainment and MTS receipt were positive related and estimated to be
13.1 percentage points for cohort one. This was the lowest estimate of the relationship. The four
subsequent cohorts had positive associations between MTS receipt and the probability of
master’s degree attainment of 26.3, 1.6, 34.2, and 7.9. There are substantial differences from
cohort-to-cohort although the relationship is positive regardless of cohort. The differences are
particular large in cohorts two and four. In sum, there are suggestive differences of the
relationship between MTS receipt and the probability of degree attainment by cohort.
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Table 2-6. Differential Test of the Relationship Between MTS Receipt and Degree Attainment by Cohort
BA completion
MA completion
MTS recipient
0.097 (0.144)
0.131 (0.150)
Cohort 2: 2005-2006 to 2007-2008
0.140 (0.135)
-0.204 (0.188)
Cohort 3: 2008-2009 to 2010-2011
0.148 (0.140)
-0.016 (0.178)
Cohort 4: 2011-2012 to 2013-2014
-0.041 (0.190)
-0.290 (0.220)
Cohort 5: 2014-2015 to 2016-2017
-0.002 (0.151)
-0.017 (0.160)
MTS x Cohort 2: 2005-2006 to 2007-2008
-0.085 (0.144)
0.263 (0.195)
MTS x Cohort 3: 2008-2009 to 2010-2011
-0.103 (0.144)
0.016 (0.186)
MTS x Cohort 4: 2011-2012 to 2013-2014
0.077 (0.194)
0.342 (0.222)
MTS x Cohort 5: 2014-2015 to 2016-2017
0.054 (0.154)
0.079 (0.164)
Covariates
Demeaned age at time of admission in teacher education
-0.002 (0.023)
-0.041 (0.040)
Male
0.002 (0.045)
-0.062 (0.069)
Shortage areas (math, science, special education, foreign languages)
-0.037 (0.040)
0.000 (0.047)
Demeaned GPA at time of enrollment into teacher education
-0.287 (0.200)
-0.327 (0.198)
Demeaned GPA in last semester before MTS award application
0.396 (0.232)
0.339 (0.221)
Standardized High School SAT math score
-0.003 (0.020)
-0.018 (0.026)
Standardized High School SAT English score
-0.010 (0.027)
-0.003 (0.031)
Student received Federal or State Need Aid
-0.027 (0.034)
-0.054 (0.046)
Student Listed Pre-Teaching as First Major of Record with University
0.017 (0.037)
0.070 (0.050)
✓
✓
Cohort Fixed Effects
N
209
209
Variance explained
0.165
0.237
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors standard errors in parentheses. Significance indicated by:*
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, or *** p<0.001.

Differential Results by Pre-Teaching Major or Financial Aid Based on Need
The results found in Table 2-7 suggest that teacher candidates of color who receive
financial aid based or declare majors other than pre-teaching when they entered the university are
more likely to complete bachelor’s and master’s degrees when they receive an MTS award. In
Table 7, Row 5, Columns 1-2 are the estimates for the interaction of pre-teaching major at time
of matriculation x MTS. The estimates for bachelor’s degree completion indicate that students
who declare pre-teaching majors when they enter the university and received an MTS award are
3.5 percentage points less likely to earn a degree than students who declare a different major
when they matriculate and received an MTS award (Row 5, Column 1). Declaring a pre-teaching
majors receiving MTS awards associated with a lower probability, by 13.8 percentage points, of
completing a teacher education master’s degree when compared to students who declared other
majors at the time they matriculated to the university (Row 5, Column 2). The negative
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relationship highlights that MTS may relate to students’ outcomes conditional on their intent to
major in an area other than teaching upon enrolling in postsecondary education.
The estimates for bachelor’s degree completion indicate that students who received
financial aid based on need and received an MTS award are 4.1 percentage points more likely to
earn a degree than students who did not receive financial aid based on need and received an MTS
award (Row 3, Column 3). Receiving financial aid based on need and receiving MTS awards
also associated with a higher probability, by 9.6 percentage points, of completing a teacher
education master’s degree when compared to students who never received financial aid based on
need (Row 3, Column 4). In sum, the evidence is suggestive, though imprecise, that MTS
programs interact with intent or financial characteristics of students of color who are enrolled in
a university’s teacher education program.
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Table 2-7. Differential Tests for Receiving Financial Aid Based on Need or Pre-Teaching
Major by MTS

MTS recipient
Receive Federal or State Financial Aid
Based on Need
Receive Federal or State Financial Aid
Based on Need x MTS Recipient
Pre-Teaching Major at Time of
Matriculation
Pre-Teaching Major at Time of
Matriculation x MTS Recipient
Covariates
Demeaned age at time of admission in
teacher education

BA
completion
0.104
(0.063)
-0.022
(0.036)

0.039
(0.069)
-0.035
(0.076)

MA
completion
0.344***
(0.094)
-0.052
(0.048)

0.156 (0.100)

BA
completion
0.069
(0.039)
-0.047
(0.073)
0.041
(0.077)
0.020
(0.037)

MA
completion
0.228***
(0.065)
-0.111
(0.107)
0.096 (0.110)
0.079 (0.049)

-0.138
(0.108)

-0.002
-0.046
-0.002
-0.045
(0.023)
(0.041)
(0.022)
(0.042)
0.007
-0.055
0.004
-0.062
Male
(0.046)
(0.067)
(0.045)
(0.068)
Shortage areas (math, science, special
-0.034
-0.033
0.019 (0.050)
0.023 (0.048)
education, foreign languages)
(0.042)
(0.040)
Demeaned GPA at time of enrollment
-0.273
-0.311
-0.265
-0.295
into teacher education
(0.201)
(0.197)
(0.203)
(0.200)
Demeaned GPA in last semester before
0.407
0.394
0.319 (0.220)
0.298 (0.226)
MTS award application
(0.234)
(0.237)
Standardized High School SAT math
-0.004
-0.015
-0.003
-0.015
score
(0.021)
(0.027)
(0.021)
(0.028)
Standardized High School SAT English
-0.012
-0.005
-0.012
-0.006
score
(0.026)
(0.032)
(0.026)
(0.032)
Cohort Fixed Effects
✓
✓
✓
✓
N
209
209
209
209
Variance explained
0.146
0.216
0.147
0.211
Notes: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors standard errors in parentheses. Significance indicated
by:* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, or *** p<0.001.

Discussion and Implications
In sum, I found statistically significant and policy relevant positive associations between
MTS awards and master’s degree attainment for teacher candidates of color in a selective
flagship university’s teacher education program relative to peers of color in the same program. I
also found suggestive evidence that there were the positive differences between MTS awards and
bachelor’s degree attainment. In addition, there is imprecise but suggestive evidence that MTS
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receipt is moderated by the cohort, declared major (e.g., intention to teach) when matriculating to
university, or receipt of financial aid based on need during postsecondary education.
Limitations
Despite the promise of this evidence, the results should be interpreted with caution as
there remain internal and external validity concerns. I address concerns that threaten the internal
validity, which include selection and omitted variable bias.
First, while I take efforts to address selection bias, there is no natural selection
mechanism for MTS to leverage in the analysis. As a result, both analytic approaches may omit
important unobserved variation for selection into the MTS program, which would bias the
estimates upwards. In fact, since MTS application equals selection in many years, it may be
unobserved variation specific to students’ participation that drives the results. Second, the data
set I use is rich, however, it still omits some key predictors that could explain selection into an
MTS. This includes factors like whether an individual is a first-generation college student (Ives
& Castillo-Montoya, 2020), has parents with college or teaching experience (Jacinto &
Gershenson, 2019), is oriented to teaching because of humanistic aims (Irizarry & Donaldson,
2012), and detailed student loan and financial aid information. These are viable factors that could
covary with MTS participation and degree attainment, and explain participation in a program.
This study faces additional limitations to the generalizability across settings. Since this
case study uses data from a single flagship university, it remains uncertain if the results in this
single flagship university are the same in other private or public universities in the same state,
and the results do not apply to other states with MTS programs because of historical, political,
and program-specific differences.
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Discussion
Despite the limitations, the study offers significant promise as the first quantitative
evaluation that observes MTS receipt, teacher education enrollment, and teacher education
degree attainment. These findings contribute to existing literature that suggests (a) money
matters for student’s higher education investments and (b) may be particularly important to
counter financial barriers salient to individuals of color.
This study provides additional support for the argument that money matters to human
capital investments (Dynarski, 2003). Extant literature offers several examples demonstrating
that state level financial aid for strong academic performance or families do not have the
financial means to pay for postsecondary education can result in increased degree attainment for
bachelor’s degrees (Bettinger, 2015; Castleman & Long, 2016; Dynarski, 2000; 2004; 2008).
This literature is by no means conclusive, as other studies show some programs do not generate
the positive effects desired (Cohodes & Goodman, 2014). In this specific case study, I extend
this evidence to include scholarships for aspiring teachers of color who enroll in teacher
education while in an institution of higher education.
This study also builds on a small of research studies that demonstrate that individuals of
color who enroll in teacher education do not complete degrees as frequently as white colleagues
(Redding & Baker, 2019; Rucinski & Goodman, 2019; Lindsay et al., 2017; U.S. Department of
Education, 2016). Other research demonstrates that this may occur because there are financial
preference (Baker et al., 2018; Boatman et al., 2017; Fiddiman et al., 2019), curricular and
relational (Berry et al., 2020; Sleeter, 2017), and teacher licensure test pass rate differences
(Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010; Milner et al., 2013; Nettles et al., 2011; Petacheur, 2012) within
teacher education by race and ethnicity. The evidence from this research extends and connects
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those two lines of research together and suggests that solving financial preference disparities can
contribute to reducing leaks from within the teacher pipeline for people of color.
Finally, this study builds on some evidence that shows that individuals are more averse to
entering careers in public service if they have student loans (Field, 2009; Rouse & Rothstein,
2011). This is a nascent and important area of work and my findings suggest that student loan
aversion for individuals who have already entered public service occupational training may be a
key component of decisions to complete training.
Implications
The associations in this evidence raise many questions for researchers and teacher
education program administrators to consider as they pursue solutions to support aspiring
teachers of color. I begin with some recommendations for researchers. Researchers need to work
on two specific problems that I was unable to address, selection and omitted variable bias.
This study made efforts to guard against selection bias with a propensity score matching
method. However, this technique does not make up for research that has stronger randomized or
quasi-randomized assignment, which researchers are beginning to advocate for within teacher
education programs more broadly (Hill et al., 2020). Researchers should seek to build future
collaborations with policymakers who are responsible for state policy implementation. It is here
that opportunity lies for retrospective research of quasi-randomly assigned MTS policy
evaluations, especially using difference-in-differences frameworks. This requires data that
captures before and after MTS program implementation and includes student enrollment
information. However, an additional approach to address selection into programs is to consider
how to use two additional quasi-random techniques when there are fewer awards than applicants
for the scholarship (Cellini, 2008). The first approach would be to use either an index created
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through valid analytic technique or a single variable (like test scores or GPA) to determine a cutpoint on a continuous running variable. This approach is useful regardless of the technique
chosen but may be difficult to use if the number of individuals of color and MTS awards in
higher education are small. A second approach would be to use a lottery for all applicants, which
could be as good as random assignment if there are a enough applicants who receive and do not
receive an award in any year. In sum, researchers should seek to build collaborations with
policymakers to evaluate MTS programs prospectively or retrospectively.
This study also used a small and rich set of covariates that are anticipated to relate to
selection and degree completion. While this established a potential foundation for future study,
researchers should seek to address two types of omitted variables. First, data from an entire state
would be useful since it is unclear how representative a flagship university is of the student
bodies in other state public or private institutions that educate aspiring teachers. Adding student
level enrollment data will expose cross-institution differences in take up of financial aid and
degree attainment. It also will provide novel opportunities for cross-institution collaboration as
well as description of differences in degree attainment by institution.
Second, student level data I use does not include parental socioeconomic status (e.g.,
education levels, income, occupations), individual motivation or dedication to teaching, or
financial information (e.g., student loan amount, out-of-pocket payments, other financial aid).
Yet, these are data are collected often by separate departments within institutions or agencies of
higher education. Researchers should collaborate with state policymakers and teacher education
programs to ensure that they collect this vital information. To answer these key questions, data
systems need to be improved. This will only happen if state agencies develop cross agency data
sharing about pertinent policies, such as MTS programs, and data sets include more detailed
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information about individuals who become teachers, or who enrolled but did not become
teachers. If these data limitations can be overcome, future work will have opportunities to
disentangle whether MTS programs have causal impacts within traditional teacher education
programs, the labor market, both, or neither.
Finally, the evidence here also provokes design related questions for state policymakers
and teacher education program administrators interested in starting a new program or improving
an existing one. There remain ethical, moral, and legal questions related to racial and ethnic
inclusion or exclusion (should programs target racial or ethnic groups that are growing or
shrinking or all individuals of color?). There are programmatic questions about whether an
awardee should be a resident of the state in which the university exists (can programs be a tool to
attract residents of other states to move to another place?) and whether service requirements must
be met in the state in which the award was granted (does it make sense to impose working
restrictions on racial and ethnically diverse individuals who have little control over labor market
outcomes?). There are also important questions about the types of licensed educators who should
qualify for aid since evidence shows counselors of color may support higher college enrollment
for students of color (Mulhern, 2019) and Black administrators may hire and retain more Black
teachers relative to White administrators (Bartanen & Grissom, 2019).
In conclusion, recruiting, training, hiring, and retaining quality teachers of color is critical
to supporting racially and ethnically diverse students. This study aimed to uncover evidence
about whether a student of color receiving a scholarship completed their teacher education
degree and became certified more than peers who did not receive a scholarship. When I imposed
linear and non-linear assumptions on the data to compare individuals whose demographic,
academic, and financial need characteristics were similar, individuals who received MTS awards
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were much more likely to complete a bachelor’s and master’s degree (and earn a teacher
certification) than counterparts who did not receive an award. The results suggest that MTS
programs may be a useful lever to reduce aspiring teachers of color who enroll continuing to
leave before earning a degree. Given the evidence, I call for further quantitative inquiry to
understand whether financial aid incentives also are positively related to teacher employment
outcomes.
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Appendix 2-A. Procedures for identifying “Minority Teacher Scholarship” Program States
To determine whether a state adopted an MTS program, I defined MTS programs as a
scholarship operated by a state government that explicitly required an applicant to identify as an
individual of color. To locate states that implemented MTS programs, I used the following
search strategy. First, I used prior literature by Bachler and Hill (2003) and Villegas et al. (2012)
to scan state level minority teacher recruitment or retention policies. Second, I searched Google
for “Teacher Scholarships” and “Minority Teacher Scholarships” by state. Third, I searched
Higher Education, Financial Aid, and Department of Education websites by state. Finally, I used
the National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP) to review all aid
available by state.20 Using the described procedure resulted in the identification of 11 MTS
programs.
It is notable as well that the definitions of individuals of color varied from state-to-state.
Some states defined fewer racial groups as an individual of color than other states. Seven of the
11 states included Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Native American identified peoples; one state
included Black and Hispanic identified peoples; another state included black, hispanic, and
asians from Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam; yet, other states include all racially and linguistically
diverse peoples and one state included only individuals attending two Historically Black
Colleges and Universities in the state. Despite the different definitions by state, the main goal of
each program remained the same; the programs aim to boost racial and ethnic diversity of
teacher candidates completing teacher education degrees and earning teacher certification.

20

NASSGAP information was retrieved from:
https://www.nassgapsurvey.com/survey/program_finder/program_finder.asp.
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Appendix 2-B. Common Support and Covariate Balance
I present graphical evidence of common support in Figure 2-B.1. The figure shows two
similar graphs. On the x-axis is the propensity score, which runs from 0 to 1. On the y-axis is the
kernel density, which is a smoothed area under the curve that is representative of the frequency
of observations that fall at different propensity scores. The figure on the left is the unmatched
control and treatment kernel density propensity score distributions while the figure on the right is
the matched control and treatment kernel density propensity score distributions. As can be
observed in this graph, when I implemented 1:1 nearest neighbor matching with a caliper of 0.01,
the control group propensities become more closely aligned with the treatment group. This
evidence suggests that the distribution of propensity scores, and thus the relative comparability
of the control and treatment groups, improved through propensity score matching with calipers
limiting the distance between matched pairs to 0.01.

Figure 2-B.1. Comparison of Unmatched and Matched Kernel Density Histograms

I also present numerical evidence (Table 2-B.1) that nearest neighbor matching with a
0.01 caliper improves the balance of the covariates. Table 2-B.1 includes the unmatched and
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matched mean (or proportion when the variable is dichotomous) by covariate. In the table, the
first three columns are the unmatched control and treatment measures, and a p-value of the
difference between control and treatment group covariates. The next three columns are the
matched control and treatment measure, and a p-value of the difference between control and
treatment group covariates. The final two columns represent the standardized bias between
treatment and control groups and the bias reduction in the covariate as a result of matching.
The matching algorithm resulted in reduced differences for nine of the 13 covariates used
to generate a propensity score, which is indicated by a positive bias reduction from matching in
the final column. The four covariates that increased in the bias between the control and treatment
group included age at time of admission to teacher education (centered) and standardized SAT
math score from high school as well the cohort two, and cohort three indicators. The differences
for the two continuous variables, age at time of admission and standardized SAT math score are
neither statistically significant nor practically relevant differences. The age at time of teacher
education admission after matching represents a difference of less than ¼ of a year between the
treated and control group. Moreover, the average standardized difference on the SAT math
section amounts to scoring difference of 10 points, which is not a large or policy relevant
difference between the groups. In fact, after matching the worsened covariate balance for these
two variables appear to be artifacts of the negligible differences between the non-matched treated
and control groups. As for the cohort two and three reductions, neither worsening of the
covariate balance for the two indicators indicates that the balance is statistically significant. In
fact, no covariate used in these models is statistically significant. Given this information from the
matching procedures, I conclude the propensity score matching models improved balance across
covariates.
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Table 2-B.1. Propensity Score Balancing of Covariates after matching for Estimating the Relationship Between MTS receipt
and Degree Attainment
Unmatched Group

Covariates

No treatment

Treatment

mean

mean

Demeaned Age at admission

-0.018

0.012

Male?

0.209

Shortage area?

Matched Group
p-value of
t-statistic

p-value of
t-statistic

Standardized
Percent Bias after
matching

Bias Reduction
from matching

No treatment

Treatment

mean

mean

0.758

0.114

0.024

0.387

-13.4

-198.2

0.163

0.391

0.216

0.186

0.593

-7.9

33.8

0.221

0.333

0.078~

0.351

0.299

0.446

-11.6

54.1

Need aid required?

0.337

0.390

0.437

0.34

0.392

0.459

10.7

2.8

Pre-teach major?

0.535

0.659

0.072~

0.557

0.639

0.244

16.9

33.3

Demeaned GPA before teacher
education application

-0.072

0.15

0.070~

-0.019

-0.027

0.870

-2.4

90.6

Demeaned GPA at completion of
spring semester prior to application
time for MTS program

-0.075

0.015

0.041*

-0.010

-0.014

0.936

-1.1

96

Standardized High School Verbal
SAT

0.183

-0.128

0.023*

0.064

-0.081

0.255

-15.0

53.5

Standardized High School Math SAT

0.022

-0.015

0.786

0.024

-0.063

0.516

-8.9

-132.2

Cohort 2: 2005-2006 to 2007-2008

0.174

0.195

0.707

0.196

0.247

0.390

13.2

-149.0

Cohort 3: 2008-2009 to 2010-2011

0.163

0.179

0.763

0.247

0.206

0.495

-10.9

-156.6

Cohort 4: 2011-2012 to 2013-2014

0.116

0.220

0.055~

0.216

0.196

0.724

-5.5

80.0

Cohort 5: 2014-2015 to 2016-2017

0.442

0.154

0.000***

0.134

0.155

0.685

4.7

92.8

Notes: ~p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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Chapter 3 Minority Teacher Scholarships and Employment: A Case Study of Labor
Market Outcomes from Flagship University’s Traditional Teacher Education Program
In the United States, the proportion of youths of color attending public schools has
expanded about twice as quickly as the proportion of educators of color since 1988 (U.S.
Department of Education, 2016). Many questions remain about why the teacher workforce
remains persistently white even though the population has shifted in almost every state (Lee et
al., 2017). Recently, researchers point to structural barriers that result in individuals of color
leaving teacher education prior to finishing their degree more than peers who are white (Baker et
al., 2018; Lindsay et al., 2017; Redding & Baker, 2019; U.S. Department of Education, 2016).
Subsequent evidence shows that solving this problem would likely benefit K-12 students of color
academically, socially, and emotionally (Bristol & Martin-Fernandez, 2019; Dee, 2004; 2005;
Gershenson et al., 2018; Redding, 2019). Thus, these two pieces of evidence should raise the
urgency for states to seek policies that repair leaks within the teacher pipeline.
One public policy used by 11 states is called a Minority Teacher Scholarships (MTS).1
MTS programs are a promising strategy offering incentives to individuals of color during higher
education and teaching. The MTS financial aid is intended to spur individuals into teaching by
reducing financial barriers that may interfere with completing a teacher education degree and
working as a public-school teacher. MTS programs aim to increase representation of teachers of
color in the workforce by (a) reducing the costs of undergraduate teacher education or (b)
reducing student loan sizes or loans paid while in the workforce. In economic theory, reducing
tuition costs and loan burdens could be fundamental financial support that address loan averse or
debt sensitive individuals of color (Baker, Lockard, et al., 2018; Boatman et al., 2017) who

1

See Landa (2020b) for descriptions of MTS programs by state.
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might otherwise avoid a lower paying public service occupation (Baker, Farie, et al., 2016; Field,
2009; Rouse & Rothstein, 2011).
Despite the great potential of MTS programs to alter the labor supply and employed
proportion of teachers of color, there is a limited amount of empirical research to explore them. It
is notable, however, that my recent work shows MTS awards are associated with: (a) a higher
probability of bachelor’s or master’s degrees for individuals and (b) implementing states
maintaining the proportion of Black candidates who earn bachelor’s degrees in teacher education
relative to states without MTS programs (Landa, 2020a; 2020b). These studies focus on higher
education completion and leave unanswered whether gains in degree attainment spill into the
teacher labor market.
To address this gap in knowledge, I study the employment outcomes from the same
university’s teacher education program as that used in Landa (2020a). Using correlational
research methods, I answer questions about employment and retention of graduating teacher
candidates from the same university’s teacher education program conditional on MTS receipt
status. I extend this analysis to also answer whether MTS recipients teach in schools with the
more students and colleagues of color.
I find that financial incentives for aspiring teachers of color that begin in higher education
and extend into the labor market matter. Individuals who receive MTS awards are about 30
percentage points more likely than individuals who do not receive MTS awards to complete
teacher education master’s degrees. Upon graduating, I estimate that individuals of color who
receive MTS awards are about five percentage points more likely to become employed in a
public school within two years. For those who enter teaching in a public school, the evidence
shows that MTS aid is associated with a lower probability of exit when compared to colleagues
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of color from the same program who did not receive an MTS award. Finally, MTS award
recipients sort into schools with greater proportions of Black, Latinx, and Asian students relative
to individuals of color who never received an MTS award.
The results suggest that aspiring teachers of color graduating from the same university’s
teacher education program are responsive to financial aid that reduces tuition fees and student
loan debt. Furthermore, the strong relationship between MTS receipt and employment in schools
with greater proportions of students of color offers insight that MTS recipients enter and remain
in schools with more students of color. Given the results here and in my other studies (Landa,
2020a; 2020b), policymakers should press to include financial incentives that reduce the costs of
training during teacher education preparation and rigorously evaluate the results of these efforts
across universities.
Background
Since state politicians write legislation, and state agencies create the rules that determine
who provides and where providers services are available, what preparing teachers need to
achieve to earn teacher licensure, and how practicing teachers maintain licensure once in the
workforce, they arguably play a critical role in solving inequities within the educational system.
One area that state policymakers should aim to address is underrepresentation of teachers of
color in the workforce. This has been a persistent historical and social problem. Beginning with
the Brown v Board of Education (1954) decision, Black educators were exited from classrooms
because administrators avoided allowing Black teachers to educate white students (Tillman,
2004). More recently, structural obstacles within higher education that are financial (Baker et al.,
2018), curricular and social (Berry et al., 2020), and due to testing requirements for licensure
(Goldhaber & Hansen, 2011; Nettles et al., 2012; Petacheur, 2012) likely relate to

125
underwhelming change in the representation of teachers of color in the workforce. Even if
teachers of color navigate higher education teacher education systems, they enter a labor market
where they face hiring discrimination at the local level (D’Amico et al., 2017) that could be due
to inadequately trained human resources managers (Goings et al., 2019) or human resource
managers and principals selecting candidate pools and hiring individuals based on subjective
characteristics or school-specific fit (Goings et al., 2020; Ingle et al., 2011).
Despite this persistently sticky problem, there are two reasons that adding educators of
color into classrooms should be a central goal of state-level policymakers. First, teachers are the
most important within school factor driving students’ experiences and outcomes (Chetty et al.,
2013) and the most experienced and qualified teachers may systemically sort away from schools
with the most students of color (Clotfelter et al., 2005; Goldhaber et al., 2015; Lankford et al.,
2002). Second, educators of color may be best positioned to have subjectively different
disciplinary tactics (Cheng, 2019), ideas around special or gifted education referrals (Fish, 2019;
Nicholson-Crotty et al., 2016), or less likely to assign worse grades due to implicit racial or
ethnic biases (Ouazad, 2014). Taken together, aspiring teachers of color face numerous
institutional barriers that restrict access to teaching and yet may be individuals who are essential
to improve access to quality education for all students, especially students of color.
MTS programs, the topic of this paper, are an understudied policy solution. These
programs use financial incentives that relieve tuition within higher education and relieve student
loan debt once employed as a teacher. In theory, these programs could increase the number of
teachers of color in the workforce by reducing aversion to borrowing money or an inability to
pay for higher education (Baker et al., 2018; Boatman et al., 2017). These behavioral
characteristics may prevent aspiring teachers of color from entering and completing teacher
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education degrees or becoming an employed teacher. In this section, I motivate a series of
hypotheses about how the financial incentives from MTS programs may incentivize individuals
of color to enter teaching and remain in the occupation for a long duration of time. I also discuss
mediating factors teachers of color face when seeking employment become and remain
employed. These hypotheses are summarized in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1. Hypothesis of the role of Minority Teacher Scholarships in Observed
Employment or Exit Activities from the Public Schools
Financial Incentive

Hypothesis with the application of the loan
stipend

Loan stipend offered if fulltime teaching employment in
public schools within twoyears of graduation

• Lower probability of employment for
teachers of color relative to teachers who
are white trained by the same program
• Recipients of MTS aid are no more likely
to become employed within two years of
graduation when compared to individuals of
color who received a master's degree in
teacher education from the same university's
teacher education program but no MTS
award

Loan stipend of $2,500 for
each year of teaching in a
public school in the same state
for up to four years or until
student loans are paid in full

• No difference in probability of exit by race
or ethnicity
• Recipients of MTS aid are no more likely
to exit, after becoming employed within two
years of graduation, before the fourth
consecutive year of teaching relative to
individuals of color who did not receive an
MTS award

Financial Incentive Counters:
• Conditional a undergraduate and graduate
teacher education degree, individuals of
different races or ethnicities are equally
likely to find jobs
• Increase persistence in job search for
individuals of color who may face implicit
or explicit hiring discrimination
• The draw of home for individuals who
were not residents of the state at time of
matriculation to the university
• Increase motivation to work in a public
school
• Conditional on becoming gainfully
employed, individuals of different races or
ethnicities from within the same teacher
education program have equal length stays
in the labor market
• Increases the motivation to continue
teaching through the first four years of
career
• Increases the motivation to work in
districts with more difficult working
conditions (compensating differentials)
• Reduces the draw of home for individuals
who are not residents of the state
• Increases the risk of exit after four years

Financial Aid Incentives for Teaching Service
Money matters for K-12 academic and non-academic outcomes (Jackson et al., 2016) and
in some contexts financial aid for higher education improves academic performance and degree
attainments for recipients who are compared to a well identified counterfactual (Castleman &
Long, 2017; Clayton-Scott, 2011; Dynarski, 2008). Since this core concept about money and
educational investments in students is largely accepted as truth, today nearly 41 states offer
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financial incentives to pre-service or in-service teachers (Appendix Table A.1).2 The incentives,
which are loan forgiveness programs, or scholarships, require different types of minimum criteria
to be met for individuals to apply. 3 Merit teacher scholarships award aid based on academic
credentials, usually standardized test scores and cumulative grade point average. “Grow Your
Own” teacher scholarships4 offer financial aid money to unlicensed educators and community
members to complete educator preparation and teach in the same district that nominated them to
teach. Service scholarships or loan forgiveness programs for practicing teachers reward
individuals for teaching in schools or subject areas that typically lack an adequate supply of
teachers. A last strategy, MTS programs, rewards aid to people of color who are
underrepresented in the workforce. In sum, there are several teacher incentives that aim to
influence behavior of individuals in higher education or the workforce.
There is a sparse amount of empirical study about whether the reform aims of teacher
scholarships result in the desired changes in the teacher characteristics of the workforce. Several
rigorous studies demonstrate that state level teacher scholarships or loan forgiveness programs
yield positive benefits in some contexts (Feng & Sass, 2018; Henry et al., 2012; Steele et al.,
2011). Feng and Sass (2018) use a difference-in-differences method to show that Florida’s
Critical Teacher Shortage Program loan forgiveness and one-time bonuses reduced attrition of
middle and high school math and science teachers. Steele et al. (2011) used an instrumental
variable strategy based on whether an individual was in teacher training while the California’s
Governor’s Teaching Scholarship existed to show that students with high academic performance

2

Authors calculations using annual NASSGAP financial aid survey data.
A service scholarship, or conditional scholarship, reduces tuition for recipients while in school. The scholarship
requires service after a degree is completed for a specified amount of time. Should an individual not meet the service
requirement, the scholarship is converted into a loan and the recipient must repay the total amount of the scholarship
plus interest. For an example, review the requirements for the
4
See literature from Gist et al. (2019) for descriptions of Grow Your Own programs.
3
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who received a scholarship were 30 percentage points more likely to work in schools where
students performed poorly on tests than peers who had high academic performance but no
scholarship. Finally, Henry et al. (2012) use descriptive quantitative methods to show that North
Carolina’s Teaching Fellows scored higher on the SAT, worked in schools with students who
performed better on state exams and had larger gains on test scores, and remained teaching for
longer durations than other North Carolina teachers who did not receive a teaching fellowship
scholarship. In sum, recipients of either scholarships or loan forgiveness responded to awards by
teaching more often in hard-to-staff schools or hard-to-staff subject areas and remaining a
teacher for longer durations than peers who did not receive a scholarship.
These studies leave much to learn about scholarships that are meant to spur increases in
the labor supply of teachers, especially when they are meant to address structural problems that
are social and historical. Past studies do not address whether enrollers complete programs more
when offered higher financial value scholarships. Nor do they address whether teacher
scholarships that are only for people of color work better relate to employment outcomes when
compared to teacher scholarships that are award based on academic credentials. This last point is
critical because the North Carolina Teaching Fellows implemented statutory rules calling for
20% of aid recipients to be people of color, a low bar. Henry and colleagues (2012) reported
recipients identified as people of color in 16% of sample they studied.
Differential Access to Teacher Labor Markets by Race/Ethnicity
MTS programs are one solution that may reduce the 30-percentage point gap in
bachelor’s degree completion between individuals who identify as white and those who identify
as Black or Hispanic (U.S. Department of Education, 2016). Yet, teachers of color, who
overcome financial, social, and institutional barriers to complete a teacher education degree still
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face institutional barriers in the teacher labor market that could negate higher completion rates in
higher education related to MTS programs.
Employment
Hiring is a complex process and factors that are organizational, geographic, and social in
nature frequently relate to which teachers become employed and where. Organizationally,
principals tend to operate in decentralized hiring environments and thus have independence in
hiring decisions (Liu & Johnson, 2006). Principals and human resource managers have been
found to select individuals based on subjective personal or organization characteristics (Goings
et al., 2020; Ingle et al., 2011). Socially, individuals often access existing personal or social
networks established through student-teaching or personal connections (Cannata, 2011; Jabbar et
al., 2019). Geographically, novice or first-time teacher applicants choice sets tend to include
districts local to a person’s residence (Cannata, 2010; Killeen et al., 2015) resulting in teacher’s
working near their home high school, university, or student-teacher placement site (Bastian &
Henry, 2015; Boyd et al., 2005a; Engel et al., 2014; Krieg et al., 2016; Reininger, 2012). Taken
together, hiring is a highly subjective process overseen by administrators and influenced by the
normative rules that shape how teacher supply and school demand play out in the teacher labor
market. Even individuals who receive an MTS award may find themselves unable to navigate
hiring processes that are likely to be unfavorable to them because of racial and ethnic
stratifications intersection with normative organizational, social, and geographic rules.
Teachers of color, who operate within the constraints of the labor market, face great
obstacles to employment relative to colleagues who are white at the district level. Some research
shows that within one district Black teachers were less likely to be hired than white teachers even
after controlling for characteristics that associate with quality (D’Amico et al., 2017). Other
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research using state or national data demonstrates that teachers of color are equally likely to
become employed as peers who identify as white when both hold similar teacher education
degrees (Redding & Baker, 2019; Rucinski & Goodman, 2019). These competing points may
seem contradictory on face value but are not. Taken together, they suggest that self-selection
drives individual teachers to apply to jobs that are within 40 miles of their homes (Killeen et al.,
2015) and subjective hiring processes limit the number of districts where teachers of color have a
high probability of employment. This argument is supported by descriptive research showing
that fewer than 15% of the districts across Connecticut and Pennsylvania employed over 50% of
the teachers of color (Fontana & Lapp, 2018; Landa, 2019). Given that MTS programs intend to
remedy financial problems but not address the complexities of labor markets, I test the
hypothesis that MTS awards do not associate with a difference in employment for teachers of
color trained at the same university.
Turnover
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education (1954) Black teachers were involuntarily
exited from systems because administrators refused to assign Black teachers to education white
students (Tillman, 2004). While termination on overtly racist terms is less common today,
turnover that associates with subjective and racially or ethnically biased processes (Drake et al.,
2019; Grissom & Loeb, 2017) and clustering of teachers of color into workplaces that are under
resourced or poorly managed is more common today (Achinstein et al., 2010; Baker & Cotto Jr.,
2020; Johnson et al., 2012; Kraft et al., 2016; Loeb et al., 2005).
To some extent, teachers experiences in schools are shaped by organizational processes.
There is some evidence that institutional processes, such as teacher evaluation, is biased by the
race or ethnicity of a teacher. For instance, work across Michigan and in one district show that
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the implementation of teacher evaluation results in lower ratings for teachers of color than within
school peers who are white (Drake et al., 2019; Grissom & Loeb, 2017). While this evidence is
limited, teachers of color appear to suffer from systemically low and biased evaluation ratings
relative to white peers.
Teachers’ experiences are also influenced by the people with whom they share a
workplace. Researchers frequently identify this by measuring the relationship between the racial
and ethnic characteristics of people and turnover (Clotfelter et al., 2011; Scafidi et al., 2007).
Newer work adds nuance to these findings, showing that racial or ethnic measures covary with
dysfunctional or under resourced workplaces (Baker & Cotto Jr., 2020; Johnson et al., 2012;
Kraft et al., 2016; Loeb et al., 2005;) and turnover (Simon & Johnson, 2015). Thus, depending
on where MTS recipients teach, they may face working conditions that accelerate turnover.
Of course, whether a teacher remains teaching may also align with cooperation with their
colleagues. Teachers of color have been shown to respond positively to the presence of more
colleagues of color whether they are administrators or teachers. For instance, research on
Missouri and Tennessee show that when a principal who is Black replaces a principal who is
white, Black teachers turnover 2-5 percentage points less than when a principal who is white
works with a teacher who is Black (Bartanen & Grissom, 2019). Another study from Tennessee
shows that Black teachers’ turnover less when they work with greater proportions of Black
colleagues (Ravenell et al., 2018). The number of students and educators of color in each school
are likely to be important proxies for the function of a school and capture turnover differences.
Given that MTS programs intend to remedy financial problems but do not simulatenously
address the conditions or processes within schools, I test the hypothesis that MTS awards do not
associate with a difference in retention for teachers of color. I also test whether the proportion of
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students or teachers of color in a school relates to MTS award receipt, a rough proxy for whether
MTS recipients work in schools with more students or colleagues of color than peers of color
who did not receive MTS aid.
Theoretical Framework
In this study, I adapt a Roy (1951) model of occupational choice for my study of MTS
programs. This model predicts that individuals choose their work by optimizing wages in one
chosen profession relative to those in other potential occupations. This calculation includes real
and opportunity costs such as anticipated wages and individual ability in occupation A, costs of
training and individual ability in occupation B, and expected nonpecuniary returns to ability in
occupation A or B. These theoretical models predict a perfectly rational individual would select
the occupation that maximizes individual pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits (job related
benefits, humanistic pursuits, and ability ceilings).
For students who have already enrolled to become a teacher, new information about their
future occupation can revise their cost and benefit assessments. For instance, an individual might
update their beliefs about the benefits of teaching as they search for jobs and view their publicly
available future wages, which are low relative to similarly educated peers and choose
employment in other professions if the costs then exceed the benefits (Allegretto & Mishel,
2018; Baker et al., 2016; Han, 2020). In another example, an individual might update their
beliefs about teaching if they receive a scholarship to become a teacher. These scholarships, like
MTS programs, reduce the costs of tuition, potentially reduce the loan debt acquired, and provide
an exogenous symbol that an organization within society believes that financial aid investments
are important.
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Rarely has prior research been able to separately model the relationship between award
of financial aid for individuals of color who aim to become teachers and the probability that
individuals of color become employed teachers because it is difficult to obtain data or deal with
selection bias. Yet, this type of analysis is critical to workforce representation because
individuals are generally averse to loans and individuals of color might be more loan averse
(Boatman et al., 2017) or sensitive to larger rather than smaller loans (Baker et al., 2018) than
white peers. Moreover, loan elimination has been shown to effectively increase future public
service of highly credentialed individuals suggesting that people are averse to loans if they are to
enter public service (Field, 2009; Rouse & Rothstein, 2011). Given that economic theory predicts
teachers regardless of race will be responsive to financial aid that reduces tuition owed and
student loan debt, I seek to fill a gap in knowledge about whether the incentives relate to labor
market outcomes for teachers of color.
Research Questions
In this study, I ask:
1.

2.

3.

To what extent are teacher candidates of color who earn their master’s degree (and
teacher licensure) from the same teacher education program more likely gain
employment within two years of graduating conditional on receiving MTS aid?
To what extent are teacher candidates of color who earn their master’s degree (and
teacher licensure) from the same teacher education program less likely to remain
employed over time conditional on receiving MTS aid?
Are teacher candidates of color who earn their master’s degree (and teacher licensure)
from the same teacher education program more likely to teach in schools with higher
proportions of (a) students of color or (b) colleagues of color conditional on receiving
MTS aid?
Methods

Program Description
For over 20 years, teacher candidates of color at the flagship university have held the
option of applying for an MTS award. There are two design features of an MTS program that
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incentivize individuals of color to behave differently than they otherwise might without financial
support. The first part of the scholarship is an incentive that lasts for two school years and is
worth $5,000 annually. For students to qualify for the MTS award, they must identify as person
of color (e.g., they check a box on a form that includes Asian, Black, Hispanic or Latinx, or
Native-American). Students maintain a scholarship if they continue in their second (or in some
circumstances their third) year in a teacher education program in one of about a dozen institution
sanctioned by the state. Students apply using a form that requires minimal information. The
information collected by the state’s higher education agency includes name, gender, and personal
contact information, racial and ethnic classification, cumulative grade point average and total
credits earned, major and anticipated college graduation data, high school of attendance and
graduation date, whether the individual attended a community college, and a signal of intent to
teach in the state in the form of a signature. In addition, the Dean of the School of Education
attests that the information about the student is accurate. This program feature incentivizes
individuals of color to enter a teacher education program or persist in teacher education even if
they are uncertain about seeking employment as a teacher.
The second feature of the program, and the focus of this study, that may incentivize
differentiated behavior for individuals of color is a loan stipend. From the time of graduation, a
student has two school years (in the fall) to become employed as a teacher. If a student gains
employment in a public school, maintains employment, and carries a loan balance into the
occupation, they can apply for a $2,500 loan stipend at the end of each school year of service.
Each MTS recipient is eligible to receive loan stipends for four years of service (a maximum of
$10,000) or until a recipient’s loan debt is paid in full. When a student holds loan debt and
submits the necessary paperwork, the money is paid directly to the student in check form, and
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this money is intended to reduce carried student loans. In sum, if an MTS recipient holds loans,
they have extrinsic financial incentives to become full-time public-school teachers within two
years and remain teaching for four consecutive years and their teacher candidate of color
colleagues who do not hold loans have no known similar incentives.
University Context
The flagship university that is the setting of this study has a racially and ethnically
diverse student population. For school years 2005-2006 to 2013-2014, about 64% of the students
enrolled in the university setting were white. 5 Of the remaining students, about 18% were
students of color (Asian, Hispanic, Black, or Native American or Pacific Islander). The
remaining students were either citizens of other countries (7%) or did not to reveal a race or
ethnicity (11%). Students enrolled in teacher education were not representative of the overall
student population. Over the 12 years of data, 82.9% of enrollees identified as white, 10.0%
identified as people of color, and 7% identified as an unknown race or ethnicity.
The teacher education program uses a rigorous application process. Students apply for
teacher education during the second year of undergraduate study. All applicants submit multiple
sources of information including key academic credentials (transcripts and standardized test
scores), a resume that contains evidence of time volunteering in schools, and multiple essays
discussing dedication and interest in the profession. In addition to the paper documents, all
applicants are evaluated during an in-person interview. Between 2006 and 2013, an average of
186 students applied for admission into the program, 127 were admitted, 124 enrolled in teacher
education, 119 graduated with a bachelor’s degree in teacher education, and 106 graduated with

5

I determined these calculations using the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) for the
university that is the setting of this study.
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a master’s degree in teacher education. In sum, the program studied has a rigorous application
process and more applicants than spaces.
Data Sources and Sample
I leverage two student level administrative data sets from a flagship university in an MTS
state. The first data set consists of administrative records for each enrolling teacher education
student at a flagship university. The second data set contains administrative employment records
for teacher education students at the same flagship university who work in the public schools in
the same state. To develop a single data set for study, I use a random unique identifier to build a
teacher-period employment record data set for all students of color who enrolled in the flagship
university’s teacher education program from school years 2002-2003 through 2013-2014.
I supplement the data with information from the same state’s K-12 public data system
and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Common Core of Data (CCD). I use the
two public data sources to calculate the proportion of educators or students of color by school
and I merge this information into my data set by matching the school and year.
In this teacher-employment panel of data from school years 2004-2005 through 20162017, there are 152 unique individuals of color who enrolled in teacher education and 600
teacher-years of employment records. Of the total teacher-employment years, 428 correspond
with individuals who received an MTS award and 172 with individuals without an MTS award.
Outcomes
In this study, I use two main employment outcomes: whether a student (a) became
employed in year t or year t+1 after graduation or (b) was retained as a teacher from year t to
year t+1. In addition, I construct two secondary outcomes focused on the racial and ethnic
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demographics of a school. These outcomes are: (c) the proportion of students or (d) educators of
color in school s and year t as two other outcomes.
Employment
I construct the employment outcome based on the requirement that MTS award recipients
gain full-time teaching employment within 16 months of graduation (the beginning of two school
years) to maintain eligibility for loan stipend incentives. To do this, I assign a value of 0 when an
individual either became a teacher three or more school years after a teacher education degree
was conferred or never became a teacher and 1 when an individual gained employment as
teacher within two years of having their teacher education degree conferred. For this part of the
analysis, I use the first record of employment for everyone (n=152).
Exit
I construct my exit indicator by comparing teacher i in year t to year t+k. In the data, k
represents the years since graduation. The k index ranges between 1 and 12 years of
employment. I define teacher i as a person who exited when a unique identifier disappeared from
the data between year t to t+1 and assign a value of 1 in the last employment record. If the codes
were the same from year t to t+1, I assumed a teacher remained in the same district and school
and assign a value of 0. In some circumstances, a teacher has a gap in service but re-enters the
labor market. While this is a common occurrence in the occupation (Gray & Taie, 2015; Grissom
& Reininger, 2012), I treat this analysis as a multiple-spell discrete-time survival analysis since
some individuals enter, exit, re-enter, and exit again (Willett & Singer, 1995). Thus, teacher i
could have more than one exit observed while another teacher i may never have an observed exit
from the public schools.
Educators or Students of Color

138
To calculate the proportion of educators of color in school s and year t, I divided the sum
of the number of educators who are identified as Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native-American,
Hawaiian, or two races by the sum of all educators in a school. To calculate the proportion of
students of color in any school, I divided the sum of the number of students who are identified as
Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native-American, Hawaiian, or two races by the sum of all students in a
school. Each set of proportions is merged with each employment record so that teacher i working
in school s has the correct proportions of students and teachers of color for year t. This ensures
any models account for individuals being in schools that have varying proportions of colleagues
or students of color at any given time t.
Predictors
Predictor of Interest
I construct a measure of whether a student received an MTS award during their time in
the teacher education program. This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the individual never
received an MTS award while in teacher preparation and a 1 if an individual received an MTS
award while in teacher preparation.
Covariates
I construct several independent variables to use in the statistical models. In the full
covariate employment model fit, I include measures of gender, and whether a student was: over
25, prepared to teach a shortage subject area (based on state determination and in the areas of
science or mathematics, special education, or foreign language), a pre-teaching major when
matriculating to the university, received state or federal need aid at any time, an “A” student
(e.g., graduating GPA greater than 3.3), not a resident of the state prior to matriculation at the
university, and teaching in the same district where clinical student teaching requirements were
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met. In addition, to control for the potential that there are important and unobserved year-to-year
secular trends in the labor market, I include graduation year fixed effects.
I also fit statistical models for exit. In the full covariate models, I include several teacher
level measures: gender, whether a student is over age 30 in year t of employment, prepared to
teach a shortage subject area, received state or federal need aid at any time, was not a resident of
the state prior to matriculation to the university, and teaching in the same district where clinical
student teaching requirements were met. I add school characteristics for the proportion of
educators and students of color (std.) because literature shows that teacher turnover relates to the
proportion of students of color (Loeb et al., 2005; Lankford et al., 2002) and to racial isolation
amongst teachers and administrators (Bartanen & Grissom, 2019; Ravenell et al., 2018).
Last, I fit models for the outcomes measuring the proportion of educators and students of
color. These are exploratory correlational models that I use to examine the degree to which
teachers of color respond to racial and ethnic matching with students and colleagues.
In these models, I include controls for individual characteristics that might relate to humanistic
commitments to teaching in a school with greater number of students or educators of color
including MTS status, the individual is Black or Hispanic, a declared pre-teaching major at time
of matriculation, received financial aid based on need, or worked in schools in urban, suburban,
or rural environments. Other measures that are related to individual preferences and social access
and comfort within an organization include whether a person was not a resident of the state when
the matriculated to the university or taught in the same district where clinical student teaching
requirements were met. All measures are defined in Appendix A, Table A.2.
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Empirical Strategy
This paper explores the association between receiving an MTS award and teacher
employment outcomes for graduates of a teacher education program in a state with an MTS
program. To estimate the differences in employment and retention, I rely on a strategy that
compares students of color who receive an MTS award to their counterparts within the same
teacher education program who never receive a scholarship. I cannot observe selection6 directly
in this study and thus cannot conclude that some unobserved characteristics drive participation in
an MTS program. However, since MTS programs are open awards that do not require merit
credentials to be met, this is a reasonable strategy to estimate the relationship between an award
and employment outcomes.
Employment
I fit a series of linear probability models using OLS to calculate the probability of
employment. The preferred linear probability models appear in the following form:
Yit = β1 MTSit + 𝛉𝐗 it + δt + εit

(1)

where Y represents the probability of employment within two school years of graduation for
teacher i in graduation year t. In these specifications, β1 captures the probability of employment
when receiving an MTS award, 𝛉 represents a vector of observable covariates expected to
associate with employment and treatment, 𝛅t is a graduation year fixed effect that accounts for
unobserved and time invariant factors that relate to employment from year-to-year, and εit is a
heteroscedasticity robust random disturbance term. A positive result for β1 indicates the
likelihood of employment is greater for individuals who received an MTS award. I adopt a

6

Beginning in school years 2015-2016 through 2018-2019, the state had funding decreases and responded by using
a GPA cut point to determine who received scholarships. This study does not cover this time frame.
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preferred model that is parsimonious but include evidence of the more expansive model to
compare the stability of the MTS coefficient.
Exit
To leverage data on annual observations of teacher employment, I extend the analysis by
fitting multiple-spell discrete time survival models for when a teacher of color exits the state
public schools. This model accounts for dynamic entry and exit of people over time, which is
important because right censored bias ensures that I am unable to observe exit of some
individuals and re-entry of others. These logistic models estimate the risk of exit as follows:
𝑝(𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1) = β0 (t) + β1 MTSit + β𝒊𝒕 𝐗 it + δt

(2)

where i represents the teacher enrolled in the flagship university’s teacher education program, β0
represents the risk teacher i exits from the school s in each period, t, observed in the data, β𝒊𝒕
represents a vector of individual and school level covariates, and the preferred model includes δt
to capture graduation year unobserved peer and labor demand characteristics in the model. The
coefficient of interest, β1 , measures the likelihood of exit conditional upon whether an individual
was or was not an MTS recipient. I interpret an exponentiated coefficient for β1 to explore
whether MTS receipt is associated with a reduced probability of exit from the public schools. If
β1 is less than 1, the result indicates that a student who received an MTS award has a lower
probability of exiting the public schools in the same state than a student who never received an
award conditional on the period and covariates in the model. I include models that are more and
less parsimonious to examine the stability of the MTS coefficient with additional covariates.
Students or Educators of Color
I conclude the analysis by fitting OLS regression models to calculate whether recipients
of MTS awards worked in schools with greater shares of students or licensed educators of color
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than individuals who never received an MTS award. The fully specified OLS models appear in
the following forms:
Yisut = βMTSisut + γTt + 𝛉𝐗 ist + εisut

(4)

Yisut = βMTSisut + γTt + βMTSisut x γTt + 𝛉𝐗 ist + δUu + εisut

(5)

where Y represents the generic outcome (e.g., proportion of students or licensed educators of
color) in the employing school for teacher i in school s and urban type u at time t. In equation
(5), 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑡 is the difference in the generic outcome in a school for recipients of an MTS award
pooled across all years of teaching. This information provides a conditional correlation of
whether MTS recipients work in schools with different proportions of students or educators of
color. This specification also includes 𝛉, which is a vector of observable covariates that could
relate with MTS participation and the racial and ethnic characteristics of students or licensed
educators in a school, δ are urbanicity fixed effects to account for unobserved clustering in
schools found in certain locations, and εisut is a random error term. I restrict both equation (5)
and equation (6) to period one through 10 because the last few periods have few observations.
In the specification for equation (5), I address a key concern that differences between
MTS and non-MTS groups is the mechanical result of selection into schools with differences in
the proportions of students or licensed educators of color or exit from schools with more students
of color or fewer licensed educators of color. In equation (5), the coefficient on 𝑀𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑡 is the
difference in the average proportion of students or educators of color in a school for recipients of
an MTS award in the first year of teaching. The coefficient on γ𝑡 estimates the period-to-period
proportion of students or educators of color in employing schools, and the coefficient on the
interaction term is the difference in the proportion of students or licensed educators of color for
each employing period for MTS recipients. This specification includes the same covariates, fixed
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effects, and error terms as that in equation (4). Thus, this analysis provides dynamic changes in
the proportion of students or educators of color for teacher candidates by the year of experience
(between 1 and 12) and urbanicity category conditional on MTS status.
Findings
I find that MTS loan stipends mattered for aspiring teacher candidates of color. There
was a small positive relationship between an MTS award and teaching employment within two
years of graduation relative to candidates of color who never received an MTS award. There was
also a negative relationship between receiving an MTS award and exiting teaching indicating
that MTS recipients had a lower probability of exit relative to peers who did not receive an MTS
award. Finally, I find evidence that individuals receiving an MTS award worked in schools with
significantly greater proportions of Black, Hispanic, and Asian students than individuals who did
not receive an MTS award. This significant difference begins at entry and persists through year
seven of a teachers’ career. However, I find no evidence that MTS recipients worked with
significantly different numbers of teachers of color.
Summary Statistics
The teacher pipeline for the university’s teacher education program experiences minimal
attrition from point of enrollment in teacher education to graduation. I summarize the proportion
of teacher candidates of color who enroll and complete a master’s degree, become employed, do
so within two years of graduating, remain teaching for four consecutive years, were employed as
a teacher and exited the public schools in Table 2. Overall, 87.5% teacher candidates of color
(n=152) graduated with a teacher education master’s degree. There were large disparities in who
graduated by MTS award receipt. MTS recipients completed a master’s degree 97.1% of the time
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while teacher candidates of color who did not receive a master’s degree graduated 66.7% of the
time. These stark differences raise questions about the employment outcomes for graduates.
For employment outcomes, 78.2% of teacher candidates of color (n=133) gain
employment in the public schools, 70.7% were employed within two years of graduation, and
46.6% remained for four consecutive years when they gained employment. Overall, 8.7% of all
teacher employment years for individuals of color (n=497) resulted in an exit from the public
schools. All teacher candidates worked in schools where 54% identified as students of color and
13.1% of the educators identified as people of color. This obscures differences by MTS status.
Teacher candidates of color who graduated with master’s degrees were almost precisely
as likely to be employed. In total, 78.2% MTS award recipients (n=101) and 78.1% of
individuals who did not receive an MTS award (n=33) became employed after graduating with a
teacher education master’s degree. However, MTS recipients were slightly more likely to be
employed within two years of graduating (72.3%) relative to individuals of color who did not
receive an MTS (65.6%). This gap persisted for MTS recipients, of whom 48.5% remained
teaching for four consecutive years while only 40.6% of individuals of color who did not receive
an MTS continued teaching for four consecutive years. Finally, MTS recipients taught in schools
with greater numbers of students of color (60.3%) and educators of color (14.3%) relative to
individuals of color who did not receive an MTS (37.4% and 9.9%, respectively). The small
differences suggest that teachers of color with completing degrees in the same teacher education
program have slightly better employment outcomes when they received an MTS award and
worked in schools with more students and educators of color.
Table 3 summarizes the mean and standard deviation for all predictor variables.
Recipients of MTS awards were less likely to identify as Black or Hispanic, male, be over age 25
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at time of first employment or over age 30 in any year of teaching, or be employed by schools
located suburban or rural environments than individuals who never received an MTS. Recipients
of MTS awards were more likely to have a higher grade point average at graduation, not a
resident of the state when matriculating, a recipient of financial aid for need during their
undergraduate schooling, prepared in a state-defined shortage area, declared pre-teaching as a
major when matriculating to the university, or employed in a city than individual who never
received an MTS award. Based on these gaps, I raise the questions: do the gaps in employment
and retention persist when I use the factors described above in statistical models?
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Table 3-2. Outcomes for Teacher Candidates of Color at a Flagship University in a state with an MTS Program
All Teacher Candidates of
Color
proportion/average
sd
Outcomes
Completed master's degree
Became Employed
Became Employed <=2 Years of Graduating
Remained Employed for Four Consecutive
Years in Public Schools
Teacher Employment Years Resulting in Exit
Proportion of Educators of Color in
Employing Schools
Proportion of Students of Color in Employing
Schools

Received MTS

Did Not Receive MTS

n

proportion/average

sd

n

proportion/average

sd

n

0.875
0.782
0.707

0.332
0.414
0.457

152
133
133

0.971
0.782
0.723

0.168
0.415
0.450

104
101
101

0.667
0.781
0.656

0.476
0.420
0.483

48
32
32

0.466

0.501

133

0.485

0.502

101

0.406

0.499

32

0.087

0.281

497

0.084

0.277

370

0.094

0.294

127

0.131

0.114

497

0.143

0.108

370

0.099

0.128

127

0.544

0.335

497

0.603

0.317

370

0.374

0.328

127

Table 3-3. Independent Variables for Teacher Candidates of Color at a Flagship University in a state with an MTS Program
All Teacher Candidates of
Color
proportion/average
sd
Independent Variables
Recipients of MTS awards
Identify as Black or Hispanic
Male
Over age 25 in first year of employment
Over age 30 in year of employment (pooled)
GPA at graduation
Not resident of state at time of matriculation
Student ever received Federal or State Need
Aid
Student Trained in State-Defined Shortage
Area
Student Declared Pre-Teaching at time of
Matriculation
School in Mid-Sized Urban (pooled)
School in Small Urban (pooled)
School in Suburban (pooled)
School in Rural or Town (pooled)

Received MTS

Did Not Receive MTS

n

proportion/average

sd

n

proportion/average

sd

n

0.684
0.605
0.184
0.211
0.159
3.507
0.184

0.466
0.490
0.389
0.409
0.366
0.262
0.389

152
152
152
152
497
152
152

1.000
0.587
0.183
0.115
0.142
3.524
0.192

0.000
0.495
0.388
0.321
0.350
0.267
0.396

104
104
104
104
370
104
104

0.000
0.646
0.188
0.417
0.165
3.468
0.167

0.000
0.483
0.394
0.498
0.372
0.249
0.377

48
48
48
48
127
48
48

0.349

0.478

152

0.356

0.481

104

0.333

0.476

48

0.303

0.461

152

0.327

0.471

104

0.250

0.438

48

0.625

0.486

152

0.663

0.475

104

0.542

0.504

48

0.223
0.153
0.523
0.062

0.417
0.360
0.500
0.242

497
497
497
497

0.257
0.154
0.505
0.041

0.437
0.361
0.501
0.197

370
370
370
370

0.126
0.150
0.575
0.126

0.333
0.358
0.496
0.333

127
127
127
127

147
Inferential Statistics
In the sections below I analyze whether teacher candidates of color become and remain
employed differently conditional on receiving an MTS award using OLS and multiple-spell
discrete-time survival analysis.
Employment
I find a small positive relationship between MTS aid and employment within two years of
graduation for teacher candidates of color. I present the estimates from the linear probability
models in equation (1) in Table 4. Columns one through five are estimates of the probability of
employment focused on teacher candidates of color only. I include a graduation year fixed effect
model (columns three and five) to examine the movement in the coefficients of interest since this
would suggest that unobserved variation attributable to labor market demand and personal
preferences plays into employment. In columns one through five, the MTS coefficient ranges
from shows that MTS recipients were 3.3 to 6.7 percentage points more likely to gain
employment relative to peers of color who did not receive an award. In models with covariates,
the coefficient ranges from 3.3 to 4.2. This suggests that labor market demand and personal
preferences for teacher candidates from the same university do not strongly associate with MTS
receipt. I interpret this as suggestive evidence indicating that MTS aid receipt is positively
associated with employment for teacher candidates of color from the same program.
Across the models with covariates, several proxy factors related to location, content
preparation area, and age were statistically significant and noteworthy predictors of employment
within two years of graduating with a teacher education master’s degree. Location preferences
appeared to relate to student’s employment. Teacher candidates home state related to whether
they were employed within the state quickly. Teacher candidates who were not residents when
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they matriculated to the university were between 24.3 to 31.4 percentage points less likely to
become employed within two years of graduation in the same state than teacher candidates who
were residents, a statistically significant result (columns 2-5). This also builds on existing work
that suggests that most teachers work locally (Boyd et al., 2005a; Engel et al., 2015; Reininger,
2012). In sum, these findings indicate that teacher candidate’s employment associated with
location grounded preferences.
In addition, teachers who worked in areas where demand is frequently unmet were more
likely to become gainfully employed while teacher’s graduating at older ages were less likely.
Teachers who prepared in state defined shortage27 areas were between 11.0 and 14.3 percentage
points more likely to be employed within two years of graduation than teachers working in
content areas that meet staffing needs. Teachers who were over age 25 when graduating with
their master’s degree were between 61.8 and 67.0 percentage points less likely to become
employed in the public schools within two years of graduation. This additional evidence suggests
that the demand for certain types of teachers and age relates to the probability of employment for
individuals graduating from the same university.

27

I used available public data from the state education agency and included any subject that was a shortage area for
more than one year.
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Table 3-4. Association Between MTS and Employment within 2 years of Graduation
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.067
(0.096)

0.041
(0.083)

0.033
(0.084)

0.042
(0.083)

0.040
(0.085)

0.259
(0.170)
-0.314**
(0.112)
-0.041
(0.085)
0.077
(0.083)
-0.628***
(0.132)
0.039
(0.104)

0.265
(0.170)
-0.247*
(0.105)
-0.021
(0.080)
0.071
(0.079)
-0.670***
(0.126)
0.071
(0.093)

0.240
(0.168)
-0.309**
(0.114)
-0.036
(0.083)
0.069
(0.080)
-0.618***
(0.130)

0.272
(0.162)
-0.243*
(0.104)
-0.039
(0.078)
0.081
(0.077)
-0.673***
(0.128)

0.138
(0.077)

0.110
(0.081)

0.143
(0.077)

0.110
(0.080)

Treatment
MTS recipient
Covariates
District was university student
teaching placement site
Not a resident of the state at time
of college matriculation
Ever receive federal or state need
aid
Enrolled in pre-teaching major at
time of matriculation
Over 25 age at time of first
employment
Male
Shortage areas (math, science,
special education, foreign
languages)

0.106
(0.087)
Graduation Year Fixed Effects
X
X
0.656***
0.725***
1.006***
0.708***
1.047***
Constant
(0.085)
(0.133)
(0.146)
(0.103)
(0.143)
N
133
133
133
133
133
Variance explained (r-squared)
0.004
0.262
0.408
0.260
0.400
Notes: Results from logistic models are like those represented here. Heteroscedastic robust standard errors in
parentheses. Significance indicated by:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; or *** p<0.001.
"A" student

-0.034
(0.090)

Exit
I find evidence that teacher candidates of color had a lower probability of exit if they had
received an MTS award. Furthermore, MTS award recipients exited less through the first three
years of teaching and more after the fourth year when compared to teacher candidates of color
conditioning for important covariates. Taken together, MTS awards associate with reduced
attrition over time although some MTS recipients appear to be responsive to the end of the loan
stipend feature of the program.
Discrete Time Survival Analysis Models
MTS awards were associated with reduced odds of exiting teaching in the public schools
in any given year. In Table 5, I present estimates of the logistic models in equation (2). Columns
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one through five are the odds ratios of exit from the public schools. I include a graduation year
fixed effect model (columns three, five) like the employment models above. These calculations
provide information about the direction of the relationship between the propensity to exit for
teacher candidates of color by MTS status.
The MTS coefficient consistently shows that MTS recipients are less likely to exit than
peers of color who never receive an MTS award (Table 5, columns one through five). In fact,
three of the five models are statistically significant despite the limited statistical power and the
models that use graduation year fixed effects are nearly statistically significant. Taken together,
the evidence from the discrete time survival models suggest that MTS awards relate to lower exit
amongst teachers of color overall.
Across the models with covariates, several factors associate with different probabilities of
exit. Students who declared pre-teaching as a major were less likely to exit than students who
declared another major at the time of matriculation. Students who were 30 years or older in an
employment year or male were also less likely to exit teaching in public schools than students
under 30 and female. Finally, teachers who trained in state defined shortage areas were less
likely to exit than teachers who trained in non-shortage areas. This suggests that several teacher
specific characteristics predicted the duration of teaching above and beyond the MTS.
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Table 3-5. Discrete Time Survival Analysis of the Association Between MTS and Exit
from the Profession
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.250***
(0.064)

0.482*
(0.168)

0.536 (0.235)

0.499*
(0.163)

0.550
(0.217)

2.086 (1.121)

2.074 (1.237)

1.330 (0.669)

0.773 (0.323)

1.263 (0.556)

0.839 (0.315)

0.235***
(0.080)
0.130*
(0.123)

0.221***
(0.097)
0.107*
(0.112)
0.275*
(0.165)

0.270***
(0.085)

1.030
(0.573)
1.421
(0.591)
0.278**
(0.110)

0.421*
(0.157)

0.453
(0.203)

Treatment
MTS recipient
Covariates
Not a resident at time of
college matriculation
Ever receive federal or state
need aid
Pre-teaching major at time of
matriculation
Over 30 years old
Male

0.450 (0.247)

Shortage area

0.459*
(0.176)

0.548 (0.250)

Proportion of Students of
0.729 (0.160) 0.873 (0.197)
Color in School (std)
Proportion of Licensed
1.669*
Educators of Color in School
1.574 (0.424)
(0.432)
(std)
Graduation Year Fixed Effects
X
X
N
468
468
447
468
447
Notes: std=standardized. Columns labeled one through five include all teacher-period observations for candidates
who entered the labor market and columns labeled six through ten include all teacher-period observations for
candidates of color who entered the labor market. Exponentiated coefficients are reported. Z statistics in
parentheses. Significance indicated by:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; or *** p<0.001.

Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves
To understand the timing of exit for all teacher candidates of color, I plot Kaplan-Meier
survival curves. These represent the probability of retention over a career arc and the estimates
address dynamic annual exit from the labor market while accounting for right censored bias.
Figure 1 estimates the probability of retention for employed teacher candidates of color across all
experience levels by MTS status and adjusted for the covariates in the fourth model from
equation (2) found in Table 5. I focus on the first four years of teaching in these figures since this
is when MTS loan stipends end.
Teacher candidates of color who received MTS awards exited a limited amount before
years two, three, and four. In fact, in year two 94.9%, year three 92.8%, and year four 88.7% of
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MTS recipients continued teaching in a public school. At the end of year four, however, only
78.1% of MTS recipients remained teaching, a decline of over 10% of the total remaining MTS
recipients. This suggests that several MTS recipients were responsive to the loan stipend ending
as a feature of the MTS program.
Teacher candidates of color who did not receive an MTS award exited teaching in the
public schools after year one and two only. In year two, only 82.2% of individuals who did not
receive MTS aid returned to teach. In year three, this number was 69.1%. Notably, in year four
and five, 69.1% of the individuals continued teaching indicating there was no exit during this
time. Individuals who did not receive MTS awards tended to exit from the public schools early in
their career only. Taken together, this evidence strongly suggests that several MTS recipients
responded to the loss of loan stipends.

Figure 3-1. Kaplan-Meier survival curves for exit by MTS status from the public schools from year
1 to year 12 for all master’s degree earning teacher education majors who are individuals of color
from the same university’s teacher education program
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Racial and Ethnic Match in Schools and MTS Status
I extend this analysis to search for evidence of selective sorting of teacher candidates of
color to schools with based on the racial and ethnic student and educator compositions
conditional on receiving an MTS award. Teacher candidates of color who received scholarships
were employed in schools with statistically greater proportions of Black, Hispanic, and Asian
students than teacher candidates who did not receive scholarships. When I allow models to
evolve for each year of a teacher’s career, I find evidence that teachers enter schools serving
different student populations and no evidence of extraordinary exit of MTS recipients from
schools serving great proportions of students of color. Finally, I also find that teacher candidates
of color who received MTS awards worked with more Black educators than teacher candidates
of color who never received an MTS award.
Students of Color
Teachers candidates of color who received MTS awards worked in schools with greater
proportions of students of color than teacher candidates of color who did not receive an MTS. In
Table 6, columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 are pooled estimates for the outcomes of students of color, Black,
Hispanic, and Asian students, respectively. Each estimate shows that MTS receipt is associated
with 13.9 percentage points more students of color, 9.0 percentage points more Black students,
3.1 percentage points more Hispanic students, and 1.6 percentage points more Asian students
(Table 6, Row 1). All estimates are statistically significant except the difference in the proportion
of Hispanic students in schools that employ MTS recipients. Thus, this data shows that MTS aid
correlates with the proportion of students of color.
A concern with these estimates is that pooling obscures whether the teachers who receive
MTS awards sort into schools with different proportions of students of color or exit at high rates
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from schools with the greatest proportions of students of color. Using equation (6), I find
evidence that teachers receiving MTS awards teach more students of color at the beginning of
their careers and no evidence that individuals with MTS awards exit from the same schools at
higher rates. In Table 6, columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, I show estimates of the interaction between MTS
and the year of teaching for an individual. The MTS coefficient is attenuated, which occurs
because the measure captures the difference between MTS and no MTS teachers in the first year
of teaching only. This suggests that teacher candidates of color receiving MTS awards begin
teaching in schools that are less differently than the pooled average suggests. Over the course of
the first seven years, the difference in the proportion of students of color (Table 6, column 2),
black students (column 4), and Asian students (column 8) suggests that teacher candidates who
received MTS awards work in schools with greater proportions of students of color than in year 1
and relative to colleagues without MTS awards. This specific association could occur because (a)
teacher candidates of color who received MTS awards remain in schools with great numbers of
students of color while colleagues who received no scholarships exit or transferred to schools
with less students of color or (b) teacher candidates of color who receive MTS awards transfer to
schools with more diverse students of color and peers without scholarships remain in the same
schools. Regardless of the reason, the large and significant differences persist. I conclude that
MTS recipients work in schools that educate greater proportions of students of color, especially
Black students.
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Table 3-6. OLS Regression to Estimate the Association Between Students of Color and MTS Receipt

MTS recipient
Year two of teaching
Year three of teaching
Year four of teaching
Year five of teaching
Year six of teaching
Year seven of teaching
Year eight of teaching
Year nine of teaching
Year 10 of teaching
Year two of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year three of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year four of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year five of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year six of teaching for
MTS recipients
Year seven of teaching
for MTS recipients

Students of
Color
0.139***
(0.021)

Students of
Color
0.094
(0.059)
-0.003
(0.068)
-0.059
(0.063)
-0.050
(0.064)
-0.028
(0.062)
-0.018
(0.064)
-0.007
(0.071)
0.005
(0.074)
0.015
(0.083)
0.042
(0.086)
0.036
(0.081)
0.097
(0.077)
0.084
(0.080)
0.083
(0.081)
0.089
(0.085)
0.062
(0.090)

Black
Students
0.090***
(0.017)

Black
Students
0.056
(0.040)
-0.020
(0.045)
-0.034
(0.041)
-0.040
(0.040)
-0.014
(0.047)
-0.012
(0.049)
-0.004
(0.051)
0.007
(0.052)
0.025
(0.058)
0.042
(0.086)
0.064
(0.060)
0.085
(0.058)
0.088
(0.059)
0.054
(0.067)
0.066
(0.070)
0.036
(0.070)

Hispanic
Students
0.031
(0.016)

Hispanic
Students
0.034
(0.037)
0.028
(0.044)
-0.017
(0.042)
-0.006
(0.044)
-0.013
(0.043)
-0.009
(0.045)
-0.002
(0.049)
0.005
(0.054)
-0.003
(0.065)
-0.007
(0.106)
-0.039
(0.055)
-0.001
(0.053)
-0.016
(0.055)
0.014
(0.054)
0.007
(0.055)
0.001
(0.061)

Asian
Students
0.016***
(0.004)

Asian
Students
0.000
(0.014)
-0.010
(0.014)
-0.009
(0.015)
-0.007
(0.015)
-0.006
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.015)
-0.011
(0.015)
-0.015
(0.015)
-0.017
(0.015)
-0.003
(0.015)
0.014
(0.016)
0.015
(0.017)
0.016
(0.017)
0.012
(0.017)
0.013
(0.018)
0.025
(0.018)
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Year eight of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year nine of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year 10 of teaching for
MTS recipients
Black or Hispanic
educator?
Not a resident at time
of college matriculation
Ever receive federal or
state need aid
Pre-teaching major at
time of matriculation
School located in small
urban place
School located in
suburban place
School located in rural
or town place

0.022
-0.029
0.008
0.040*
(0.090)
(0.068)
(0.064)
(0.019)
-0.018
-0.110
0.047
0.049*
(0.098)
(0.073)
(0.077)
(0.022)
-0.077
-0.111
0.031
0.007
(0.105)
(0.099)
(0.119)
(0.020)
-0.004
-0.005
0.057**
0.055**
-0.052**
-0.051**
-0.006
-0.006
(0.025)
(0.026)
(0.020)
(0.020)
(0.018)
(0.019)
(0.004)
(0.004)
-0.037
-0.037
-0.013
-0.018
0.004
0.006
-0.022***
-0.021***
(0.031)
(0.031)
(0.025)
(0.025)
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.063*
0.060*
0.086**
0.081**
0.001
0.002
-0.019***
-0.019***
(0.027)
(0.028)
(0.027)
(0.027)
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.039
0.039
-0.018
-0.019
0.049**
0.050**
0.008
0.008
(0.025)
(0.025)
(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.016)
(0.017)
(0.004)
(0.004)
-0.275***
-0.276***
-0.243***
-0.250***
-0.074*
-0.070*
0.033***
0.035***
(0.027)
(0.028)
(0.030)
(0.031)
(0.029)
(0.030)
(0.005)
(0.005)
-0.497***
-0.501***
-0.260***
-0.268***
-0.269***
-0.266***
0.031***
0.032***
(0.022)
(0.023)
(0.027)
(0.027)
(0.023)
(0.023)
(0.005)
(0.005)
-0.719***
-0.714***
-0.338***
-0.335***
-0.386***
-0.385***
0.010
0.011
(0.040)
(0.042)
(0.032)
(0.033)
(0.042)
(0.042)
(0.008)
(0.008)
0.748***
0.766***
0.316***
0.335***
0.389***
0.386***
0.023***
0.030*
Constant
(0.037)
(0.062)
(0.034)
(0.047)
(0.034)
(0.042)
(0.006)
(0.014)
N
485
485
485
485
485
485
485
485
Variance Explained
0.564
0.570
0.344
0.363
0.433
0.438
0.155
0.182
Notes: Estimates represent the outcome for the proportion of students of color in a school. Standard errors in parentheses. The comparison group
for school location are schools in mid-sized cities. Significance indicated by:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; or *** p<0.001.
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Educators of Color
Teachers candidates of color who received MTS awards worked in schools with similar
proportions of licensed educators of color than teacher candidates of color who did not. In Table
7, columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 are pooled estimates for the proportion of licensed educators of color,
Black, Hispanic, and Asian educators, respectively. Each estimate shows that MTS receipt is
associated with 1.1 percentage points more educators of color, 1.6 percentage points more Black
educators, -0.5 percentage points more Hispanic educators, and -0.1 percentage points more
Asian educators (Row 1). Only the Black educator outcome is statistically significant, and the
difference is large considering the state’s workforce has fewer than 10 percent educators of color
in total.
I advance the same model as the students of color section, equation (6) to examine the
concern that there are dynamic changes over time that obscure MTS recipients entering and
persisting teaching with more colleagues of color. These models are found in columns 2, 4, 6,
and 8. I focus on the Black educator outcome and find evidence that this difference is likely
driven by early exit amongst the teachers of color who are not MTS recipients. In Column 4,
year one and two of teaching, teachers of color receiving an MTS recipients have almost the
same number of Black colleagues as teachers of color who do not receive an MTS. Beginning in
year three, this estimate jumps to 2.4 percentage points more. This difference persists through
year six. This suggests that the statistical difference found here is an artifact of exiting by
teachers of color who did not receive MTS awards. I interpret this result is evidence that teachers
of color who received MTS persisted in schools with more Black colleagues.
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Table 3-7. OLS Regression to Estimate the Association Between Licensed Educators of Color and MTS Receipt

MTS recipient
Year two of teaching
Year three of teaching
Year four of teaching
Year five of teaching
Year six of teaching
Year seven of
teaching
Year eight of teaching
Year nine of teaching
Year 10 of teaching
Year two of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year three of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year four of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year five of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year six of teaching
for MTS recipients

Educators of
Color
0.011
(0.009)

Educators of
Color
-0.007
(0.022)
0.012
(0.029)
-0.016
(0.026)
-0.005
(0.028)
-0.010
(0.025)
-0.009
(0.027)
-0.042
(0.022)
-0.038
(0.021)
-0.030
(0.023)
-0.023
(0.023)
0.005
(0.033)
0.030
(0.032)
0.017
(0.033)
0.024
(0.031)
0.033
(0.034)

Black
Educators
0.016**
(0.005)

Black
Educators
0.009
(0.014)
0.004
(0.016)
-0.011
(0.011)
-0.008
(0.012)
-0.009
(0.012)
-0.004
(0.012)
-0.009
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.014)
-0.000
(0.016)
0.008
(0.025)
0.008
(0.021)
0.024
(0.019)
0.017
(0.019)
0.014
(0.019)
0.024
(0.021)

Hispanic
Educators
-0.005
(0.009)

Hispanic
Educators
-0.019
(0.018)
0.009
(0.026)
-0.004
(0.027)
-0.000
(0.028)
-0.010
(0.026)
-0.012
(0.027)
-0.034
(0.018)
-0.035
(0.019)
-0.034
(0.020)
-0.037
(0.028)
-0.005
(0.028)
0.007
(0.028)
0.006
(0.030)
0.018
(0.028)
0.015
(0.029)

Asian
Educators
-0.001
(0.002)

Asian
Educators
0.002
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.002
(0.005)
0.008
(0.008)
0.007
(0.005)
0.000
(0.005)
-0.000
(0.005)
0.001
(0.005)
0.007
(0.008)
0.002
(0.006)
0.001
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.009)
-0.007
(0.007)
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Year seven of
teaching for MTS
recipients
Year eight of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year nine of teaching
for MTS recipients
Year 10 of teaching
for MTS recipients
Black or Hispanic
educator?
Not a resident at time
of college
matriculation
Ever receive federal
or state need aid
Pre-teaching major at
time of matriculation
School located in
small urban place
School located in
suburban place
School located in
rural or town place

0.032
(0.030)

0.002
(0.020)

0.035
(0.022)

-0.004
(0.007)

0.002
(0.009)

0.035
(0.028)
-0.000
(0.034)
0.008
(0.033)
0.002
(0.009)

0.016*
(0.007)

-0.007
(0.019)
-0.024
(0.023)
-0.025
(0.031)
0.016*
(0.007)

0.002
(0.007)

0.042
(0.023)
0.036
(0.026)
0.047
(0.034)
0.002
(0.007)

-0.016***
(0.002)

-0.000
(0.007)
-0.010
(0.007)
-0.016
(0.009)
-0.016***
(0.002)

-0.026**
(0.008)

-0.027**
(0.008)

-0.015**
(0.006)

-0.016**
(0.006)

-0.011
(0.006)

-0.010
(0.006)

0.001
(0.002)

0.000
(0.002)

0.037***
0.036***
0.025**
0.024**
0.015
0.016*
-0.002
-0.002
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.020*
-0.020*
-0.010
-0.010
-0.003
-0.003
-0.007***
-0.007***
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.141***
-0.141***
-0.091***
-0.092***
-0.040**
-0.038**
-0.010**
-0.010**
(0.015)
(0.014)
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.003)
(0.003)
-0.183***
-0.186***
-0.099***
-0.101***
-0.070***
-0.070***
-0.015***
-0.016***
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.011)
(0.012)
(0.003)
(0.003)
-0.215***
-0.216***
-0.109***
-0.108***
-0.075***
-0.075***
-0.031***
-0.031***
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.261***
0.275***
0.112***
0.117***
0.101***
0.111***
0.046***
0.045***
Constant
(0.022)
(0.028)
(0.011)
(0.015)
(0.021)
(0.025)
(0.004)
(0.004)
N
485
485
485
485
485
485
485
485
Variance Explained
0.505
0.519
0.347
0.362
0.230
0.247
0.214
0.233
Notes: Estimates represent the outcome for the proportion of licensed educators of color in a school. Standard errors in parentheses. The
comparison group for school location are schools in mid-sized cities. Significance indicated by:* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; or *** p<0.001.
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Limitations, Discussion, and Implications
This paper presents new evidence exploring the relationship between an MTS award and
employment for teacher candidates of color in the same teacher education program. I find
suggestive evidence of a positive relationship between MTS awards and probability of
employment within two years of graduating from a master’s program and a negative relationship
between MTS awards and the probability of exit from teaching. Notably, I find evidence that
MTS recipients exited less than individuals who did not receive an MTS while loan stipends
were available (four years) and evidence of increased exit of MTS recipients in the year that loan
stipends conclude. Finally, I found a statistically significant and positive associations between
receipt of an MTS award and the proportion of people of color in the same school building for
the first seven years of employment. Teachers of color who received an MTS award gained
employment and remained in schools with more students of color relative to peers who did not
receive an MTS award. Teachers of color who received MTS awards also began and continued
working with more Black educators than teachers of color who did not. In sum, I interpret this
evidence to suggest that MTS aid relates to employment outcomes and sorting to schools serving
different amounts of students or colleagues of color.
Despite the promise of this evidence, there are limitations related to selection, right
censoring, and omitted variables bias that threaten the internal validity of the estimates. First, I
do not observe MTS selection directly and thus cannot rule out that unobserved selection criteria
into MTS. This is problematic if the unobserved selection criteria are applied systematically
within the university’s teacher education program and would result in an over-estimate of the
relationship. Second, right censoring bias is a problem because the time frame of the data ensures
that most individuals are observed for less than the entire time frame and many individuals will
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never experience the event of interest. This threatens inferences from this work because it is
possible that teachers revealed behaviors are obscured resulting in either over- or underestimates. Third, there are several omitted variables that potentially correlate with MTS awards
and the outcomes, such as other financial aid received, family income, personal motivation and
dedication to teaching, or first-generation higher education student. These variables could bias
estimation in either direction since it is feasible that they covary with treatment and outcome.
This study also has an important limitation to the generalizability across settings. Since
this case study uses data from a single flagship university, it remains uncertain if the results
would replicate in other university’s or other states that have implemented differently designed
programs or contextual features. No evidence here should be interpreted as conclusive that MTS
programs work the same way in all university’s or certification pathways. Future studies should
aim to collect all data from across a state implementing a program in order to estimate intent-totreat and treatment-on-the-treated effects of programs.
Despite the limitations, the evidence here bodes well for MTS programs as an important
public policy that states can use as part of a broader set of strategies to increase the racial and
ethnic diversity of their teacher workforce. Notably, the findings align with prior evidence
showing that (a) individuals with strong academic credentials enter teaching more frequently
when receiving scholarships (Henry et al., 2012), (b) teachers respond to service scholarships or
loan forgiveness by working in hard-to-staff schools or subjects more (Feng & Sass, 2018; Steele
et al, 2011), and (c) individuals enter public service jobs when potential student loans are
reduced (Field, 2009; Rouse & Rothstein, 2011). If the policies cause increases in representation
of teachers of color in the workforce, prior studies suggest this could lead to important benefits
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for students of color (Bristol & Martin-Fernandez, 2019; Dee, 2004; 2005; Gershenson et al.,
2018; Redding, 2019).
There is strongly suggestive evidence from this study that some teachers responded to the
incentives of this program. A small, but particularly relevant, body of work suggests that
financial aid incentives may increase sorting into public service careers when they lower tuition
because they (a) reduce or (b) eliminate potential student loans (Field, 2009; Rouse & Rothstein,
2011), thereby addressing racial or ethnic differences in aversion to loans (Boatman et al., 2017)
or sensitivity to loan sizes (Baker et al., 2018). This study, when synthesized with the evidence
from Landa (2020a), affirms that several teachers of color responded, as theory would predict, to
reductions in the costs of schooling and acquired student loans.
This information, while not conclusive, should challenge public policymakers to think
carefully about the optimal design features of teacher scholarships broadly and MTS aid
specifically. I pose two questions of import for consideration: (1) Is a program more effective
with frontloaded tuition reductions or backloaded student loan debt forgiveness? Existing
evidence suggests the former, but there is evidence that the later also works in Florida (Sass &
Feng, 2018). This is a fertile area for future experimentation to gain a deeper understanding of
how different financial aid approaches. Field (2009) offers an experimental approach to test
hypothesis that individuals who receive money upfront rather than on the backend of schooling
take up educational opportunity and public service occupations more. Researchers moving
forward on this work would be able address issues related to selection bias found in this paper
since random assignment is a possibility.
A second question worth answering is: (2) What are the costs and benefits of changing
the length of the incentive (e.g., loan stipend program) for practicing teachers? If the loan stipend
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program extends the length that a teacher of color remains, this would potentially improve
several average conditions of education. First, students of color may gain (Bristol & MartinFernandez, 2019; Dee, 2004; 2005; Gershenson et al., 2018; Redding, 2019) since teachers of
color would be better represented amongst teachers, and this change may reduce harsh
disciplinary, and biased grading or gatekeeping practices. Second, inequitable sorting of new
teachers into schools with large proportions of novice teachers may be reduced, a labor market
condition that differential affects students by race and ethnicity (Goldhaber et al., 2015;
Lankford et al., 2002). This change could yield important benefits for students of color since
returns to teacher experiences are quite large in the first few years of teaching (Atteberry et al.,
2015; Kraft & Papay, 2014). Answering this question also helps spell out the contributions of an
MTS program. If these contributions confirm my studies of a single university’s teacher
education program, they may demonstrate how spending money in this manner is a worthy
investment of taxpayer dollars.
Finally, I also found that financial aid incentives from the MTS related to recipients
working in schools with more students of color and Black colleagues. I consider this a curious
result that requires more investigation. Is this result an artifact of scholarship recipients’
differential commitments to schooling than individuals who never received scholarships? Given
the differences begin at entry as a teacher and persist over time, to some extent this result is
likely some combination of access related to social networks (Cannata, 2011; Jabbar et al.,
2019), humanistic commitments to students (Irizarry & Donaldson, 2012), and hiring processes
(Goings et al., 2019; 2020; Ingle et al., 2011). The evidence here supports the contention of some
researchers that one policy solution to inadequate labor supply across schools that are hard-tostaff would be to increase the proportion of teacher candidates of color (Achinstein et al., 2010).
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Moving forward, this work also highlights a key challenge that researchers and
policymakers need to jointly take on. Data in this area is extremely limited because higher
education and teacher employment data typically requires cross agency collaboration, which is
often dependent on the goals of individual employees within government. Researchers should
aim to collaborate with state policymakers so that each state has a comprehensive and linked
teacher education and teacher labor market database. The maintenance of a longitudinal database
would increase opportunities to externally evaluate programs like MTS or describe changes to
the workforce on the state level. It would also increase opportunities for individual teacher
education programs to evaluate their curriculums, mentorship, and clinical aspects of their work
with data sharing between state education agencies.
On this note though, the administrative data available currently may have important
information missing. In this study, I draw on a crude proxy variable (Delisle, 2017), financial
need aid awarded during college, to detect whether there are differences in employment
outcomes. However, there are several other factors that might be more productive for statistical
models. These include but are not limited to parent’s income, educational attainment levels, and
occupation if a mother is a teacher (Jacinto & Gershenson, 2019) and student loan size at time of
graduation (Baker et al., 2018). Ultimately, these more granular variables may address selection
even if it is weakly identified.
In conclusion, recruiting, training, hiring, and retaining quality teachers of color with
financial aid programs holds great potential to improve the experiences and outcomes of students
of color in American public schools. This study aimed to uncover the evidence about whether
teachers of color differed on employment outcomes conditional upon receiving an MTS. The
evidence here suggests that financial incentives relate to teacher’s entry and retention in the
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workforce. Financial incentives should be part of a broader set of policies to increase the
proportion of teachers of color in the workforce. I call for further quantitative inquiry into MTS
programs and qualitative inquiry to better understand the perceptions of which mechanisms
support them on their journey to teaching.
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Appendix A
Table A.1. State Level Financial Incentives for Pre- and In-service Teachers

State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

Illinois

Indiana
Iowa

Kansas

Program Titles

Alabama Teacher Recruitment Incentive
Scholarship;
Technology Scholarship for Alabama Teachers
Alaska Teacher Scholarship Program
Arizona Teacher Student Loan Program
(ATSLP);
Math, Science, & Special Education Teacher
Loan Forgiveness Program (MSSE)
Arkansas Geographical Critical Needs
Program;
Arkansas Minority Teacher Scholarship;
Minority Masters Fellows Program;
State Teacher Assistance Resource Program;
State Teacher Education Program;
Teacher Opportunity Program;
APLE for Credentialed Teachers (K-12);
Assumption Program of Loans for Education
(APLE);
Child Development Teacher & Supervisor
Grant Program;
State Work Study & Teacher Intern Program
None
Minority Teacher Incentive Program Grant
Christa McAuliffe Teacher Incentive Program;
Critical Need Scholarship;
Delaware Teacher Corps.

MTS
program

Teacher
Practice
Scholarship

Critical
Needs
Teacher
Scholarship

1996

2006;
2010

2005

2003

2003

1990;
2004

2003

1990

1992

Teacher
Scholarship
Program

Grow
Your
Own
Program

2009;
1994
1995
2017;
2012

1995;
2001

1998

None
Florida Fund for Minority Teachers; Chappie
James Promising Teacher Loan;
Critical Teacher Shortage Tuition
Reimbursement
Promise II Teacher
None
Grow Your Own Teacher Scholarship;
Idaho Student Education Incentive Loan
Forgiveness Contract
Golden Apple;
Illinois Future Teacher Corp Scholarship
Program;
Minority Teacher Scholarship MTI;
Teacher Shortage Scholarships;
Teacher and Child Care Provider Loan
Repayment Program
Minority Teacher Scholarship I Indiana;
Minority Teacher Stipend
Iowa Teacher Shortage Loan Forgiveness
Program;
Teach Iowa Scholar
Kansas Special Education Teacher Service
Scholarship;
Kansas Teacher Education Scholarship;
Kansas Teacher Service Scholarship

2003

2002

1991

1993

2002

2002;
2003

2005

2003

1990;
2014
2002;
2015
2007;
2007;
1991

2013
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Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Nevada
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
South Dakota

Kentucky Teacher Scholarship/Loan;
Minority Educator Recruitment and Retention
Scholarship
TOPS Teacher Scholarship Program
Educators For Maine
Distinguished Scholar Teacher Education
Award;
Maryland Teacher Scholarship
Tomorrow's Teachers Scholarship
None
Indian Teacher Education Scholarship
Graduate Teacher;
Teacher Education Scholars;
William Winter Teaching Program
Missouri Minority Teaching Scholarship;
Missouri Teacher Education
None
None

2003

1990
2003
2003
1991;
2000
2003

1992*
2003;
2014;
1990
1993

1993

None
Teaching Fellows Program
Minority Teachers Program;
Teacher Loan Repayment
NYS Masters-in-Education Teacher Incentive
Scholarship Program
None
Millennium Teacher Scholarship/Loans;
NC Teaching Fellows Program;
Physical Education-Coaching Scholarship
Loan
Prospective Teacher Scholarship Loan
Teacher Retraining Scholarship
None
Oregon Troops to Teachers
Science Teachers Education Program
Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship
South Carolina Teaching Fellows

2010
1993*

2014
2017

2006

1991;
2006;
2003
2003
2006
1993
1993
1999

None
Christa McAuliffe Scholarship;
2003;
Tennessee
Minority Teaching Fellows Program;
1991
1990
Tennessee Teaching Scholars
Texas
Texas Grow Your Own
Utah
Terrel H Bell Teaching Incentive
1997
Vermont
None
Higher Education Teacher Assistance Program;
Southside Virginia Tobacco Teacher
2004;
Virginia
Scholarship/Loan Program;
2003
Virginia Teacher Scholarship Loan Program
Washington
Future Teachers Conditional Scholarship
1990
West Virginia
Underwood Smith Teacher Scholarship
1991
Minority Teacher Loan;
Wisconsin
1990
2003
Teacher of the Visually Impaired Loan
* indicates no information available to confirm the program existence or implementation

2018

1994
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Table A.2. Definitions of Variables for Study of Employment Outcomes for MTS
recipients
Outcome Variables
Employment within
2 years of graduation
Exit from teaching
Proportion of
Licensed Educators
of Color
Proportion of
Students of Color
Treatment
MTS

Descriptions
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a teacher has an employment record in year t or
year t+1 and completed a master’s teacher education degree and a 0 if they did not
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student of color completed a master’s teacher
education degree, gained employment prior to year t+1, and had a teacher employment record in year t
and year t+1 and a 0 if they did not
A continuous variable between 0 and 1 that is calculated by dividing the number of licensed educators
of color at school s in year t by the number of licensed educators at school s in year t
A continuous variable between 0 and 1 that is calculated by dividing the number of students of color at
school s in year t by the number of students at school s in year t
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student of color receives an MTS award and a 0
if a student of color does not receive an MTS award.

Independent
Variables
Pre-teach major
Received State or
Federal Need Aid
Not a resident at time
of college
matriculation
Age 25
Age 30
Gender
Shortage
“A” Student
Proportion of
Licensed Educators
of Color (std)
Proportion of
Students of Color
(std)
Urbanicity
Graduation Year

A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student is a pre-teach education major and a 0 if
they are not.
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student received any state or federal need aid
during their time at the flagship university and a 0 if they did not.
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a teacher i was not a resident of the same state at
the time of matriculation to the university and a 0 if they were a resident.
A dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 when teacher i at school s in year t is at least 25 and a 0
if teacher i is less than 25
A dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 when teacher i at school s in year t is at least 30 and a 0
if teacher i is less than 30
A dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 if a student is male and a value of 0 if female.
A categorical variable that take a value of: 1 if a student is preparing in a shortage area (STEM, SPED,
or foreign language) and a 0 if a student is preparing in a non-shortage area (elementary, humanities,
music)
A dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 when teacher i at school s in year t graduated with a
GPA of greater than 3.3 and a 0 if teacher i had a GPA less than or equal to 3.3
A standardized continuous variable with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 that is calculated by
subtracting the proportion of licensed educators of color for all individual observations in the data
from proportion of licensed educators of color for the individual teacher at school s in year t and
dividing that by the standard deviation for all observations of licensed educators of color
A standardized continuous variable with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 that is calculated by
subtracting the proportion of students of color for all individual observations in the data from
proportion of students of color for the individual teacher at school s in year t and dividing that by the
standard deviation for all observations of students of color
This is a set of four categorical variables that takes a value of 1 if teacher i is employed in school s and
urbanicity u (e.g., mid-sized or small urban, suburban, or rural/town) and a 0 if the urbanicity does not
match teacher i employment location.
This is a set of 12 categorical variables that takes a value of 1 if it is the graduation year for the student
and a 0 if it is not.

